Political Cleavages and Social Inequality in the Middle East: Turkey, Irak and Algeria 1990-2018

Juliet-Nil Uraz

Supervisor: Thomas Piketty

Referee: Facundo Alvaredo

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Abstract

Using four sources of opinion surveys conducted in the Middle East between 1990 and 2018, this paper documents the evolution of political cleavages in light of inequality dynamics in three country: Algeria (between 2002 and 2018), Iraq (between 2004 and 2018) and Turkey (between 1990 and 2018). Extending a comparative methodology developed for western democracies, I built homogeneous times-series on electoral behavior and created simple measures of inequality. I investigated whether one could relate the divides observed in voting patters, and especially the ethno-religious component, to social cleavages, putting into perspective survey findings with evidence gathered in social sciences. My findings suggest that similar socioeconomic determinants play a differentiated role on electoral behaviour depending on the historical and institutional context. However, the identity-based voting remains highly interconnected with social disparities and does not offer extensive explanatory power, except in the extreme case of sectarian political system, such as the one of Iraq. The growing popular discontent that took the form of massive abstention in recent elections in the Algerian and Iraqi settings further invite to pay specific attention to diverse mode of political participation going beyond the vote. **JEL codes**: N45, D31, D63, D72, O5

Keywords: Middle East and North Africa, Arab World, political economy, income inequality, electoral behavior, social cleavage, public opinion

To my parents and grandparents

Figure 0.1: An illustration of education and cultural cleavages in the Middle East
The erudite Hacivat (left) and the popular Karagöz (right) in the Ottoman shadow play

Figure 0.2: Middle East and North Africa

Source: M. Gasiorowski & S. Yom, 2018. *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Routledge

Acknowledgements

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[1]World Cups are not included.

Disclaimer

Political Science literature has been designing a consequent set of models for trying to capture the determinants of voting choice, from Michigan voting models, spatial analysis, to the the subsequent declinations of the voting choice theory. Without denying the importance and the fruitfulness of such a modelling approach, this work suggests a slightly different path, reconnecting with a more descriptive and interdisciplinary collection of information.

Why do we vote and for whom? What is the main driver of voting choice? Can we predict the ballot cast? And in particular, why did secular Turkish individuals suddenly start voting for Islamic parties? Is sectarian identity still the main driver of the Iraqi ballot? Why do Egyptians who prefer redistribution not vote left? Are Algerians getting tired of the party of the Independence? Instead of asking such puzzling interrogations that are likely to often get stuck into the "it depends" deadlock, one suggest to put survey data findings in perspective by using the existing literature from various disciplines, to multiply the angles so as to set the path for a deeper understanding.

To start this exploratory journey of political cleavages and social inequality in the Middle East, the reader will have to accept to put out of his luggage his sophisticated econometrician toolkit for a moment, without getting too disappointed by unsatisfactory correlations. Better to be honest from the start, he will most likely not find definitive answers to his questions. Instead, the author hopes that any traveller who would accept to follow her along this journey will get frustrated enough to carry on, on his own.

This work has been realized within the collective project "Political Cleavages and Inequality" carried by the World Inequality Lab, under the direction of Amory Gethin, Clara Martínnez-Toledano and Thomas Piketty. All errors are my own.

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1 Introduction

This place is different

With no clear borders nor precise definition, the Middle East constitutes an imaginary concept that resonates in the collective mind. Wrapped with an Orientalism inherited from the colonial past, it often appears as a specific and unique setting that usual analytical tools would be unable to grasp. This is especially relevant in comparative political economy in which the particular relationship between Islam, the predominant religion across the region, and politics, would require specific grids of analysis for investigating electoral dynamics in the area. The long-lasting divide between Political Islam and the so-called left secularism has been arguably shaping the understanding of Middle Eastern politics, to a quite similar extent than the left-right cleavage in European countries (Blaydes and Linzer, 2012). The persistence of authoritarian traits in most of the zone equally prevents a broad use of standard frameworks developed for Western contexts.

Yet, at the crossroads of three continents - Europe, Africa and Asia - the area is far from being an homogeneous entity. Partly united under the Ottoman rule, the zone shares some common patterns and history but encompasses tremendous diversity, as much geographically than in terms of political systems. The region extends between the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and includes the Persian Gulf monarchies as well as the republics of the Arabian Peninsula in its broader sense. In this work, I will refer to the concept of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) used by international organizations. I will depart from the World Bank definition by equally considering the OECD country that is Turkey, but not Israel (0.2).

Although covering more than 20 countries, the zone is still perceived as genuinely 'different' by outside observers. The importance of hydrocarbon-resources across the region made of the Middle East a case-study for investigating the alleged impacts of resource curse, both in economic development and political stability. In this place in turmoil, more attention has often been given to ethno-religious conflicts and foreign interventions than to inequality dynamics. The rise of an identity-based vote with the settlement of sectarian systems in Lebanon or Iraq, or the arrival in power of openly religious parties such as the AKP in Turkey or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have been exemplifying the idea of such singularity.

Facing these undeniable facts, the researcher still remains with pending questions when it comes to

MENA politics. Reducing the understanding of electoral behavior to its ethno-religious dimension seems quite unsatisfactory given the historical roots of identity conflicts. Why do they seem more salient now? How did they take on a political resonance? More importantly for our purposes, to what extent do they overlap with social disparities? All of these interrogations cut across one of my main research questions: *Is the identity-based vote associated with specific socioeconomic determinants?.*

A new role for social cleavages in the most unequal region in the world

The increase of multiparty elections in the region since the 2000s has been renewing the academic interest for the social composition of the MENA electorate. The liberalization turn of the 1980s-1990s notably signed a reinvention of the clientelist and populist features of MENA regimes. The 'rise of crony capitalism' defined new alliances between the government, the powerful security apparatus and an emerging bourgeoisie that may have replaced previous post-independence social contracts (Diwan et al., 2019). Blurred borders between private and public capital marked the institutionalization of rent-seeking behaviors in which identity lines played a new role. The transformation of the relationship between civil society and state, as well as the changes in the set of beneficiaries of distributive policies, may have equally led to a neglect of a growing part of the electorate (Blaydes, 2020).

The Arab uprisings in 2011 would have then been a partial response to the political exclusion of some social groups, especially among the new generation. The more or less unexpected results of the transition elections that followed the toppling of the regimes, in Egypt or Tunisia, also defined the political scene along new divisions with a specific role played by the middle class (Diwan, 2013). By contrast, Turkey appeared as an exception with a sudden prevalence of former cultural divides that track back to the nation-state foundation. Encompassing all the previous dividing fractures, the Ottoman / Republican cleavage would have taken over in the Turkish setting, at the expense of a more class-based party system (Bermek, 2019a).

More recently, a new wave of social unrest since 2018-19 has been attracting attention on the inability of most MENA regimes to find political solutions to rising inequalities, suggesting a new Arab Spring. Following an increase in bread prices in Sudan, protests led to the overthrow of the president Omar Al-Bashir by a military coup. The Algerians have been continuously demonstrating every Friday since February 2019. First refusing the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika for a fifth mandate, the movement did not stop with the organization of new elections in December but called for a dismantling of the political system. Egyptians and Iraqi also took the streets in fall, denunciating the worsening

of economic conditions and the pervasive corruption. Syria and Lebanon followed and in all cases, anti-government mass demonstrations were marked by demands for radical governance reforms.

This wide trust deficit thus echoes the popular pressure for fairer redistribution of national resources. The MENA region is indeed the most unequal in the world, reaching inequality levels close to those observed in Brazil or South Africa (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Between 1990 and 2016, the richest, defined as the top 10 percent, were receiving 64 percent of the total regional income, six times as much as the bottom 50 percent. During the same period, only 37 percent went to the top 10 percent in Western Europe (Blanchet et al., 2019). This extreme polarization also goes hand in hand with an increasingly squeezed size of the middle class, usually measured as the middle 40 percent of the income distribution. Contrary to Western Europe or the US in which the middle 40 and the top 10's shares are pretty much equal, the MENA middle class holds 20 to 30 percentage points less than the richest. Beyond fueling political instability, widening inequalities are likely to have shaped the evolution of the structure of political conflict.

An exploratory journey in a comparative perspective

This paper is based on the following observations. Most MENA countries hold regular elections since several decades. Despite concerns around electoral fraud and irregularities as well as more or less fierce repression of the opposition, party-system exists and elections keep playing an important role, to show approval of the regime or capture popular discontent when they are massively boycotted, as in Iraq or Algeria in 2019 (De Miguel et al., 2015). At the same time, inequalities are exploding and social unrest shapes the political agenda, denoting a severe crisis of political representation. Interestingly, recent mass protests do not display demands expressed along religious, ethnic or clear sectarian lines.

Is this revealing a redefinition of political cleavages in terms of socioeconomic determinants? Is the salient anti-elite discourse signalling a new role for class-based voting? And retrospectively, did socioeconomic determinants actually ever disappear behind the identity vote?

If one cannot know what the future will be made of, one can still look back at the past and investigate the structure of the electorate along several dimensions of inequality in a broader perspective. Relying on survey data, and following Piketty (2018), this study built systematic and homogeneous time series on electoral cleavages in the Middle East, using simple measures of inequality between 1990 and 2019. A specific focus is put on income and education but also age, gender and political participation, in

addition to regional, ethnic and religious identity. Adopting a methodology developed in a comparative framework, the main idea is to look at differences in voting behaviour between deciles of a given dimension. For instance, one will be looking at the gap between the voting choice of the top 10 percent and the remaining bottom 90 percent of the income distribution over time. If the poorest and the richest vote alike, this gap should cancel out, and adding control would allow to differentiate the additional effect of several dimensions as well as their mutual interactions.

The scope of this paper is limited by data quality and availability. Choices have been made to restrict the analysis to the cases of Algeria (between 2002 and 2019) and Iraq (between 2004 and 2019) while investigating the specific setting of Turkey (between 1990 and 2018). If Turkey, in many aspects, differs from the rest of the area, the country has historically been playing a prominent role in the region, notably by incarnating a potential leading democratic model while facing similar types of tensions and inequality levels. This paper then does not aim to draw conclusions for the region at large. Nevertheless, the author hopes that this work would encourage further research and that the sample covered will be expanded in the near future by diversifying data types and sources.

My research questions are then adapted to each country setting. All especially focus on the extent to which the cleavages in voting patterns identified relate to specific dimension of social inequality. In Turkey, the apparent salience of the religious cleavage is questioned in light of other socioeconomic determinants driving the vote for the religious incumbent. In Iraq, the prominence of the ethno-religious divide in a context of growing popular discontent that transcends sectarian boundaries invites us to look for potential signs of other cleavages going beyond the sectarian one. In Algeria, the predominance, since the country's independence, of the state-party, as well as the major political crisis happening at the time of the writing, lead to pay a special attention to a potential transformation of the regime's social base.

This thesis is structured as follows. First, I present the framework in which this work takes place and how interacting the concept of political cleavages with inequality dynamics can be informative in general, by briefly reviewing some evidence gathered in other countries with high level of inequality (Section 2). I then provide some background information on the MENA setting at large, motivating the investigation of political cleavages through the lens of party competition (Section 3). Next, I present my data sources, the process that guided the choice of my restricted sample and the challenges encountered when harmonizing survey data (Section 4). In section 5, I develop the comparative methodology frame that I applied to the MENA case and how I proceeded for identifying both political

and social cleavages. In section 6, 7 and 8, I turn to country-specific analysis that are structured in a similar way: they include a summary of recent history politics before developing the main cleavages identified. Section 9 concludes. The Appendix is equally structured on a country-case basis.

2 Inequality and political cleavages: a brief review

What is the meaning of the term "political cleavage"?

This work extensively uses the concept of social and political cleavage derived from the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However, the term is adopted in a broad and flexible sense, as a synonym of divide or fracture line. The objective is to capture a durable aspect of the political conflict along a well-defined dimension, such as income, education and so on. A cleavage is then supposed to have some time consistency and to originate in macro-historical and structural changes. In Lipset and Rokkan (1967), political cleavages succeeded nation-state building and industrial revolutions, and constituted original divides that shaped and froze the formation of party systems in Europe.

Four main cleavages were identified: the *centre-periphery* cleavage, derived from the centralization policies of the state that encompasses both territorial unity and cultural identity and divides elites between state bureaucracy and regional or cultural minorities; the *religious-secular* cleavage, related to the conflicting relationship between the state and the Church; the *land-industry* cleavage referring to the diverging economic interests of industrial and agricultural sectors which generated "peasant" parties as well as the *capital owner-worker* social cleavage echoing left-right divide in terms of economic policy preferences. One can highlight here the salient lack of any ethnic cleavage clearly identified. The ethnic component would be only partially captured by the centre-periphery cleavage in the specific case of converging ethnic and regional diversity.

Cleavages can overlap, disappear and come back over time. The approach is then necessarily relying on a cross-cleavages perspective which questions their interaction and their expression in political competition. If the concept of cleavage is especially useful in a comparative framework, it needs to be completed with more context-based approaches and does not aim at replacing those. In that respect, the in-depth qualitative tools of varying social sciences remain of great interest to support any analysis of political cleavages. Inequalities take different forms that only partially predict each other. Following Bourdieu (1979), one could schematize several forms of capital differentiating individuals endowments and likely to relate to political positioning: economic (proxied by income), cultural (captured by education), and social capital (an interaction term less likely to be measured without theoretical assumptions). All remain highly context-dependent and can encompass the ethno-religious as much as the gender dimension that the debated theoretical concept of intersectionality may help to grasp (Lutz et al., 2011). Needless to say that there is no single and simple answer as to who are

the 'privileged' or 'destitutes' in a given system, and that no single party unites them all.

