Reflections on Inequality, Capital and Carbon in the 21st century

Thomas Piketty

Paris School of Economics

Kapuscinski Lecture, November 25 2015

- This presentation is partly based upon ***Capital in the 21st century*** (HUP, 2014). In this book, I study the global dynamics of income and wealth distribution since 18c in 20+ countries. I use historical data collected over the past 15 years with Atkinson, Saez, Postel-Vinay, Rosenthal, Alvaredo, Zucman, and 30+ others. Aim is to put distribution back at the center of political economy
- **Today I will present a number of selected historical evolutions & attempt to draw lessons for the future.**
- **I will also present results from a new study « Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris**. Trends in the Global Inequality of Carbon Emissions (1998-2013) and Prospects for an Equitable Adaptation Fund » (joint with **Lucas Chancel**, PSE 2015)
- **Basic premise: rising inequality and global warming are two defining challenges of our time; they are closely related and need to be addressed together.**

This presentation: four points

- **1. The long-run dynamics of income inequality**.
  The end of the Kuznets curve, the end of universal laws.
  Institutions and policies matter: education, labor, tax, etc.

- **2. The return of a patrimonial (or wealth-based) society**.
  Wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in rich countries. **The metamorphosis of capital.**

- **3. The future of wealth concentration**. With high r - g during 21^{c} (r = net-of-tax rate of return, g = growth rate), then wealth inequality might rise again. Need for more transparency.

- **4. Inequality and carbon**. Rising inequality and global warming need to be adressed together. Top global emitters must compensate poor countries for negative externality.

- **1. The long-run dynamics of income inequality**.
  The end of the Kuznets curve, the end of universal laws.
  Institutions and policies matter: education, labor, tax, etc.

The World Top Incomes Database





Institute for New Economic Thinking

Center for Equitable Growth

E·S·R·C Economic & Social Research Council

Figure I.1. Income inequality in the United States, 1910-2012



The top decile share in U.S. national income dropped from 45-50% in the 1910s-1920s to less than 35% in the 1950s (this is the fall documented by Kuznets); it then rose from less than 35% in the 1970s to 45-50% in the 2000s-2010s.
Sources and series: see

Figure 1. Income inequality: Europe and the U.S., 1900-2010



The share of total income accruing to top decile income holders was higher in Europe than in the U.S. around 1900-1910; it is a lot higher in the U.S. than in Europe around 2000-2010.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c (fig.9,8)


Top 10% Income Share: Europe, U.S. and Japan, 1900-2010
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
Share of top decile in total income
U.S.
Europe
Japan
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
The top decile income share was higher in Europe than in the U.S. in 1900-1910; it is a lot higher in the U.S. in 2000-2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

- The rise in US inequality in recent decades is mostly due to rising inequality of labor income

- It is due to a mixture of reasons: changing supply and demand for skills; race between education and technology; globalization; more unequal to access to skills in the US (rising tuitions, insufficient public investment); unprecedented rise of top managerial compensation in the US (changing incentives, cuts in top income tax rates); falling minimum wage in the US

  ➔ institutions and policies matter

Figure 9.1. Minimum wage in France and the U.S., 1950-2013



Expressed in 2013 purchasing power, the hourly minimum wage rose from $3.8 to $7.3 between 1950 and 2013 in the U.S., and from €2.1 to €9.4 in France. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.


College Attendance Rates vs. Parent Income Rank in the U.S.
Percent Attending College at Ages 18-21
20
40
60
80
100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Parent Income Rank
Slope = 0.675
(0.0005)

- **2. The return of a patrimonial (or wealth-based) society**. Wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in rich countries. Intuition: in a slow-growth society, wealth accumulated in the past can naturally become very important. In the very long run, this can be relevant for the entire world. Not bad in itself, but new challenges.
  The metamorphosis of capital call for new regulations of property relations. The key role of the legal and political system. Democratizing capital: worker codetermination, patent laws, etc.