What can we learn from interacting political cleavages and inequality dynamics?

The worldwide context of rising income and wealth inequalities since the 1980s invites to question what form the redistribution conflict can take and whether it has been shaping the political space over time. Do the poorer, and conversely the richer, federate their votes against each other, as would suggest a simple median-voter logic? What is the importance of the class cleavage, understood as the opposition between lower and upper/middle class voters defined along one or several dimensions? Is the voting difference between the top and the bottom of the distribution (of income, education, wealth) becoming more salient and did the relationship change over time? How does that relate with the increasing importance of identity vote observed in many countries?

Adopting a long-run approach and using post-WWII electoral surveys, Piketty (2018) found evidence of a similarly changing structure of political conflict in Western countries (namely the US, France and the UK) with the emergence of a multiple-elite party system reflecting the multidimensional aspect of inequality. While the left-wing movement has been associated with lower education and lower income in the 1950-1960s, its support gradually shifted towards the most educated in the following decades, with the high-income voters still voting preferentially more for the right but to a smaller extent than before. The globalization-delayed effect in the 2000s and the positioning with respect to migration may have realigned some party systems along a new divide between nativist (low-income / low-education) and internationalist (high-income / high-education), in the case of France and the US, or may have marked the stabilization of the multiple-elite divide for the UK. Extending the methodology to Brazil (Gethin and Morgan, 2018), India (Banerjee et al., 2019) and South Africa (Gethin, 2020) reveals various country-specific pictures in extreme inequality settings that resonates with the diversity encountered in the Middle Eastern case.

In South Africa, heightened political divide strongly relates to the racial socioeconomic inequalities inherited from the apartheid regime. However, the dominant post-apartheid party, the African National Congress, has seen the gradual reduction of its electoral base since 1994, driven by the emergence of an opposition appealing to the new Black middle class. The decline of a one-party dominance redefined sociopolitical identities, while some fragilized groups, notably the youth and the lower-educated, turned to abstention. In India, on the other hand, a strong caste-based cleavage seems

to persist in a context of escalating religious tensions. The rise of regionalist parties and the electoral success of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party since 2014 further reduced the limited role played by income or education in the determinants of voting choice, once controlling for caste affiliation. In Brazil, the Bolsonaro 2018 vote attracted business and intellectual elites even though similar 'populist' far-right movements are generally seen as mainly supported by lower-educated and poorer voters. The Brazilian specificity could result from the increasing appeal of the previous ruling party, the Worker's Party of Lula (PT), for the bottom 50 percent of earners. The polarization of the vote along the income dimension as well as diverging preferences may have resulted in the rallying of the upper-middle class to an opposition more favorable to liberal economic views.

3 MENA specificity: an overview

3.1 Politics and party systems

The Middle East region is often perceived as suffering from a deficit of party competition and a prevalence of authoritarianism. The important role of traditional solidarity groups and clientelism would have prevented the development of party systems, and means that party competition would not be reflecting political cleavages. Additionally, the ruling parties often appeared as captured by the bureaucratic and military state apparatus without a clear ideological stance. In such context, the evolution of political cleavages measured uniquely through the lens of party choice would be unlikely to be particularly affected by inequality dynamics. There are nonetheless several reasons to believe that looking at the social composition of MENA parties electorate may still be informative of the dimensions of the political conflict around redistribution. To put into perspective my country analysis, I first provide historical and background information for the region at large, motivating my approach.

Can we capture political cleavages by looking at party choice?

Following Hinnebusch (2017), one can identify four stages for tracing back party development in the Middle East. A historical overview reveals that parties have played a role as prominent in the consolidation phases of respective regimes as they have done in the transition between each stages. Going back to the end of the XIXth century, political parties first emerged in the Ottoman Empire due to modernization requests, as expressed by the Young Turks movement, or to Arab nationalist demands within the multi-ethnic empire. This marked the beginning of the *'liberal oligarchy'* stage that extended across the region until the 1950s and was marked by the domination of parties of notables that united a wealthy upper-class and lacked grassroots resonance. However, mobilizations against colonial rulers and Western countries that administrated the area after WWI, with the exception of Turkey, have sometimes been accompanied by the emergence of large-scale movements playing crucial roles in the independence process, such as the Wafd party in Egypt. Driven by a grown urban educated middle-class, political parties flourished during a limited interlude of pluralism of varying time length across the area.

The region then almost entirely turned to so-called *'populist authoritarian regimes'* that used single parties endorsed by the middle class and/or the military to carry out a "revolution from above" and

inscribe their respective country within the 'third world' camp. It is still important to bear in mind that opposition survived underground or in exile and remained organized in party structures. This is especially the case of the Islamist parties that happened to play a major role when these regimes went through profound transformations between the 1970s and the 1980s (Cammett et al., 2015).

A new period of limited pluralism attempt was launched in the late 1980s while *'post-populist authoritarian'* governments implemented neoliberal policies, transforming the existing party structure into a renewed scheme of clientelist patronage. Opposition parties on both side of the political spectrum, the Islamist and liberal / secular left movements, were gradually authorized to take part into the nascent multiparty electoral process but government-party continued to be predominant.The 2000s saw an increasing destabilization of this previous equilibrium that exploded for some part of the area with the Arab uprisings, leading major figures of the region to resign (Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt) or triggering violent civil strife as in Syria. One should highlight here that Turkey and Israel took a path contrasting with the rest of the region since the 1950s by experiencing a competitive mass-party system that consolidated until today.

The role of the Army and the Islamic (dis)advantage

One quite specific feature of the MENA landscape certainly resides in the role played by the army in defining the relationship between the state and the civil society across the region. The limited importance of political parties in the Middle East especially results from the role of the military in marginalizing or subordinating political parties, a point further detailed in the country-case section. The limits imposed on the authorized and legalized opposition, still today, highlights the importance of who is kept aside from the party system or not in a given context. Islamic and Kurdish parties were thus repeatedly banned from political competition in Turkey until 2002 while various extreme-left movements have been denied legal existence for a long time (Zürcher, 2017). The dismantling of the Baath party in Iraq in 2003 still disqualifies its former officials from standing for elections and Algeria holds a restricted list of legalized parties that have notably been updated only under popular pressure in 2012.

One can then better understand the concerns over not well capturing political cleavages by relying only on the party system structure. The lack of party consolidation, related to the delayed institutionalization of electoral competition, has notably been found to lead to little congruence between voter preferences and party programmatic positions in some MENA countries (Çarkoğlu

et al., 2018). At the same time, the fight against political Islam across the region by the populist and post-populist authoritarian regimes, as defined above, may have reinforced the mismatch between individuals' preferences and authorized parties' positions. For a long time, many scholars have argued that the importance of religious networks in the social landscape and the incarnation of the opposition in repressed Islamic movements has fostered a strong support for these groups among civil society. This would have strengthened a subsequent major political and social cleavage that could not been reflected in party choice as long as Islamist were not allowed to stand for elections. Nonetheless, the evidence gathered since the pluralism initiated by the Arab uprisings allows some insight into this question. In particular, voters supporting Islamist and secular left parties that took part in the transition elections do not seem to exhibit a strong divide in terms of economic preferences (Cavatorta and Wegner, 2018). Moreover, both sides of the opposition apparently displayed a pretty similar voter base made of more educated and wealthier voters, which questions the importance and direction of the sociopolitical cleavages previously identified.

3.2   Social inequality dynamics: preliminary observations

The peculiar interplay between voting and distributive policies in the MENA region

To a large extent, this work does actually not pay attention to voters preferences expressed beyond the party choice, neither to the congruence degree between these preferences and parties' programmatic positions. There were nonetheless numerous questions in the data sources reflecting individuals' beliefs and opinions. Two main reasons motivated this choice. First, it is difficult to gather information on political party positions and their respective program in the case of the Middle East. This point is further elaborated in section 5.3. Second, without assuming that they are the main drivers of the vote, clientelism and cronyism played an important role throughout the period of interest and directly linked votes to distributive policies. This latter point especially justifies the focus on party choices expressed by individuals for digging into the potential interactions between political cleavages and inequality dynamics.

Traditional ties, especially clientelism and tribalism, have been described as alternative mechanisms of elite-mass linkage which have a key role in the MENA area. While the size of the welfare state has dramatically shrunk over the last decades, distributive channels took different forms and extended

to resource transfers realized under patronage schemes (Blaydes, 2020). This is especially relevant in the case of clear sectarian political systems, such as in Iraq or in Lebanon. In these settings, the allocation of government goods and resources between the different ethno-religious groups is based on more or less formal agreements concluded at the government level. Moreover, the process of voter mobilization in electoral authoritarianism, through the development of patronage networks, involved electoral considerations in redistribution, as illustrated by the cases of Egypt or Jordan (Lust, 2009).

Furthermore, clientelist patronage has been renewed with the rise of crony capitalism in the region. In the 1980s-90s, the MENA area went through structural adjustments programs under the auspice of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Up to this point the countries were relying on state-led development strategies and on import-substitution industrialization. However, their increasing reliance on foreign capital and their lack of automatic stabilizers amplified the impact of the oil counter-shocks and favored deep macroeconomic imbalances. Facing recurring twin default crisis of government budget and external deficit, the countries switched to development models based on export-led growth giving a new role to the private sector. The adoption of 'Washington consensus' policies led the drivers of the growth to shift from the state-owned conglomerates to politically connected firms (Diwan et al., 2019). In fact, privatization did not necessarily increase competition. Instead, private actors inherited from state monopolies and benefited from favourable treatment that strengthen the opacity around business-government relations and fueled corruption. To that respect, the 'resource-rich labor-abundant' countries such as Iraq or Algeria, following the classification of Cammett and Diwan (2016), experienced limited structural adjustment but increased repression against the opposition and their use of patronage for allocating state resources.

Inequality dynamics and emerging cleavages

At the eve of the twenty-first century, looking at growth and poverty since 1980, one could have concluded that "the MENA [had] the lowest incidence of poverty of any region in the developing world" or even that "the Middle East region [had] become one of the most equal in terms of income distribution" (Adams Jr. and Page, 2003). While data re-estimation over the same period casts serious doubts about the second affirmation (Alvaredo et al., 2018), the factors identified back then for explaining such singularities remain of particular interest. International remittances and public employment were showed to play a major role in alleviating poverty in the region. The scarcity of available data does not allow to draw a long-term evolution of the poverty rate for the area[2]. However,

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[2]Only few data points are available for Iraq and Algeria when relying on World Bank indicators for instance.

looking at the evolution of remittances received in the case of Algeria suggests a dramatic decrease in poverty over the first decade of the 2000s (Figure 3.1) while their amounts have been showed to be tightly linked with an ethnic component (Margolis et al., 2013a).

Figure 3.1: Evolution of personal remittances received by selected MENA countries (as a percent of GDP) between 1980 and 2019

Source: World Bank, Remittances inflows database

In parallel, the collapse in oil international prices in 2014 led to a slowdown of public state hiring and to a recurring risk of not ensuring wage payments in times of crisis in countries highly dependent on hydrocarbon resources[3]. Pervasive corruption and low governance indicators[4], accompanied by the deterioration of social services and the dramatic reduction in public investment experienced since the privatization turn of the 1980s-1990s, is likely to have hurt further the poor and the peripheral regions. The size of the welfare state in the MENA area shrank enormously from its previously much higher level (Cammett and Diwan, 2016; Eibl, 2020a). The "roll-back" of the state led to the drop of state expenditures from 50-60% in the 1970s to 25-30% of GDP in the late 1990s, with similar levels nowadays despite important heterogeneity within the country.

All in all, the usual statement of declining living conditions observed in the MENA, in the absence of

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[3]Al-Omar A. and Cornish C. (2020, April 8), "Iraq warns over threat to public sector pay from oil price collapse.", *Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com

[4]See the Table A3.1 for the cases of Algeria, Turkey and Iraq.

accurate inequality data at the country level for most of the region, may denote strong inequality of opportunity in human development and in the labor market, despite an almost continuous increase in the GDP per capita until the 2010s (Assaad and Krafft, 2016) (Figure 3.2). In a context of high population growth, the youth appears to be the most vulnerable segment of the MENA population since the 2000s. While the youth bulge peaked in the early 1990s, new generations have been continuously facing extremely high unemployment rates, especially among young graduates. In the 2000s, the region exhibited both the highest youth population share and the highest youth unemployment rate in the world for over 25 years (Kabbani, 2019b). In 2019, the unemployment rate still peaked at 26.9 percent for individuals aged between 15 and 24 years old.

Figure 3.2: Evolution of GDP per capita (current US dollars) between 1980 and 2018

Source: World Bank Indicators
Note: World Bank definition of the MENA region excludes Turkey, high-income MENA countries include United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia

The MENA countries are also plagued by an important informal sector in which the youth tends to concentrate. Youth social exclusion equally triggered important migration movements, between urban and rural areas at the country level, within the region itself but also outside of it. The net migration rate has then been significantly important and negative over the last decades, (Figure 3.3). The evolution of the net migration rate also reflects the importance of the refugee crises triggered by both the Iraqi civil war in 2005-2006 and the Syrian one since 2011, especially in neighboring countries as Turkey. Last, recurring civil strife and violent conflicts are likely to have disproportionally affected women and children.

Figure 3.3: Evolution of net migration in selected MENA countries between 1982 and 2017

Source: World Bank Indicators
Note: Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates.

When studying social cleavages reflected in the voting choice, one should therefore pay a specific attention to the potential generational divide. The high abstention rate observed among the youth in some settings also invites us to consider various forms of political participation beyond voting. The important gender inequalities prevalent in the MENA region, at least in terms of participation in the labor force or financial inclusion measured by the degree of ownership, eventually suggests the need to analyse this gender dimension on its own.

4 Data

4.1 Overview of Data Sources

Working with opinion surveys or disregarding the MENA?

In the absence of exit-polls publicly available for MENA countries and at times the lack of local polling institutes, four opinion surveys asking at least one question relative to voting preferences have been used in this work:

- World Value Survey (WVS)

- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

- Arab Barometer

- Afrobarometer

Several reasons motivate this choice. First, all of these surveys are designed in a cross-country framework that pay specific attention to translation issues and framing biases that can occur with survey data. They equally involve local research institutes that are in-charge of conducting the survey, so as to better take into account any context specificity. They are deemed to be representative at the national scale and account for sample size no inferior to 1,000 observations. The Arab Barometer, in particular, has been especially designed for the MENA region (excluding Turkey) and includes a wide range of items relative to governance and political preferences.

Second, while numerous concerns are often raised with respect to using opinion surveys in authoritarian regimes, an increasing number of scholars have been arguing in favor of not discarding the Middle East and the Arab World in survey research (Tessler, 2020; Cavatorta, 2020). It goes without saying that political instability or fear of repercussions in context of violent civil strives could lead respondents to falsify their replies, especially with respect to voting preferences. However, there is growing evidence that data quality in the MENA context might not be so different from other regions in the world. Benstead (2018) notably found systematic schemes in the missing data distribution over all regions and political regimes, without identifying a MENA specificity.

Finally, one can only hope that acknowledging the limitations of such data by extensively using them could further spur data-collection process in a region severely affected by lack of data transparency.

A recent World Bank report distinctly estimated that declining data transparency in the region had a concrete economic impact and might have triggered a loss of income per capita between 7 and 14 percent from 2005 to 2018 (tra, 2020). One could similarly argue that the lack of survey collection or not using those can only reinforce the exceptionalism bias that the MENA area already suffers from.

On the other hand, another approach would be to use official electoral results by the smallest sample unit available and to match them with socioeconomic local information collected through contemporaneous census, for instance. However, election results at district level (or any other type of administrative electoral entity for which results are officially aggregated) are not easy to collect. They are not compulsorily made public across countries, even less in time-series format. Data scraping relying on newspapers require access to digitalized records and corresponding language knowledge. Moreover, borders and definitions of administrative entities are likely to have evolved over time, which would require a considerable amount of harmonization work for creating time-consistent geographical identifiers. Additionally, microdata and census have not always been conducted, either made public, as in the Iraqi case discussed in section 4.2. To that respect, it is worth mentioning the impressive efforts of the Tafra Institute for creating and making publicly available time-consistent data series in the case of Morocco.

Choice of the sample of interest

As the first step, the survey data mentioned above has been systematically collected for all MENA countries and a mapping has been realized of the share of missing items for the voting question per each country and survey. This overview is aimed at picking the countries that could be investigated by looking at party choice, the latter being considered as a legitimate proxy for capturing some dimension of the political conflict. I therefore initially reported as missing all responses as "None", "Blank", "Undecided", "Abstention" or "Boycott". The results of this investigation as well as the electoral calendar over the same period are provided for each MENA country identified in the Appendix A2.

Additional features of the survey have also been taken into consideration in the choice of the final sample. Lebanon has been discarded in the absence of good quality variable about the ethno-religious affiliation, which thereby prevents a meaningful understanding of political cleavages in a sectarian political system. The high political fragmentation denoted by the numerous potential replies to the party choice question has similarly led to not the decision of excluding Egypt. More details are provided in Appendix about the Egyptian case A4.1. Yemen and Palestine have been put aside because

of the absence of recent general elections to which one could compare the distribution of respondents within the party system. Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Morocco and Iran either displayed a very high share of missing values, considerably shrinking the sample size and not allowing for any statistical power, or did not display more than two data points, limiting the scope of a time-comparative perspective. Lastly, Tunisia could have been investigated within our methodological framework, especially given the democratization pattern that the country displayed after the Arab Spring, contrary to Egypt for instance. Nonetheless, partly due to the dearth of time, I decided not to approach the Tunisian case as the time span covered was more limited, when compared to Algeria or Iraq.

At the end, Turkish data, beyond their specific analytical interest for this study, covered an important time frame and displayed comparatively better quality of the party choice variable in terms of missing items (inferior to around 35% except in 2001). Data from Algeria and Iraq allows to trace back to the early 2000s and shed light on the political systems that seem to be living their own staggered Arab Springs since 2019. Summary table 4.1 displays the data sources and electoral calendar for the three countries selected.

Limits and no response

There are clear limitations in using such data. With the exception of the CSES, the data/surveys have not been designed to capture electoral behaviour. In particular, the surveys may have been conducted outside the timing of an electoral campaign.This point is especially important if one want to consider the results as representative of national elections. The time lag between the when the elections and surveys are held, may be reflected in the expression of preferences for a party or a candidate that actually did not take part in the electoral process. The replies also usually do not reflect the coalition agreements that are sometimes concluded or defeated in a very short time span. Moreover, the especially important share of missing values for the party choice question is likely to bias any estimator computed from a truncated version of the sample as missing items (denoting a potential refusal to reply) are highly unlikely to be randomly distributed in the population.

Table 4.1: Sample of MENA countries selected (data sources and electoral calendar)

Algeria		Turkey		Iraq	
Legislative election	Source	Legislative election	Source	Legislative election	Source
2002	WVS, 2002	1991	WVS, 1990	2005 (Jan)	WVS, 2004
2012	Arab Barometer, 2013	1995	WVS, 1996	2005 (Dec)	WVS, 2006
2014 (presidential election)	WVS, 2014	2002	WVS, 2001	2010	Arab Barometer, 2011
2017	Afrobarometers, 2015	2007	WVS, 2007	2014	WVS, 2013
2019 (presidential election)	Arab Barometer, 2019	2011	CSES, 2011	2018	Arab Barometer, 2019
		2015	CSES, 2015		
		2018 (presidential election)	CSES, 2018		

To that respect, I do not distinguish between respondents replying either abstention or boycott, but instead I used that information for completing the turnout question for whenever the latter was also missing. I equally paid specific attention to socioeconomic characteristics of non-voters. I isolated, whenever available, the "none" response which appears to be especially of interest in the Arab Barometer survey given the specific phrasing of the party choice question 4.2. I specifically investigated this item for 2019 but considered "none" as a missing value in the general case. The structure of the no response item for Algeria is displayed in Table A1.6. Lastly, the response "other" has been kept as a distinct response in the list of potential items for the party choice.

To sum up, the specific framework of this study led me to voluntarily disregard observations of individuals that did not identify to an existing party or that refused to reply to the question. This point is eminently arguable and a specific analysis of missing values would be particularly interesting but goes beyond the scope of this paper. For identifying political cleavages, I choose to only look at the distribution of individual characteristics over the space of political competition captured by the existing party system. Therefore, I do not aim to reflect on voters' beliefs or on how congruent these can be with the parties' ideological stance.

Table 4.2: Party choice variable across surveys

World Value Survey (e179)		Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	
Which party would you vote for: first choice		Current Lower House election - Vote choice Party List (E3013_H_L) Current Presidential elections- Vote choice second round (E3013_R_)	
Arab Barometer (q503)		**Afrobarometer (q99)**	
Wave 2/3/4	Which of the existing parties is closest to representing your political, social and economic aspirations?	Wave 5/6	If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?
Wave 5	Which party if any do you feel closest to?		

4.2   Harmonization in Practice: Challenges and decisions steps

An important part of this work consisted in harmonizing survey data across time periods and sources. Presently, only the World Value Survey has made available a time-series version of its different waves. There is no do-file provided by the Arab Barometer, the Afrobarometer or the CSES in order to merge the several rounds of their respective surveys. Each round contains different set of questions with wording and/or categorization which may have been equally reviewed over time. Unfortunately, the various harmonization projects that have been recently launched by various collective of researchers

are either limited to a subset of categories that usually do not include the party choice or have not been made publicly available so far[5]. To my knowledge, there exists no formal guidance or handbooks covering all of the various issues that one can encounter while harmonizing these widely used datasets, thus, providing the researcher with considerable leeway and flexibility. In the following section, I review some of the harmonization choices that I had to make, exemplifying the challenges encountered by detailing the case of education. In order to keep this research paper brief and succinct, I do not list out all the problems that arose during the process but additional information and detailed codebooks can be provided upon request.

The Case of Education

The lack of consistency of the education variable across time periods and surveys has been well documented in public opinion research (Ortmanns and Schneider, 2016). Despite the adoption of the the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), a UNESCO coding framework by most surveys, education remains an item which is challenging to measure, both in a coherent and a comparable way. Education has nonetheless been at the core of public opinion research as it is deemed to be capturing social stratification in a multidimensional way in the absence of such-designed composite indicator. In this work, I paid specific attention to education given the recent evolution of human capital inequality in the MENA region.

The reader can find in Appendix A1.1 a summary table displaying the education categories for each of my data sources. Following the ISCED 2011 categorization in eight items (for Statistics, 2012), I built a relational table aiming at documenting my harmonization choices. My objective was to end with an ordinal variable divided in 3 categories: "Low", "Mid" and "High". Nevertheless, I had to make some ad-hoc deviations from these initial harmonization rules so as to ensure consistency of the variable over time and across data sources. The main reasoning guiding my choices was the following trade-off: minimizing *ad-hoc* changes and maximizing distribution coherence. In other words, I paid special attention in case there were some jumps in the distribution of the variable over time, once having accounted for the weighting scheme of the sample. I also kept the ordering of the detailed categories unchanged. That is, if a sub-item was moved between "Low", "Middle" or "High" compare to the initial harmonization rules, I made sure to not transfer observations initially falling into the "Low" category to the "High" one, and vice-versa.

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[5]See for instance, the ONBound project "Old and New boundaries: National Identities and Religion" initially supposed to run until June 2020 https://www.onbound.international/ or the promising ongoing POLINQ project "Political Voice and Economic Inequality across Nations and Time"

For example I considered the 3rd WVS item "incomplete secondary school: technical / vocational type" as part of the "Low" category instead of the "Mid" one in the case of Iraq but for Iraq only. Not doing so would have significantly inflated the "Mid" category with respect to what was suggested by the country-specific documentation. Moreover, accounting for the sample weighting scheme did not correct for such "inflation". The choices made are documented for each country in the table's column identified by the 2-digit country code. The analysis has been also performed without such changes but the results do not appear to be sensitive to my choices.

Different sources of information have been consulted to guide the decision process but regretfully, user-friendly documentation continues to be missing for most non-OECD countries [6]. For example, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics has been building some interactive country-profile tools displaying the education system characteristics with the compulsory schooling age and providing few statistics on the school-age population distribution by education level[7]. However, information on the evolution of the education system over time or any details beyond a screenshot of the situation at a particular time are mostly missing, thereby, preventing meaningful time comparison. Similarly, the World Bank "Country at a Glance" section relative to education statistics remains relatively scarce [8]. One can refer the reader to the World Education News and Reviews, a not-for-profit organization, which offers well-detailed country-profiles for additional details [9]. On the other hand, national statistics websites are not always easy to navigate through for non-native speakers and/or do not make publicly available time-series data. For the Iraqi case, the oldest dataset for Education Statistics dated from 2015 and focused on enrolment rates only [10].

This being said, any choice remains questionable and subject to the set of assumptions that the harmonizer had in mind. It might also not be relevant to take for granted that the sample of a given survey was deemed to be representative of the population along the education dimension. One can only regret the scarcity and unequal quality of the methodological documentation accompanying survey data. Weighting processes do aim at adjusting sample data to ensure a better representativity of the characteristics of the population from which the sample is drawn. However, in all these surveys the weighting rules were let to the discretion of each participant country and may therefore have

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[6]Turkey and Israel are the only MENA members of the OECD, since 1961 and 2010 respectively. For OECD countries and few non-OECD countries, the OECD has made available online a set of annually updated indicators, the "Education at a Glance" report. See https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile

[7]For the Iraqi case, see http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/iq

[8]See https://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/country/iraq

[9]https://wenr.wes.org/2017/10/education-in-iraq

[10]http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/2015-11-23-08-09-54

been based on different dimensions, depending on which ones were considered important by the country-specific survey team.

Besides, in the absence of accurate education statistics in some specific settings, one can doubt that the education dimension has been playing a significant role in the weighing scheme decisions of the teams in charge[11]. One would indeed need to rely on an official distribution of education attainment, as provided by a census for instance, so that to know the "targeted distribution" that the actual sample would have to reflect. If such information is not available, the education dimension cannot be taken into consideration in any weighting computation. For Algeria in 2002 for example, the weighting was done only along the gender and the age dimension following the 1998 census while education was let aside as "census [gave] school enrolments but not aggregate educational levels"[12]. In the case of Iraq, the political tensions about the conduction of any census, which would especially help to update the demographic figures upon which the power-sharing agreement at the government level is based, has led any census planned to be indefinitely postponed. The last full census dates back to 1987, ahead of the 2nd Gulf War while more than 4 millions of internally displaced persons have been accounted since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime (Vishwanath et al., 2017).