Figure I.2. The capital/income ratio in Europe, 1870-2010



Aggregate private wealth was worth about 6-7 years of national income in Europe in 1910, between 2 and 3 years in 1950, and between 4 and 6 years in 2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 3.1. Capital in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010



National capital is worth about 7 years of national income in the United Kingdom in 1700 (including 4 in agricultural land). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 3.2. Capital in France, 1700-2010



National capital is worth almost 7 years of national income in France in 1910 (including 1 invested abroad).

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 5.3. Private capital in rich countries, 1970-2010



Private capital is worth between 2 and 3.5 years of national income in rich countries in 1970, and between 4 and 7 years of national income in 2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure S5.2. Private capital in rich countries: from the Japanese to the Spanish bubble



Private capital almost reached 8 years of national income in Spain at the end of the 2000s (ie. one more year than Japan in 1990). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 5.5. Private and public capital in rich countries, 1970-2010



In Italy, private capital rose from 240% to 680% of national income between 1970 and 2010, while public capital dropped from 20% to -70%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

- **3. The future of wealth concentration**. With high r - g during 21^{c} (r = net-of-tax rate of return, g = growth rate), then wealth inequality might reach or surpass 19^{c} oligarchic levels. Need for more transparency about wealth. Need for progressive taxation of net wealth.

Table 12.1. The growth rate of top global wealth, 1987-2013

Average real growth rate per year *(after deduction of inflation)*	1987-2013
The top 1/(100 million) highest wealth holders (about 30 adults out of 3 billions in 1980s, and 45 adults out of 4,5 billions in 2010s)	6,8%
The top 1/(20 million) highest wealth holders (about 150 adults out of 3 billions in 1980s, and 225 adults out of 4,5 billions in 2010s)	6,4%
Average world wealth per adult	2,1%
Average world income per adult	1,4%
World adult population	1,9%
World GDP	3,3%

Between 1987 and 2013, the highest global wealth fractiles have grown at 6%-7% per year, vs. 2,1% for average world wealth and 1,4% for average world income. All growth rates are net of inflation (2,3% per year between 1987 and 2013). Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Table 12.2. The return on the capital endowments of U.S. universities, 1980-2010

Average real annual rate of return *(after deduction of inflation and all administrative costs and financial fees)*	Période 1980-2010
All universities (850)	8.2%
incl.: Harvard-Yale-Princeton	10.2%
incl.: Endowments higher than 1 billion $ (60)	8.8%
incl. Endowments between 500 millions and 1 billion $ (66)	7.8%
incl. Endowments between 100 and 500 million $ (226)	7.1%
dont: Endowments less than 100 million $ (498)	6.2%

Between 1980 and 2010, U.S. universities earned an average real return of 8.2% on their capital endowments, and all the more so for higher endowments. All returns reported here are net of inflation (2.4% per year between 1980 and 2010) and of all administrative costs and financial fees.

Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 14.1. Top income tax rates, 1900-2013



The top marginal tax rate of the income tax (applying to the highest incomes) in the U.S. dropped from 70% in 1980 to 28% in 1988. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

Figure 14.2. Top inheritance tax rates, 1900-2013



The top marginal tax rate of the inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) in the U.S. dropped from 70% in 1980 to 35% in 2013. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.

- **4. Inequality and carbon**. Rising inequality and global warming need to be adressed together. Top global emitters must compensate poor countries for negative externality.

- Top 1% emitters (70 million out of 7 billion) pollute as much than bottom 50% emitters (3.5 billion individuals).

  Average emissions: about 100t CO2e for top 1% emitters versus about 2t for bottom 50% (vs. 6t world average).