Additional Challenges: Religiosity, the rural/urban dummy and the regional location

With respect to religiosity, two main variables have been identified as potential candidates for harmonization purposes, one relative to service attendance or pray frequency that would allow to capture the intensity of religious practices and another one relative to the self-description as religious or non religious. The wording and distribution of these variables appear to be highly different across time and survey sources. I still tried to come up with some harmonization propositions, details of which can be found in the Tables displayed in Appendix A1. It is also worth noting that these variables are impartially correlated and deserve to be analyzed on their own as they capture vastly different aspects of religiosity.

The rural/urban variable which is not always available is pretty unsatisfactory, as no formal definition of these two concepts is provided in survey documentations. In the World Value Survey, the variable is coded into brackets providing information about the size of the town defined as the number of its inhabitants. In the absence of more detailed information about the exact location and the meaning of

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[11]The details of the weighing decisions are unfortunately not always made available in the metadata documentation.
[12]WV4 Methodology Questionnaire Algeria 2002, page 14. Retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

rural/urban in each survey, harmonization has been deemed impossible. This is especially unfortunate as most sampling are said to be representative of rural and urban units, without divulging into further details. Sadly, standardized frameworks as the one developed by the project Africapolis for the African continent[13] have not been yet developed for survey data with cross-country ambition.

The number of provinces surveyed equally varies across sources and over time for each country. In particular, the South of Algeria and the North-West of Iraq appear to be especially undersampled due to respectively their lower weight in the country demographic or the insecurity of the region (related to the presence of Daesh in the governorates of Anbar in Iraq in 2014 for instance). Grouping of regions has been done to limit the loss of information due to the merging of different datasets. I tried to fit with administrative boundaries and/or reflect well-known regional and ethnic disparities. My data still does not always allow to capture regional disparities identified by the literature, additional sources have then been mobilized for generating informational maps.

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[13]See https://africapolis.org/

5 Methodology

In terms of research design, this study extensively relies on the methodological framework developed by Piketty (2018) and extended by Gethin (2018). Below, I briefly develop the main reasoning of this paper and refer the reader to the above mentioned papers for further details.

5.1 Identifying social cleavages

The main point of this work is to follow over time the electoral behaviour of several groups of individuals identified along a dimension that captures some aspect of inequality. For instance, for whom did the lower educated vote throughout the period? The scope and nature of the social cleavages that such an approach could reveal is limited by the set of variables selected by the researcher. This study then does not pretend to cover all the potential cleavages or to capture the most meaningful ones, neither from an historical perspective, nor from the individual's beliefs that are shaping one's voting decision.

Instead, depending on the subset of harmonized variables at my disposal, I paid particular attention to discrete variables that have the potential for a comparative approach and are likely to capture well-defined dimensions of inequality, namely the main socioeconomic determinants, such as *income*, *age*, *gender* or *education* but also measures of *political participation* in a broader sense (turnout, political activism, involvement in civil society through active memberships in civil organizations like labor unions or charity). In addition, I also considered several aspects that are known to drive identity-vote such as *geographical location*, *religion*, *language*, measures of *religiosity* or *ethnic origin*, whenever these were available. I discarded occupation mainly for the difficulty faced in the harmonization process, including between sources covering the same country.

My objective is also to compare groups of individuals in terms of their party choice along a given dimension. Therefore, I focus on the voting gap between different categories of a given variable, such as low vs high education, youth vs old, women vs men. In other words, I wish to know how important is the difference between the share of lower educated / young / male voters endorsing a given party A compared to the share of higher educated / old / female individuals voting for the same party.

Let's consider a binary variable x that equals to 1 if an individual belongs to a given category (e.g. the youth) and 0 otherwise. Let's equally denote y a dependent variable that takes 1 if an individual voted

for the party or the coalition A (e.g. the Islamic parties and the AKP in Turkey) and 0 otherwise. The simple mean difference β is a direct measure of the potential cleavage associated with x and can be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.

$$\beta = E(y|x=1) - E(y|x=0) = P(y|x=1) - P(y|x=0)$$

$$\text{with } P(y=A) = \beta_0 + \beta X + \epsilon$$

In such a linear probability model, β captures the percentage point difference between the proportion of individuals defined by $x = 1$ (e.g. being aged below 25) and $x = 0$ (e.g. being aged above 25) in terms of vote share y for the party A. In other words, β is the difference between the share of young voters voting for Islamic parties and the share of older voters voting for them. If this difference is positive, the voters aged below 25 supported *proportionally more* the Islamic parties than the older voters, and conversely. In the following example, the blue line displays the β coefficient.

Figure 5.1: An example for interpreting 'voting gap' along a dimension of inequality (here age)

Adding controls preserves the intuitive interpretation of the β coefficient but might be misleading. In fact, one would like to know by how much the young voters are more likely to vote for Islamic parties than older individuals, everything else being equal (same gender, same level of education and so on).

In Figure 5.1, the red line displays the voting gap between young and older voters (aged below/above 25), after controlling for education and the green light accounts for additional controls. One can then see that while the youth sounds to vote less for Islamic parties than older voters since 1999 (with a negative β coefficient), the relationship is reversed when accounting for education from 2011 onward, and throughout the period with additional controls.

However, control variables may affect the voting choice in a non-linear way and interaction terms would have to be additionally considered. One should bear in mind that the set of controls used throughout this paper are then never deemed to be exhausting the residual variation in the dependent variable and that no causal interpretation holds in this setting. Each control may equally have an effect on voting preference that is not going into the same direction and I will tend to favor limited number of controls in the analysis.

What is of interest is rather the magnitude and the direction of the effect when adding controls or when looking at the evolution of this β difference over time. Does controlling for education increase or decrease the voting gap observed between young and older voters for a given party? Did the voting gap reverse throughout the time span? Adopting this regression framework also allows to test whether a potential effect is actually significantly different from zero at a given statistical level, and if that still holds once having accounted for a set of control variables. Results of OLS regressions are provided for each country per year and over the period. Multivariate imputation by chained equation were initially considered for dealing with missing data, but have not been implemented.

5.2   To harmonize or not to harmonize: the decile approach

Looking at the evolution of our β coefficient over time might however, confuse its interpretation. As noted by Gethin (2018), the difference in vote shares is equally reflecting both the actual change in the party score at the national level and structural changes in the composition of the electorate. This point will be especially relevant when digging into the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals voting for opposition parties, whose importance on the political scene in terms of votes shares are at times rather volatile. I will then tend to privilege broader coalitions or ruling parties with relatively stable vote shares in my analysis. Regarding the second point, this is less of an issue when dealing with shorter time period as the distribution of education attainment over the population, for instance, is pretty stable within a limited time frame. However, I will still prefer adopting a so-called 'decile approach' when the variable of interest is decomposed into a consequent number of categories, allowing

to partially overcome the harmonization issues encountered.

Considering a categorical variable x and assuming that the population is uniformly distributed within each category, one can apply a reweighing scheme for approximating quantiles while accounting for the initial distribution of the sample along this variable. This approach has been especially used for income that usually tends to be coded within country-specific brackets. In other words, one want to identify who are the top 10 percent earners according to the distribution of income within the sampled population for a given year. Extending this methodology to education or religiosity enables to account for the differences of distribution observed between surveys that result as much from structural changes than differences in the wording of the question.

Nevertheless, one may notice that such individual-specific reweighing schemes may lead to attribute an individual to different quantile groups. This would then prevent solving the subsequent regression models that take the quantile variables as regressors. Following Gethin (2018), I duplicated my sample as many times as the number of quantiles considered (five times for quintiles, ten times for deciles etc.) and then differentially applied the reweighing scheme at the individual level, in each version of the dataset. Next, I generated a decile version of the variable of interest and clustered my standard errors by individuals for regressions performed over the expanded dataset. Another way to go that could relax the uniformity assumption would be to duplicate the datasets with randomly replacing individuals within each category. This alternate solution has not been further investigated but could constitute an interesting robustness check.

5.3   From political competition to political cleavages: the party classification challenge

Approaching political cleavages in a long-term perspective requires to draw some party-linking and identify ideological affiliation. In fact, if one want to follow how cleavages evolved over time, one need to create continuity within one or several political movements, clearly identified throughout the period. For Western countries, the usual solution is to rely on a left-right divide. The main difficulty is then to accurately classify a given political party in one or the other side of the political spectrum, while performing sensitivity tests depending on the definition adopted or letting aside specific cases. Piketty Piketty (2018) for instance equally split the party *La République en Marche* of the French president Emmanual Macron in between the right and the left for the election of 2017, given a political

platform relating to both sides of the spectrum, depending on the dimension considered.

The researcher has a numerous amount of tools developed in Political Science at his disposal. He can rely, for instance, on the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) developed by the World Bank Development Research Group that offers standardized indicators of party affiliation and ideology for over 180 countries in a time-series format [14]. The Manifesto Project equally designs an important set of cross-country indicators based on political parties programs contents [15].

Unfortunately, for most MENA countries, the information available is scarce and inconclusive. Only Turkey is included in the Manifesto Project database while the DPI does not provide more information that classifying religious parties as Islamic. This is especially problematic in the Iraqi case. In the absence of a standardized framework for identifying parties' ideological stance, it is difficult to escape from a sectarian view of the political landscape which reinforces, by construction, the salience of the sectarian cleavage identified. The Iraqi political scene has undergone an increasing fragmentation process in the last 15 years. Nonetheless, in the absence of political comparative tools and unclear conclusions from the literature consulted, I decided to affiliate Iraqi parties depending on their ethno-sectarian identity. I also distinguished what I denoted an "anti-sectarian or secular" coalition in which I gathered parties that did not necessarily have strong ties but that did claim an anti-sectarian stance, which found a particular electoral resonance. Details on the classification performed can be found in Appendix A1.1.

This lack of systematized tools on political parties in the MENA regions has been especially acknowledged by scholars arguing against the exceptionalism bias that applies to Middle Eastern studies. According to Cavatorta (2020), *"we have no experts' surveys coding policy positions, and we know next to nothing on how close or distant parties of the same family for instance are. We know even less on whether parties' positions match voters' values or not, preventing us from more clearly understand how parties offer policies and how they are received in the electorate"*. Thus, I mainly relied on an extensive consultation of political science literature for drawing affiliations and whenever deemed relevant, tried to decompose the electoral base of the coalitions I created, as a robustness check. My choices remain questionable and my results sensitive to these artificial party grouping. However, I believe that drawing conclusions from looking at broad coalitions which appear to make sense at least from an outsider perspective can still be informative. My results would have still gained to be confronted with feedback from country experts and as such they should be only considered as

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[14]See https://mydata.iadb.org/Reform-Modernization-of-the-State/Database-of-Political-Institutions-2017/
[15]See https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/

preliminary.

5.4   Weighting scheme

This analysis has been performed two times: once without accounting for the official election results and once with rescaling all sample weights so as to match the party choices expressed in each survey with the outcomes of the closest elections, except in two cases. I used the 1999 election results for rescaling the 2001 WVS survey for Turkey, as the AKP was not yet a political force in 2001. I used the 2017 election results for rescaling both the 2014 WVS and the 2019 Arab Barometer data for Algeria. Presidential elections took place in Algeria in 2014 but a reweighing scheme based on their outcomes would lead to disregarding opposition parties quoted by respondents that did not present a candidate or boycotted the electoral process. The main rationale for performing this reweighing exercise is to consider each survey as representative of the composition of the electorate in a given timeframe, broadening the interpretative scope of the findings. Such an approach has been adopted for conforming the comparative frame developed in the collective project "Political Cleavages and Inequality" carried under the direction of Amory Gethin, Clara Martínnez-Toledano and Thomas Piketty.

Mathematically, the rescaling process only consists of taking the share of individuals that voted for a given party (according to official results and in terms of percentage of votes received) $\hat{p}$ and computing the weight $\hat{w}t$, such as the share of respondents that reported that they voted for that party would be the same, while accounting for the original weighting scheme w that ensured the representativity of the sample at the national level.

$$\hat{w} = w \times \frac{\hat{p}}{p}$$

While this does not alter my main results, one may highlight few points in the MENA setting. First, the fragmentation of the political landscape may result in an important share of responses of party choice difficult to attribute to a coalition or an ideological movement. These non-identified items would then fall within the category "Other" (as in the case of Egypt A4.1 or in the case of Iraq in which respondents sometimes quoted lists that were running only in their governorate and that I did not manage to affiliate to a broader coalition). On the other hand, official elections outcomes are sometimes more fragmented than the distribution of party choice encountered within the sample

which leads to artificially inflating the "Other" category after the reweighing process. In particular, for Algeria, the share of other parties that do not necessarily receive any seat in the Parliament, given the features of the political system represented, is between 35 and 55 percent of general elections outcomes while only 5 to 12 percent of the respondents surveyed either replied "Other" to the party choice question or gave the name of a party that was not included within the main coalitions that I considered. To sum up, the limited size of the sample may lead to underestimating the importance of the political fragmentation that only a reweighing scheme can make salient. My summary statistics are however drawn with accounting for the initial weighing scheme only, as correcting for electoral behaviour would distort the representativity of my sample along other dimensions.

6 Turkey

With its long history of secular democratic rule and its consolidated multiparty system, Turkey is often considered as a specific case within the MENA landscape. The rise and political predominance of a ruler openly claiming its Islamic identity since 2002 has been questioning a sudden transition to Identity Politics and the surviving of preceding cleavages. Standing as the party of the Left Behind of the Republic, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) invites the researcher to adopt a renewed cross-cleavages perspective in which socioeconomic determinants keep playing a major role.

In this section, I review some well-known dividing lines of Turkish voting behaviours, focusing on the period following the military coup of 1980. First, I draw an overview of the political landscape, starting with the first multiparty elections of 1946. Then, I question the salience of a religious divide in a Republic shaped by State-secularism. The need of integrating other dimensions leads to identify a rising 'inverted' class divide, with low-income and lower-educated voters shifting towards right-wing parties since the early 1990s. Lastly, I turn to the the inescapable ethnic and regional features of Turkish cleavages, reflecting on the socioeconomic disparities behind the 'Kurdish question'.

6.0.1 A multiparty system challenged by new players at the eve of the XXIst century

The first multiparty elections took place in Turkey in 1946, after two decades of one-party ruling. The Republic, born from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, had well set up a representative body and universal suffrage, even enfranchising women as early as 1930. Nonetheless, the forced bonding to the Western modernization path came hand-in-hand with an authoritarianism distilled by a ruling class of military bureaucrats, victorious of the war of Independence (1919-1923) but in numeric minority. This elite, highly educated and urban, endorsed the nationalist and secular vision of the state personified by its Founding Father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and referred as "Kemalism". A state-founding party, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), also incarnated these principles on the political scene. The potentiality of disappointing electoral outcomes, however, prevented any long-lasting multiparty interludes, nor political consolidation of the opposition until the start of the Cold War (Zürcher, 2017).

Rural discontent and private sector frustration allied in the Democrat Party (DP) and won the first

free and fair elections in 1950. The original matrix of Turkish politics was born: on one side, the old-establishment, represented by the CHP, nationalist, urban, secular and interventionist, thereby often positioned on the left of the spectrum; on the other side, the alliance of the previously-excluded rural pious and conservative bourgeoisie, the 'periphery' culturally dominated, corresponding to the centre-right (Kabbani, 2019a). Three decades of two-party system followed, alternating between the Kemalist CHP and its main challenger (respectively the Democrat Party (DP) replaced by the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP) in 1961). In addition to these two parties, the third actor of Turkish politics was undoubtedly the Military. While let aside from the electoral arena, the army endorsed the role of gatekeepers of the Republic intervening no less than four times in the political agenda of the country. Two direct coups, in 1960 and 1980, and two indirect ones, by means of memorandum in 1971 and 1997, led to government changes, notably preserving the secular aspect of the State (Hale, 1994). The 1980 coup, in a context of increasing street violence between far-right and far-left activists and political fragmentation, may have been the one with the longest-lasting effect.

In fact, the military rule initiated a three-year-long interruption in the democratic system, while artificially clearing up the whole political scene. Not only a new Constitution (1982) and an electoral law introduced a crucial 10 percent electoral threshold, preventing any extreme to get into the Parliament, but all officials and previously existing parties, including the CHP, were banned from the political scene from 5 to 10 years. At the same time, the Military incorporated into the state-ideology a new component known as the 'Turkish Islamic Synthesis'. Redefining the tumultuous relationship to religion, this attempt aimed at uniting both Islamism and Turkish nationalism in a broad Right bloc, face to the threatening rise of leftist movements (Kaya, 2017). In the context of the Cold War and anti-communism, the coup equally enshrined the denial of legal existence to any extreme-left movement. Such founding experience inscribed the political history of the Third Republic era that followed between sharp rupture and continuity.

Figure 6.1: Legislative election results in Turkey

The 1980s let the path to a multiparty system split in between 3 to 4 main actors, governing altogether through coalitions. The centre-right, while internally divided between the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP), more akin to the traditional DP/AP rural vote and the liberal newcomer Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), concentrated the majority of the votes (Figure 6.1). Nonetheless, the successive offsprings of the CHP, split between a social-democratic branch, the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP), and a more traditional one, the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*, SHP), ensured keeping foot in the circle of power. It is by eventually crossing the 10 percent threshold in 1991 and becoming the first party in terms of vote in the next elections that an Islamic Party, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), broke this equilibrium .

Political Islam was not absent of the Turkish landscape before that. The integration of Islam into the State apparatus accompanied the emergence of an Islamic dissent hostile to Kemalist reforms that tried to find an institutionalized path since the start of the Republic. The threat of religious reactionary movement led the regime to systematically close any party which could be perceived as mixing religion and politics. The 1970s saw nonetheless the continuous rise of an Islamist party around the charismatic figure of Necmettin Erbakan, who even entered the government before the coup. The RP's victory in 1995 then signed the comeback of a movement benefiting from the failure of the centre-right to effectively incarnate the 'Turkish Islamic Synthesis'.

At the same time, the mid-1990s also marked the entrance of the Kurdish dissent into the political

arena. Main ethnic minority, the Kurds initially kept confined to a security deadlock. Perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country, the separatism stance of Kurdish organizations led to a circle of escalating violence and state repression that peaked in the 1980s. These two 'structural fears' of the Republic, namely division and Political Islam, were present since the replacement of a cosmopolitan Empire, head of the Sunni Islamic Caliphate, by a secular nation-state who had to fight for its borders (Özerdem and Whiting, 2019). Yet, both mainly aligned within the left-right divide which prevailed during the Cold War. If the Kurdish opposition was framed under a "class divide" aligning with the left, the Islamic found their way within the anti-communist right (see the self-positioning of their respective electorate on a left-right spectrum (Figures 6.2a and 6.2b). It is thus really from the 1990s onward that these two players managed to get their voice heard by electoral means, marking a turning point in the role of Identity politics in Turkey.

(a) Kurdish parties voters

(b) Islamic parties and AKP voters

Source: Authors' computation.

Note: The figure shows the share of votes received by the Kurdish and Islamic parties by self-assessed position on a left-right scale.

Figure 6.2: Self-positioning of voters on a left-right scale

1995 thus paved the way for a profound change in the Turkish landscape. Despite military interventions and the successive ban of the RP in 1997 and its offspring in 2001, the AKP raised from these ashes in 2002 and captured all the protest votes, on the aftermath of the country's most severe economic crisis up to date (Pamuk, 2018). Against all expectations, the conservative – religious party, ruled by the successful mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, managed to remain in power until today, opening an unprecedented period of one-party dominance since 1946. Changes in external and domestic factors nonetheless modified the AKP dynamics in between its first two terms. After having embodied a model role in the 2000s and having initiated a notable open-policy dialogue with Kurdish dissents,

the Syrian War and the Arab Springs as much as the disappearance of any EU adhesion prospects led the AKP to gradually shift towards a combination of ultra-nationalism and political Islam. 2015 also announced the first loss of majority for the incumbent which had to start courting nationalist votes and marked a new alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP). The failed putsch attempt of 2016 further pushed the authoritarian drift experienced by the country, akin to its Russian new ally. A referendum institutionalized the shift to a strong presidential system while the Kurdish question was securitized again in light of the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

6.0.2   A new role for the religious cleavage in the secular Republic?

The advent and the survival of an Islamic party as the major incumbent in the oldest secular Republic of the Middle East has been raising heightened debates on a potential rise of the role of religion in voting behaviour. Many have seen in the electoral success of the AKP a reflect and an announcement of a phenomenon that could encompass the country's borders, raising both hopes and fears for the future of democracy in the Middle East (Somer, 2019)[16]. Such political mutation has been argued to denote a fundamental change in the Turkish electorate, reviving the relevance of a profound secular/religious cleavage (Turam, 2011). Yet, the vivid literature on Political Islam should not overshadow the lack of consensus and empirical evidence pointing in that direction. Economic outlook has notably been found to play a greater role in explaining the large and rising support for the AKP during its consolidation in power (Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; Çarkoğlu, 2012; Kalaycıoğlu, 2010).

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[16]Some have notably seen in the AKP victory a potential for strengthening the secular democracy by setting the path to a less conflicting relationship between the Islamic and the Military.

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters with respect to other voters supporting either Right and Islamic parties or the CHP. The respondent is asked whether he would describe himself as religious, the nuances are subsumed into a binary variable (yes/no) by the authors. No data are available in 2018.

Figure 6.3: The religious cleavage between CHP and AKP voters

While religiosity, captured through self-description as religious, appears to definitely have a strong impact on vote choice, Figure 6.3 rather points to the persistence of a religious divide initiated ahead of the AKP's electoral success, and going beyond the voting pattern for Islamic Parties. Since 1991, religious voters have consistently been more likely to vote for right-wing parties than non-religious voters by 25 to 35 percentage points after controls. The strength of the divide is nonetheless interestingly reduced when controlling for the self-positioning on the left-right scale, suggesting a partial overlap of the religious cleavage with conservative/liberal views (see the regressions results displayed in Table A2.2 in Appendix).

This is consistent with the fact that the mainstream center-right already partly captured the more religious and conservative part of the electorate. In fact, while the AKP, initially claimed its affinities with European Christian-Democratic parties, it also incarnated a conciliatory and moderate approach in a fragmented Islamic landscape (Hale, 2005; Hale and Ozbudun, 2009)[17]. A more traditional and extreme branch notably survived and constituted a constant sizeable opposition until today. The conflict between Erdoğan and the supporters of the Gülenist movement that reached its peak following the putsch attempt of 2016, equally encompasses these divisions (Taş, 2018). In the presence of outside options, the more devout voters, as measured by the degree of religious practices, then did

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[17]One should highlight here that such analysis only holds for the first period of the AKP ruling as a sharp shift in the party's use of religious rhetoric has been observed once well-settled in power and especially after 2011.

not only vote for the incumbent since 2002.

Moreover, research paying specific attention to parties' discourses and practices reveals that Turkish Islamic parties have not been emphasizing religious matters in electoral campaign before getting access to power (Wuthrich, 2015). Instead, it rather seems that religion may have been initially instrumented by the adverse camp, emphasizing an anticipated threat to secularism. Religiosity was then not necessarily *the* determining factor of the vote until recently but could have become so among the anti-Islamic supporters, as a backlash effect (Somer, 2010). Nonetheless, while voters describing themselves as non-religious proportionally supported more the secular CHP over the period, one do not observe a massive anti-Islamic-voting surge under AKP's rules .

(a) Centre-right (ANAP/DYP) before 2007   **(b)** Centre-right and Islamic (RP) before 2007

Source: Authors' computation.
Note: The figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (ANAP/DYP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by religiosity (measured by service attendances or frequency of pray)

Figure 6.4: Decomposition of the vote for the AKP and previous right parties by degree of religiosity

Considering the degree of service attendance reveals nonetheless a slightly different picture (Figure 6.4). The vote gap between the most devout and the ones not reporting hardly no religious practices did increase with the election of the AKP, but only when compared to the structure of the vote for former centre-right parties. Looking at the right bloc at large, including the previous Islamic parties, replicates in similar proportion the religious divide observed throughout the period (Figure 6.4 (right)). The election of the AKP also led less religious to vote way more for the CHP but a sharp increase is only visible after 2015 (Figure A2.2 in Appendix). All of this suggests the limited explanatory power of the religious cleavage taken on his own. Sensible to the definition adopted, religiosity is unlikely to capture all the dimensions of the political conflict, despite its increasing salience on international media coverage as on the AKP's rhetoric itself.

Rather than a surge of a religious divide, the higher importance perceived for the religiosity dimension in Turkish politics may denote a mutation of the "Islamic identity", aligned with interests in economic liberalisation (Yavuz et al., 2003). Far from the traditional vision of the rural pious, the modern devout would instead cultivate such identity as a component of his social capital, giving him access to business and social connections relying on inter-personal trust schemes(Livny, 2020). Islamic business associations notably played a major role in the empowerment of new entrepreneurs (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). With the share of the population describing itself as religious continuously rising, from 75 to more than 85 percent, the religiosity gap between poorer and richer dwellings slowly narrowed and almost canceled over in the recent period (Figure A2.4 in Appendix).The interaction of religiosity with other socioeconomic dimensions, and the subsequent intra-elite and distributional conflict between the secular apparatchik and an openly devout new business elite, may then be key for getting a deeper understanding of the Turkish dynamics.

6.0.3   The rise of an "inverted" class cleavages?

Political analysts quickly noticed the AKP's singular capacity to unite among its electorate parts of the society as diverse as the "poor and pious" and the rising liberal bourgeoisie of central Anatolia, the so-called "Anatolian tigers" (Bermek, 2019b). This phenomenon, far from being unprecedented, constituted an amplification of the electoral bridge initiated by the Islamic parties throughout the 1990s. It is this successful cross-class alliance that ensured the party a support base large enough to not need joining any coalition. The AKP was indeed in 2002 the first one to get enough seats so that a single-party government could be formed, and the party even managed to consolidate and increase its electoral support, maintaining this privilege continuously until 2015. Such success would not have been possible without gaining the support of poor workers, and especially the *gecekondu* (built at night), poor urban dwellings resulting from the massive internal migration movement which shaped the country's landscape since the 1960s [18]. In fact, many hold the preference of that volatile part of the electorate to be determinant for whoever aims at standing alone on power (Wuthrich, 2015). Digging into the party choice of the bottom 50% earners thus holds a special importance, especially for identifying the specificity of the current incumbent with respect to its predecessors.

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[18]For a fictional journey of a rural migrant through the urbanization process of Turkey and Istanbul in particular, one can refer to the Literature Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk's 2015 novel *A Strangeness in My Mind*

Figure 6.5: Vote for right-wing parties among the half-poorer voters

What clearly appears in Figure 6.5 is that the AKP managed to gather altogether votes that were previously almost equally split between the mainstream centre-right, the previous Islamic parties and the traditional branch of the centre-left, or disenfranchised [19]. Moreover, the party confirmed its comparative advantage among low-income groups over time, despite an apparent lack of changes in the high level of income inequalities throughout the 2000s, which even further increased since 2013 (Alvaredo et al. (2018), see Figure A2.8).[20] In particular, the AKP appears to have indefinitely captured the votes of the leftist CHP bastions, as revealed by the mutation of the electoral map (A3.1, A3.2, A3.4), without having necessarily initially applied its social justice electoral promises (Patton, 2006). Understanding its continuous appealing among a group who do not seem to have experienced a quantitative improvement, at least in terms of the evolution of its share in the national income distribution, require to combine both a broader picture and a more qualitative assessment.