- Results from « Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris. Trends in the Global Inequality of Carbon Emissions (1998-2013) and Prospects for an Equitable Adaptation Fund » (joint with L. Chancel, PSE 2015)

FIGURE 1.B. DISTRIBUTION OF CURRENT PRODUCTION-BASED CO_2e EMISSIONS



TABLE 1. CURRENT PER CAPITA CO_2e EMISSIONS

	tCO_2e per person per year	Ratio to world average
World average	6.2	1
N. Americans	20	3.2
Russians / C. Asians	10	1.6
West. Europeans	9	1.5
Chinese, Middle East	8	1.3
S. Americans	5.2	0.8
S. Asians, Africans	2.4	0.4
Sustainable level	1.3	0.2

FIGURE 1.C. DISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATED PRODUCTION-BASED HISTORICAL CO_2e EMISSIONS



TABLE 3. CURRENT PER CAPITA CO_2e EMISSIONS - CONSUMPTION-BASED

	tCO_2e per person per year	% change with production	ratio to world average
World average	6.2	0	1
N. Americans	22.5	13	3.6
West. Europeans	13.1	41	2.1
Middle East	7.4	-8	1.2
Chinese	6	-25	1
Latino Americans	4.4	-15	0.7
S. Asians	2.2	-8	0.4
Africans	1.9	-21	0.3
Sustainable level	1.3	0	0.2

Source: authors' calculations based on (Peters and Andrew, 2015) and (WRI, 2015). Key: Western Europeans emit on average 13.1tCO_2e per year and per person, including consumption-based emissions. This figure is 41% higher than production base emissions and 2.1 times higher than world average. Note: data for 2013.

Distribution of current consumption-based emissions



Where are top individual emitters?

FIGURE 7. REGIONAL COMPOSITION OF TOP 10, MIDDLE 40 AND BOTTOM 50% EMITTER GROUPS



Source: authors. Key: Among the top 10% global emitters, 40% of CO_2e emissions are due to US citizens, 20% to the EU and 10% from China.

TABLE E.4. WHO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CLIMATE ADAPTATION FUNDS?

Regions	Effort sharing according to all emissions (flat carbon tax) (%)	Progressive carbon tax strategies			Effort sharing according to a global tax on air tickets (%)
		Strategy 1	Strategy 2	Strategy 3	
		Effort sharing among all emitters above world average (%)	Effort sharing among top 10% emitters (above 2.3x world average) (%)	Effort sharing among top 1% emitters (above 9.1x world average) (%)	
North America	21.2	35.7	46.2	57.3	29.1
EU	16.4	20.0	15.6	14.8	21.9
China	21.5	15.1	11.6	5.7	13.6

TABLE E.4. WHO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CLIMATE ADAPTATION FUNDS?

Regions	Effort sharing according to all emissions (flat carbon tax) (%)	Progressive carbon tax strategies			Effort sharing according to a global tax on air tickets (%)
		Strategy 1	Strategy 2	Strategy 3	
		Effort sharing among all emitters above world average (%)	Effort sharing among top 10% emitters (above 2.3x world average) (%)	Effort sharing among top 1% emitters (above 9.1x world average) (%)	
North America	21.2	35.7	46.2	57.3	29.1
EU	16.4	20.0	15.6	14.8	21.9
China	21.5	15.1	11.6	5.7	13.6
Russia/C. Asia	6.0	6.6	6.3	6.1	2.8
Middle East/N.A.	5.8	5.4	5.5	6.6	5.7
Latin America	5.9	4.3	4.1	1.9	7.0
S.S. Africa	3.1	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.1

Conclusions

- **The history of income and wealth inequality is deeply political, social and cultural; it involves beliefs systems, national identities and sharp reversals**
- In a way, both Marx and Kuznets were wrong: there are powerful forces pushing in the direction of rising or reducing inequality; which one dominates depends on the institutions and policies that different societies choose to adopt
- High r-g can push toward high wealth concentration, but many other forces are also important
- The ideal solution involves a broad combination of inclusive institutions, including progressive taxation of income, wealth and carbon; education, social & labor laws; financial transparency; economic & political democracy