On one hand, the AKP could leverage on the "Islamic Trust advantage" built by previous movements and the strong ties within social civil organization (Livny, 2020). Its predecessor notably raised to

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[19]One should bear in mind the regular increase of the electorate body over time, related to the youth of the Turkish population. For instance, 2011 elections accounted for more than eight million new voters

[20]Measured by the evolution of national income share, inequalities levels are high and stable in Turkey between 2002 and 2013, while having experienced a sharp decrease in the precedent decade. The 2010s, in contrast, depicts a slight but sustained upswing of both the top 10% and the 1% shares, established in 2016 at 53.9% and 23.4% respectively. Relying on the evolution of the Gini coefficient even dates the return of inequality increase as early as 2007 (World Bank estimate).

power in the mid-1990s under the dual slogan of bringing on the frontline the *halka hizmet* (social services) and the *adil düzen* (just economic order). The so-called Welfare party, RP, emphasized as much the need for a secure economic environment, ending endemic corruption, as the urge to tackle poverty, while proving its worth by an exemplifying local governance (Wuthrich, 2015). Such social justice lens also later resonated with the actual economic performance of the country, favourable to income growth. Contrasting with the previous cycle of financial crisis and deep recessions, the economic outlook under the AKP rule was effectively marked by a notable stability, which is likely to have been electorally rewarded. The first term especially (2002-2007) constitutes an exceptional interlude of economic prosperity and high-quality growth (Acemoglu and Ucer, 2019). While most reasons are mainly attributable to major structural reforms launched ahead of the party's mandate, the greater fiscal discipline of the government as much as its ability to keep inflation to unprecedented low levels may have pleased as much the businessmen benefiting from a consequent growth of exports than the poorer workers.

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income quintiles among AKP voters in the Turkish adult population, and its evolution over time.

Figure 6.6: Composition of the AKP electorate by income quintile

Turkey was the first MENA country to open its capital account and shift from import-substituting industrialization to export-led growth in the early 1980s. The liberalization turn, however, came with a lack of regulation of the banking sector, further damaged by the government use of public banks to fund political patronage. Three major financial crises rhythmed the 1990s and fueled popular

resentment against the financial and political elite. The discredit of all mainstream parties due to the perceived collusion may explain how the AKP managed to impose itself as a coalition of both globalization losers and winners, representing notably the new exporting small and medium enterprises. The decomposition of the AKP electorate by income quintiles indeed confirms that the party scored more than 40 percent in all quintiles, except the highest one (Figure 6.6). At the same time, the factors having fuelled the growth, namely a massive credit expansion and a boom in the construction sector, may also be the ones having retained the party's supporters over time. The interventionist policy of the government renewed clientelism well-beyond the religious communities. The Housing Policy benefited a large number of low-income dwellings while public procurement contracts went to politically connected firms (Gürakar, 2016). Corporate credit lending by state banks (Bircan and Saka, 2019) has equally been showed to play a political role in elections times [21].

On the other hand, the AKP might be a political reply of a long-lasting rural/urban divide. The poor urban workers who came populating the cities' surroundings kept being associated to their rural origin and differing values and practices, especially their religiosity. These "peasants in the city" have successively being perceived as the "Rural Other" to "the Threatening Other" by an elite worried about the resonance of radical Islam or Marxist movements within a growing electorate (Erman, 2013). The targeted policies of the AKP towards them dramatically improved their situation and decreased the share of the population living under national poverty line from 18.6 to 13.9 percent between 2005 and 2017 [22].The advent of the AKP also coincided with a reversal in the economic power of this working class. The liberalisation process of the 1980s and the associated real estate boom led to a substantial capital increase of *gecekondu* voters whose dwellings suddenly gained a market value. Their upward mobility may have thus found a political expression in the support given to a new generation of local politicians proud of their rural origin (Erman, 2011).

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[21]It is worth mentioning that the political beneficiaries of the related urban transformation projects were not necessarily only the *gecekondu* voters but also the better-off classes targeted by the transformation of former shanty land to mega-projects of consumption or entertainment sites.

[22]More strikingly, taking the upper middle-income country poverty line at $5.50 a day (2011 PPP) suggests a shift from 35 percent in 2002 to 9.2 percent in 2018, with half reduction happening during the first AKP mandate (Figure A2.7 in Appendix).

Figure 6.7: Vote for right-wing parties among the top-income earners

Looking at the income gradient for the top 10 percent earners is then of particular interest as it does not suggest a rallying of the economic elite who was backing the centre-right in the 1990s behind the AKP (Figure 6.7). Instead, while confined in the opposition camp, the CHP finds a significantly stronger support among the top earners with respect to the rest of the population. Such results call nonetheless for some caution as looking at the distribution of the top 10% earners' vote reveals that the elite is more roughly equally split in two than uniformly endorsing the Kemalist party. Between 2007 and 2018, the share of the top 10% earners' voting for the AKP is even higher than the one going to the CHP, and stable around 40% (Figure 6.8). Yet, in light of the net electoral advantage of AKP, this appears as a preference of the top 10% earners for the CHP, with respect to poorer voters.

Figure 6.8: Decomposition of the vote choice among top-income earners

Consistent with the *Kulturkampf* story, this divide invites to further investigate the dimensions along which the elite splits up between so-called Ottoman and Republican camps. In particular, the perception of own's position on the social scale may confirm the claimed replacement of an elite by another, the ones now perceiving themselves as 'Upper Class' and potentially perceived by others as *nouveaux riches* endorsing proportionally more the AKP (Figure A2.12 in Appendix)[23]

Another striking feature of the Turkish landscape is that neither income nor education benefit the incumbent. The latter not only has the biggest impact but also does not exhibit any tendency inversion over the period. The higher-educated voters have consistently been less supportive of the AKP, and more supportive of the CHP, than the lower educated since the early 1990s. Most of all, the amplitude of the effect is relatively symmetric and applies to the conservative parties at large (centre-right and Islamic included) (Figure 6.9).

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[23]Exclusion from power circles may accompany a change in the perception of own's social position and thus own social self-assessment. Top income earners would then not necessarily identify themselves as belonging to the upper class when not being represented in the government. More research would also be welcomed on the exact capital's composition of the well-identified Anatolian Tigers. They may indeed be more likely to have accumulated a substantial wealth than to be the ones perceiving the highest remunerations. The real wage growth having been almost null in the last decades, relying only on income is unlikely to have been enough for an upward mobility.

Figure 6.9: Vote for right-wing parties among the higher-educated voters

In addition, the effect of education appears to be highly robust to controls and strong enough to revert the impact of religiosity. Higher education significantly decreases support for Islamic Parties even among religious voters (Figure A2.16) . The same also holds with respect to gender. Contrary to previous Islamic parties, the AKP appeals proportionally more among women than men, including after controls, but a higher level of education encompasses this gender bias (Figure A2.18, also see the results of the regression displayed in Table A3.1, column (3)) [24]. Such-defined "intellectual elite" therefore seem to relate more to the Kemalist inheritance and to the related cultural cleavage [25]. Education was indeed at the core of Atatürk's modernization reforms with a specific focus on secularism, marginalizing religious schooling until very recently. Moreover, Turkish education attainment lags well behind OECD average despite a growth over the last decades[26]. This aspect may have then further deepened the education divide.

At the same time, the AKP rule also signed an unprecedented recognition of religious schools (*imam hatip*) which number exploded since 2011 According to Turkish Ministry of Education statistics,

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[24]Such results inviting to a deeper investigation of the gender voting gap resonate with the findings of Meyersson (2014) or **?**

[25]The deep historical roots of this educational cleavage may find its best illustration in the traditional Turkish shadow play. Inherited from the Ottoman Era, the plays keep entertaining kids on the insurmountable conflicts between the illiterate and popular Karagöz and the highly educated and poetic Hacivat Figure 0.1

[26]The country has experienced educational reforms expanding compulsory schooling throughout the period (schooling being extended to 8 years in 1997 and to 12 years in 2012

the number of religious schools reached almost 30 percent of all schools in 2018. The inclusion of elective courses on religion in the curriculum, in 2012, equally raised interrogations about the advent of a "pious generation" in a country in which 40 percent of its population is aged below 25 (Lüküslü, 2016). Interestingly, when looking at the voting differential of the youth, one can observe that the AKP initially did not keep the comparative advantage that former Islamic parties had among the new generation. The youth vote less for the AKP than older voters but controlling for education, among others, significantly reversed this trend after 2015 (Figure 6.10, also see the regressions results displayed in Table A3.4 in Appendix).

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below 25 and the share older voters voting for the Islamic parties and the AKP after 2007, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure 6.10: Vote for islamic parties and AKP among young voters

While the regime may have lost the young graduates that were over-represented in the Gezi park protest of 2013, it did not get massively rejected by the new generation at large, despite a rising youth unemployment rate [27]. Moreover, contrasting with other MENA countries, Turkey exhibits an extremely high level of electoral participation with more than 80 percent of turnout (Table A2.1 in Appendix). To that respect, the youth do massively vote as much as older voters and the inter-generational gap remains pretty limited in terms of turnout in the recent period (Figure A2.24 in Appendix).

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[27]While the youth unemployment rate ranges around 16 percent in 2002, it continuously rose starting in 2012 and hit 25 percent in 2019 (Turkish Statistical Institute)

6.0.4 The regional cleavages and the "Kurdish question"

The picture of the political cleavages in Turkey would not be complete without turning to the major regional disparities of the country and their ethno-cultural component. Turkey's landscape is clearly divided between the richer West Aegean coast and the populous urban centres of Istanbul and Ankara, on one side; and the Eastern and Southeastern regions, on the other. Historically most deprived and underdeveloped, the two latter do not exhibit strong sign of convergence since the economic liberalization turn of the 1980s, despite targeted policies. The so-called Kurdish question then partly encompasses long-lasting regional inequalities that take as much an income than an educational dimension (additional maps are displayed in Appendix A2.7). Regional patterns in voting behaviour are equally salient and stable with the West Coast going to the CHP, central Anatolia to the AKP and the southeast to the Kurdish parties throughout the period (see the electoral maps A3 in Appendix).

GDP per capita in US dollars, 2017
- 3489 - 5824
- 5824 - 7804
- 7804 - 9954
- 9954 - 14253
- 14253 - 17827

0   250   500 km

Figure 6.11: Geographical distribution of income per capita in 2017

Predominantly located in the East and Southeast of the country, the Kurds population represents a culturally and linguistically distinct minority which recognition has been a matter of blooded conflict over the last century. Based on a French assimilationist model, the Turkish Republic did not collect any ethnic statistics since the 1930s. Estimates of the Kurdish population's share, as much as precise territorial delimitation, have thus been source of historical tensions, with average estimates ranging in

between around 20 and 25% of the total Turkish population nowadays [28]. Moreover, the South-East regions remain ethnically diverse and a significant share of Kurd joined the flow of internal migrants, especially after the tougher repression of the 1980s.

Figure 6.12: Geographical distribution of the Kurdish population in Turkey

While the Kurdish dissent took different forms, between recognition sought of cultural rights, pseudo-Marxist guerrilla or quest for self-determination, its qualifications as a proper political matter is a relatively recent phenomenon (Barkey, 2017). Until the mid-1990s, the cleavage rather took the form of alternate phases of 'tacit' coexistence (1940s-60s) or self-reinforcing cycles of state-repression and escalation of violence (1920s-30s, 1970s-90s) (Bozarslan, 2003). The first unilateral ceasefire of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in 1993, altogether with the abandon of the separatism quest, paved the way for openly Kurdish political parties to emerge in the electoral arena. Yet, the 10 percent electoral threshold and the military-pushed repression, led the succession of Kurdish parties, successively banned and reinvented, aside of the Parliament and so, despite major electoral gains in the South-Eastern and Eastern regions [29].

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[28]The CIA Factbook estimates of 2016 are for instance of 19% while Kurdish groups claims are rather close to 20 million. See the Figure A2.37 for the regional distribution of Kurdish-speaking population in my data. Capturing the Kurdish population through the language spoken at home is unsatisfactory in survey-data as the state-repression of language use would lead to downwards estimates.

[29]Starting in 1995, the succession of Kurdish Parties topped between 4% and 6%. Some MPs affiliated with Kurdish

The AKP's arrival to power in 2002 initially further challenged Kurdish politics. By sharing a somewhat similar history of state repression and ban, the AKP was also appealing to the more pious and socially conservative electorate of the Southeast region [30] . Moreover, the pro-EU stance of the AKP further incentivized the newcomer to emphasize its ability to represent all the "periphery" of those left behind during the Republican era. Its first two terms therefore represented a noticeable exception of open-policy dialogue and recognition of Kurdish sub-identity that led it to gain a significant and original political support among the two predominantly Kurdish regions.



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Kurdish speakers and the share of speakers of Turkish and other languages voting for the AKP, before and after controls. No data available before 2007.

Figure 6.13: Vote for the AKP between Turkish and Kurdish speakers

Nonetheless, despite two peace initiatives with the PKK and the opening of negotiations, the reversal of the regional and international context puts an end to this parenthesis in 2015. The empowerment of the Syrian Kurdish organization thanks to Anglo-Saxon support in the fight over ISIS, together with the lack of prospect of any EU adhesion in the forthcoming future, led to the reappearance of the territorial integrity challenge embodied by the Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Kaya and Whiting, 2019). In line with these changes, my findings suggest that Kurdish speakers have massively voted against the AKP in the past decade, with a peak in 2015. In that year, after controlling for other individual characteristics, they were less likely to support the incumbent by almost 50 percentage

movement also entered the Parliament by running as independents throughout the period.
[30]For a geographical visualization of the religiosity gradient, refer to the map A2.35 and A2.36 based on survey data from the KONDA barometer

points (Figure 6.13) [31].

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of South Eastern Anatolia residents and the share of other voters voting for Kurdish Parties, before and after controlling for other variables. No data are available before 2007.

Figure 6.14: Kurdish parties advantage among the Southeastern region

At the same time, a new Kurdish party adopting an inclusive radical left stance suddenly appeared as a threatening electoral opponent in the 2014 presidential election. The The Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), that some commentators saw as the contemporaneous incarnation of a left-wing populism arising in neighbouring Greece and Syria managed to put an end to the 13-year-long one-party rule of the AKP in June 2015 (Kaya, 2019). For the first time, Kurdish MPs were entering the parliament as a party while the HDP succeeded in being supported not only by the Southeast region (Figure 6.14, but also by other parts of Turkey. The ethno-regional cleavage then does not seem to be fully frozen and remains deeply rooted in socioeconomic inequalities. Kurdish voters have been supporting ruling parties when those met both their cultural and social demands, while Kurdish parties also managed to federate votes beyond the ethnic group by adopting inclusive platform.

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[31]Notice that not all Kurds speak Kurdish as first language, so that our results are likely to capture only one side of the cleavage and not reflect the good score of the AKP among the Kurdish population between 2002 and 2011.

7 Iraq

The first democratic elections of Iraq took place in 2005, in a country still under US occupation and devastated by a very heavy economic and humanitarian toll. Despite regular revivals of bloody civil war and the fight against the Islamic State, five elections have been held until today. The new regime adopted an identity-based political structure, deemed necessary for Iraq territorial and sovereignty survival. Since then, rising protests and fragmentation of ethno-sectarian blocs have been questioning the future of Iraqi governance marked by popular discontent. Is Iraq's move from Identity Politics calling for a new role of social cleavages?

In this section, I first introduce the major institutional changes that followed the US-led invasion of the country in 2003. I document the prominence of the sectarian divide in voting patterns by looking at the votes of the main ethno-religious Iraqi groups. Considering the effect of income on the vote, I then question whether intra-sect inequalities challenged this cleavage over the period, paying a specific attention to the social recomposition of the 'opposition camp'. The lack of strong additional divides beyond the sectarian one, in a context of rising abstention, leads me to analyse the signs of a governance crisis that seems to surpass both social and ethno-religious identity.

7.0.1 A democratic transition shaped by ethno-religious sectarianism

Formally independent since 1932, Iraq found its modern form after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The country first remained reliant on Britain which administrated the territory after WWI. It is under the influence of the pan Arabism, promoted by the Egyptian Nasser, that a revolution inscribed Iraq as a Third World power in 1958. The coup overthrown the monarchy in place and established a nationalist republic under military ruling. Social and agrarian reforms, backed by one of the most prominent communist party of the Middle East, accompanied the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (Dawisha, 2009). Factional conflicts, however, fragilized the regime. Ten years later, the Ba'ath Party, a movement born in neighbouring Syria and that increasingly resonated within Iraqi officials, took power. Keeping with the republican and socialist form of the regime, it imposed a secular and highly centralized authoritarianism, quickly embodied by its leader Saddam Hussein. While the first decades were marked by ambitious reforms and significant improvement in human development outcomes, the two Gulf Wars (with Iran 1980-88 and the annexation attempt of Kuwait in 1991), followed by ravaging international economic sanctions, let the country devastated.

The US-led invasion in 2003, supposedly for preventing nuclear armament, ended unravelling the former regime.

The post-2003 era instituted a profound institutional reconfiguration of the Iraqi landscape . Ensuring a fair representation of the various ethnicities and religious sects that compose the country, primarily Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, appeared as the preferred solution for putting an end to the capture of power by a politico-military elite drawn from regional and sectarian minority. The initial Governing Council put in place by the US occupier then aimed at reflecting the demographic weight of Iraqi major communities, including Turkmen and Christian.However, the disbanding of the Iraqi army as much as the policy of systematic De-Ba'athification, putting more than half a million of Iraqi out of work, led to an insurgency in Sunni areas. The conflict quickly turned into all-out civil war between violent militia, often aligned with tribal and religious interests (Marr, 2018). In between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, Iraq had a long history of ethno-religious conflicts. The Ba'athist regime signed the political dominance of Sunni Muslims from central Iraq over poorer Shia, while it also incarnated an Arabic nationalism hostile to the Kurdish part of the population. Accounting for these divides and the violent bloodshed that followed US occupation defined the new Iraq along clear identity lines (Haddad, 2020b). Political violence and insecurity also remained an inherent part of Iraqi landscape until today.[32]

At the same time, a decentralized and quasi-federal state organized around an identity-based political system, the *muhasassa*, emerged. The two first elections held in spite of the war, in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly, and in December 2005 for the first parliament, enshrined its modalities. All communities united in apparently monolithic blocs and only one secular party, led by the interim Prime Minister, Al-Allawi, imposed itself in the political landscape.[33] With the Baath party banned and its former members prohibited from standing for the elections, all main players were former opponents to Saddam regime, either organized in exile in Iran, as the two main Shia parties, the Islamic Dawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), in Great Britain, as the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party related to the Muslim Brotherhood movement, or that existed clandestinely like the Kurdish Parties. The secular Wifaq party (Iraqi National Accord, INA) contrasted with the others by the former Baathist affiliation of its Shia leader and its open backing from the US and Saudi Arabia.

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[32]According to the Iraqi Body Count, the outbreak of the civil war in 2006 and 2007 led to more than 25K civilian death per year, but more than 4K of annual deaths were still registered until 2018. See https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/.

[33]Few additional parties also aimed at representing the other minorities, notably the Turkmen but remained marginal in terms of votes shares.

His list also aimed at gathering fragmented socialist secular movements and the Communists, divided about the form of the new state (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006). The higher demographic weight of Shi'a led their coalitions to gain a majority of votes both times while Sunnis initially boycotted the electoral process. Yet, the quota-sharing system ensured that the government would be made of coalitions with a turning allocation of positions among the three groups.

Source: authors' computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Iraqi political parties in legislative elections between 2005 (January) and 2018.

Figure 7.1: Legislative election results in Iraq (main coalitions)

Despite definite tensions and a new war in 2014 due to ISIS expansion over the North-West of the territory, the Islamist-dominated system has been remarkably stable, and elections held continuously. Normalization of the sectarian divide of power also let a greater place for intra-group competition over time. The successive electoral cycles then illustrated an intensification and fragmentation of the political scene, with secular and/or anti-sectarian alliances taking a growing importance (Figure 7.1). While the political elite seems to have gradually moved from fractionalization to collusion around power-sharing, popular discontent has been increasingly voicing and transcending identity boundaries, partly echoed in political outcomes (Haddad, 2020a). Uniting against the autocratic drift of the Shia Prime Minister, Al-Maliki, the secular list Al-Iraqiya notably arrived first in the elections of 2010. Yet, by rallying mostly Sunni and protest votes, the coalition quickly split without offering an alternative path.[34] Growing streets protests which aroused throughout the country, and primarily in Shia areas

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[34]The Al-Iraqiya list notably united the Wifaq party of Allawi and major Sunni parties that left the Tawafuq coalition created for running the 2005 elections or that were running on their own before.

since 2015, further shaped the political agenda. Moving from demands for basic services provisions, the social movement quickly denunciated the failures of the state at large, questioning the legitimacy of its identity setup. For the first time, the anti-sectarian stance deeply resonated in the Shia political bloc in the elections of 2018 and a new coalition managed to reshuffle the cards, reflecting this call for out-of-the-system alliances (Isakhan and Mulherin, 2018; Dodge and Mansour, 2020). However, record abstention as much as sustained protests since October 2019 have been questioning the ability of the 2003 regime to actually reinvent itself.

7.0.2   Social and spatial inequalities in Iraq

More than three decades of conflicts severely deteriorated Iraqis' social conditions. With infrastructures and institutions in tatters, poverty has been exploding in an economy dominated by oil and resource curse. The salient security issue of the post-2003 era, as much the poor governance, further delayed any improvement of the situation for a population still largely relying on humanitarian assistance (Bank, 2014). No significant reduction in either poverty or income inequality has then been observed throughout the period. The twin crisis of 2014, the worsening of economic conditions due to the collapse of oil prices and the resurgence of violence with the rise of ISIS, cancelled all the progress made in poverty reduction between 2007 and 2012 (Krishnan and Olivieri, 2016). The share of the population under the national poverty line stagnates around 20 percent and is even expected to double by 2020 as a result of the global pandemic (Bank, 2020). Iraq also exhibits extremely high levels of inequality both at the national and at the sub-national level. According to 2007 data, 53% of national income (before taxes and transfers) are estimated to be held by the top 10 percent while the bottom 50 percent share only topped at 15 percent (Alvaredo et al., 2019).

Source: Author's computation.

Figure 7.2: Geographical distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Iraq

On the other hand, profound spatial disparities have been partly mirroring the demographic diversity of the country. Despite the lack of ethnic census, government statistics of 2010 estimate around 65% of Iraqi population to be Shia and 35% Sunni, while the share of Kurds, mainly Sunni, ranges between 15 to 20 percent. The three main groups also largely concentrate in defined areas, namely a Kurdish North, a Sunni Centre, and a Shia South (Figure 7.2). Regional inequalities have a clear ethno-religious dimension, which nonetheless reverted over time (Figure 7.3).

Source: Author's computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Institute for Management Research, Radboud Universty)

Figure 7.3: Evolution of social disparities in Iraq in terms of Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) growth between 2004 and 2018

While Shia and Kurdish provinces have been historically the most deprived under Saddam regime, the latter experienced a reversal of fortune (Figure 7.4). After having suffered from state's repression and ethnic cleansing campaigns, the Kurdistan Region benefited from a rather peaceful and prosperous time that sharply contrasted with the rest of the country and translated into better human development indicators [35]. The three Kurdish governorates also enjoy a regime of *de facto* autonomy since 1991, institutionalized with the 2005 semi-federal constitution.

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[35]Better quality data are also available for the Kurdistan Region following the conduction of a specific demographic survey in 2018 International Organization for Migration (2018).

(a) 2004 **(b)** 2018

Source: Authors' computation using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of income groups by region over time. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni and mixed, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Figure 7.4: Regional composition of income quintiles in Iraq

This pattern could have even been reinforced by the uneven distribution of oil reserves (nonexistent in the Western part) but the post-2003 central-sharing agreement based on demographic weight especially aimed at compensating this bias. The succession of rebellions and conflicts had however a more pronounced spatial divergent effect, at the expense of the Sunni North-West and the Shia Southern regions, which reflects an unequal access to public infrastructures and services, as depicted by the regional distribution of the Human Development Indicator that captures both education and health living standards (Figure 7.3). Increasing geographical disparities may have then deepened the ethnic cleavage that took the form of an independence referendum for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legality was rejected by the Iraqi federal government. At the same time, rising tensions over the rallying of the mixed and oil-rich province of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region has illustrated the fragility of previous agreements (Natali, 2010; Mustafa, 2020). While united as opponents to Saddam, the alliance between Kurdish and Shia traditional parties has been increasingly put into question in the context of the war against Daesh (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

7.0.3 The persistence of sectarian voting

The specific feature of the Iraqi system leads to extremely high regional cleavages. To that respect, Iraq constitutes one of the most striking examples among the Middle East, partly similar to what is observed in Lebanon due to its confessional system. The regional variable captures almost perfectly the ethno-religious divide as depicted by the regional distribution of votes for Shia and Sunni lists by

provinces (Figure 7.5). Confronted with political parties clearly affiliated to one or another community, one could question the relevance of carrying an analysis at the country level. If the running lists were clearly geographically distributed and if no Sunni list, for instance, was running into the South of Iraq, this would rather call for narrowing the focus on intra-sect dynamics. However, it is important to keep in mind that decomposing Iraq within three major groups occupying distinct territories is a simplified misrepresentation. Mixed provinces, such as the capital Baghdad or the disputed province of Kirkuk, remain important, and only one-third to one-half of Iraqi governorates are demographically dominated by a single community (Bank, 2017). The geographical decomposition of political outcomes also confirms that inter-sectarian votes exist beyond support for secular and anti-sectarian coalitions. One may also interestingly note that the electoral base of the latter do not exhibit especially low level of religiosity as measured by the intensity of practices (Figure A2.6 in Appendix).

(a) Shia Islamic lists

(b) Sunni lists

Source: Authors' computation using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: The figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic and Sunni Islamic lists by region over time. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni and mixed, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia.

Figure 7.5: Regional distribution of vote in Iraq

Kurdish votes, nonetheless, display a dissimilar pattern, with almost no national list interfering in the Kurdish political scene (Figure A2.4 in Appendix). An alliance of two main parties that benefited from their historical legitimacy, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) created in 1946 and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) established in 1975, predominates. The 2018 elections are again notable in that respect given the significant score of the Communist Party, including in Kurdistan [36]. Apparent Kurdish unity also encompasses existing tensions between the two main rulers that has

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[36]It is worth mentioning that the then Shia Prime Minister Abadi symbolically ran his list in Kurdistan as well in 2018, adopting an unprecedented secular discourse, but its score is not reflected in my data.

been especially deadly in the mid-1990s. A growing opposition equally emerged as illustrated by the increasing score of the party Gorran that stands against clientelist patronage since 2009 (Table A1.1). Broadly speaking, the success of an anti-sectarian coalition explicitly endorsing a social class type of discourse in 2019 may have been radically shaking the foundation of the whole Iraqi's political system, including in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan.

7.0.4 What place for the income gradient in a sectarian vote?

Decomposing the vote for Shia parties along the income dimension confirms the importance of regional and sectarian disparities. In fact, while we do find an effect of income on the vote gap between the top 10% and the bottom 90% of earners, controlling for region, religion and ethnic origin almost cancels it out between 2005 and 2014 (Figure 7.6). In other words, income appears to have a limited differential impact on voting behaviour, once we account for ethno-sectarian affiliation. The same is observed with respect to vote for Sunni parties (Figure A2.12in Appendix.) Yet, the sectarian divide is not going without deep intra-sect inequalities. A poverty mapping exercise by district notably reveals that pockets of extreme poverty are side by side with islands enriched by oil windfalls, including within regions predominantly populated by one sect (Vishwanath et al. (2017); ?, see the map 7.8). How can we then understand that income seems to play virtually no role in voting behaviour for most of the period?

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated earners and the share of other voters voting for Shia Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-sectarian identity.

Figure 7.6: Vote for Shia Islamic lists among economic elite (top 10 percent earners)

First, this may result from a supply side shortage as the fall of Saddam Hussein regime came along with the ban of the former socialist pan-Arabism ideology which ruled the country since 1968. With most leaders of the post-2003 era being former opponents defined by their ethno-religious identity, few parties openly identified themselves on a left-right spectrum nor aimed at gathering the poor voters altogether. At the same time, secular coalitions that adopted a more socialist tone were predominantly joined by Sunni parties and thus struggled finding an effective cross-sectarian resonance. They also initially appealed more to both richer Iraqi from the Shia South and the Sunni North.

It is thus not incidental that the half-poorer voters were significantly more supportive of anti-sectarian lists only in 2018, date at which the alternative took the form of an unprecedented alliance between the secular communists and a faction of Islamic Shia, the Saadrists (Figure 7.7, regression results are displayed in Table A2.4). Decried as a tactical alliance with no future, this coalition also revealed the importance of the interactions between leftist and Islamists on the social ground, especially since the rise of streets movements (Robin-D'Cruz, 2019). By redefining the boundaries of the "anti-sectarian" camp, suddenly prone to incorporate Islamic components, this novel coalition may have reintroduced a class cleavage beyond sectarian voting while transforming the social and regional composition of the opposition[37].

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[37]I made the choice to exclude the so-called Saairun coalition from the grouping of Shia parties depicted in Figure 7.6 given the translation of its anti-sectarian stance into a concrete alliance with a long-lasting secular party, the Iraqi Communist Party. Nonetheless, other Shia parties equally denunciated sectarianism and opened to Sunni Muslims but in the absence of similar alliances. Income decomposition of principal Shia parties' support would worth a further investigation. The Saadrists have notably always been displaying a poorer electoral base.

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-sectarian identiy.

Figure 7.7: Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among half-poorer voters

On the other hand, the sectarianization of Iraqi politics also coincided with a struggle over oil-resources and their redistribution. The oil manna made of Iraq a rentier state with a centrally managed economy and a pervasive public sector which size has been multiplied by three since 2003, expanding from 850, 000 employees in 2004 to between 7 and 9 million in 2016 (Al-Mawlawi, 2019). The tacit quota-sharing system in the government and all administrations ensured the divide of state resources between the different stakeholders. The redistribution among communities on ethnic, religious or tribal ground notably channels through public appointments and civil servant wages which represents the fastest-growing expenditure item in the government budget. Employees in the public sector are also much richer while the bottom 50% of earners concentrates in the private sector and informal jobs (Figure A2.7 in Appendix).

In a country plagued by corruption and often ranked in the world top 10, clientelist patronage defined on an ethno-religious base keep playing a prominent electoral role (Abdullah et al., 2018) [38]. As much as Baath membership had been a standard requirement for much of state employment, ethnic and sect identity may have been key to accessing public services at large. The state impairment equally led to an increasing role for networks and tribal ties, further incentivizing the relevance of the sectarian identity and vote. The civil war that tore apart the country after the US invasion and the close links between politics and militarized groups lastly made of the sectarian affiliation a matter of

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[38]In the 2018 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions index, Iraq ranked 168th out of 180.

security (Jabar, 2018).

Population in multidimensional poverty
(headcount ratio, % population, 2017)

- 0 - 5%
- 5% - 10%
- 10% - 15%
- 15% - 25%

Source: Authors' computation using subnational decomposition of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (University of Oxford).
Note: The Muldimensional Poverty Index is an international measure of acute poverty that identifies deprivation across health, education and living standards.

Figure 7.8: Spatial distribution of poverty in Iraq in 2017 (Multidimensional Poverty Index)

At the same time, the 2018 elections, marked by a higher support for Shia Islamic list among the economic elites, also revealed how a system based on sectarian line actually failed in equally benefiting to all members of a same sect. To that respect, it is worth mentioning that in 2015, contrary to their expectations, Christia et al. (2017) did not find that Shia groups were exhibiting better access to public services in Baghdad with respect to the Sunni population, while being the politically dominant majority in that area. It is also in the mostly Shia province of Basra that social protests started mid-2015. Demonstrators held their own Shia leaders accountable for the worsening of public services and lack of electricity in one of the most oil-reserves rich governorate.

This point is even more important than such protests took place in spite of the war against the Sunni Islamic State that was reviving a clear threat along religious line (Haddad, 2020a). The limited but significant effect of income on vote choice in 2018 may then reflect the growing importance of intra-sect conflicts and the subsequent greater electoral role let to socioeconomic determinants. Those who have fewer opportunities to access the distributive policies of the state are also less likely to endorse a

clientelist patronage system that let them aside. Following the changes in the voting behaviour of the most destitute could then allow to identify other cleavages than the identity-based one.

7.0.5   An absence of cleavages beyond sectarian identity?

However, this approach remains quite inconclusive in the Iraqi setting, whatever one look at the support for Shia Islamic lists or anti-sectarian ones. One do not observe the emergence of new striking cleavages along education, age or gender dimensions. Yet, decades of conflicts severely damaged public institutions, especially education and healthcare, that used to be ranked near the top of the MENA region in the late 1970s. Differential of education attainment also partly overlaps with a generational divide in one of the youngest country in the world. In 2019, the UN estimated the share of the population aged below 24, that have grew up under sanctions and wars, around -60% [39]. The destruction of schools on a large scale has been especially detrimental to women and rural areas that exhibit a significant reduction in school enrollment rate (De Santisteban, 2005; Diwakar, 2015). Moreover, the number of internally displaced persons, a majority of women and children concentrated in poor urban areas, still ranges between 2 and 3 million today (one out of ten Iraqi), with half of them resulting from the population movement following US-led invasion (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2019).

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[39]In my data, younger cohorts do not seem to reach significantly lower education attainment between 2004 and 2019 (Figure A2.13 in Appendix). This point nonetheless questions the bias that our sample may suffer from, especially towards areas most severely affected by conflict that have not been sampled after 2014 for security reasons.

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-sectarian identity.

Figure 7.9: Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among the intellectual elite

The collapse of the Iraqi educational system as much as the increase inequality in access to post-primary education along geographical or gender difference could have then contributed to create or strengthen an educational cleavage (Figure A2.14 in Appendix). Nonetheless, likewise income, education does not seem to significantly impact voting choice, after having controlled for ethno-sectarian dynamics and the difference observed in 2018 remains limited in scope (Figure 7.9). Youth and women equally do not endorse more secular and anti-sectarian lists with respect to other voters, as much as those who declared experiencing significant economic difficulties (Figures A2.21, A2.17 and A2.20 in Appendix).

Figure 7.10: Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group

The absence of a salient education divide may relate to the continuous and massive exodus of the urban middle class that grew under Saddam regime (Batatu, 1979). Initiated during the war decades, the brain drain further amplified with the sectarian violence and the deBa'athification process of 2006-2007, leading to the potential disappearance of the former educated middle class in Iraq demographics nowadays. While precise estimates are yet to be missing, the increase of the Iraqi diaspora has been deemed especially important (Sassoon, 2012). To that respect, one can observe in Figure 7.10 that anti-sectarian lists were initially more supported by higher educated voters. While the importance of the gap faded away over time, the support among the most educated remained relatively high, especially in 2010 and 2018.

Anti-sectarian alliances, by reinventing themselves and moving beyond the secular camp, also gradually appealed to a more diverse electorate without constituting monolithic blocs. In fact, decomposing the support for anti-sectarian lists by income group and by region confirm that sectarian divide persists within such alliances. One can observe the displacement of the social base from the poorer-half Sunni to the poorer-half Shia between 2010 (Figure A2.22), in which the main anti-sectarian coalition was the predominantly Sunni Al-Iraqiya one, and 2018 (Figure A2.23), in which the dominant coalition was the Shia-led one of Saairun. In both cases, however, the anti-sectarian camp was supported by the high-income voters from Middle-Northern Iraq that one could suspect to be the former elite of

Saddam regime [40].

7.0.6 A system in crisis?

Despite the absence of a clear generational cleavage in terms of party choice, the new generation is yet the one who increasingly took the streets since 2011, and especially 2015 (Jabar, 2018; Costantini, 2020). The youth especially suffers from rampant unemployment and denunciates the widespread nepotism and corruption which do not benefit them. In our data, less than half of young men are employed in 2004 and this share dramatically dropped over the period, reaching one fifth in 2018. Women, for their part, are let aside from the labour force, regardless their age with less than 15% of them being employed. This constitutes a striking difference with preceding decades marked by significant women empowerment and a particularly low score, including for MENA standards [41].

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the regional decomposition of abstention declared by respondents. North-Eastern Iraq corresponds to the Kurdistan region. Middle-Northern is predominantly Sunni and Southern Iraq Shia. Baghdad is mixed.

Figure 7.11: Regional distribution of abstention

Social discontent, rather than channelling through vote for anti-sectarian lists, may have then mostly expressed itself in the form of abstention that increased across all income groups in 2018 (Figure A2.24). The youth voted on average less than their older fellows but the gap almost doubled in

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[40]This analysis should nonetheless be taken with care as decomposing by income groups and by region considerably reduces the sample size and the statistical power left over. Both figures are displayed in Appendix

[41]Women's share in the labour force reached 25 percent in Iraq by the mid-1980s while MENA estimates range around 20% nowadays (modelled ILO estimates excluding Turkey).

the last elections, including after controlling for income and education (Figure A2.25). Women also considerably voted less than men over the period but this gender gap cancels in 2010 and 2014, a timing interestingly matching when the anti-sectarians lists won the elections (Figure A2.26). Strikingly, while boycott aligned with Sunni identity at first, refusing to cast a vote may have become the clearest cross-sectarian mode of political expression (Mansour and van den Toorn, 2018) (Figure 7.11).

The higher degree of political activism among abstentionists, especially since 2014, equally suggests that abstention has been invested as a politically meaningful tool, rather than expressing political apathy (Figure A2.28). One may however notice that conversely to the Algerian setting, poorer voters reported in 2018 a lower degree of political activism than at the start of the period while the reverse trend is observed among high-income voters. This might nonetheless be mainly driven by the decrease of activism observed among the poorer Sunni (Figures A2.31 and A2.32) and the insecurity context related to ISIS threat on that region.

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the regional decomposition of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in the Iraqi adult population. North-Eastern Iraq corresponds to the Kurdistan region. Middle-Northern is predominantly Sunni and Southern Iraq Shia. Baghdad is mixed.

Figure 7.12: Regional distribution of trust deficit towards the government

At the same time, abstention does not appear as the political instrument of the destitute only, which translates into the cancellation of the turnout gap along both the income and the education dimension in 2018. Trust deficit towards the government equally jumped across all social and sectarian groups (Figure A2.35). All of this highlights the cross-class feature of the 2018 electoral sanction as much as

the cross-sectarian spread of the discontent. In 2018, the predominantly Shia-populated southern region was not only exhibiting the highest level of political activism but also the highest share of respondents reporting a total lack of confidence in the government, surpassing for the first time the score of the Sunni middle-north (Figure 7.12).

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters who declared having no confidence in the government and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for other ethno-religious identity.

Figure 7.13: Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among voters not trusting the government

To some extent, the rising abstention may invite to conclude that the anti-sectarian lists are not necessarily perceived by discontent voters as incarnating an opposition to the political system. It is worth noting that these lists are not preferentially more endorsed by individuals that expressed no trust in the government since 2014, with the 2018 elections not differing from that respect (Figure 7.13). Similarly, the most politically active voters do not vote so much more for these lists, once controlling for ethno-sectarian identity (Figure A2.33 in Appendix).

8   Algeria

Contrasting with the other countries of the area, Algerian politics is still dominated by the state-party that ruled the country after its independence in 1962. Yet, the country was the first one of the Arab World to launch multiparty elections at the end of the 1980s. The experience was however curt short by the victory of a fundamentalist Islamic party, immediately banned and repressed by the military apparatus. This failed attempt and the decade of civil war that followed inscribed the second democratization stage of the XXIst century between ruptures and continuity. The state-party still predominated and survived to the Arab Spring. The mass protests that arose in 2019 may have nonetheless by profoundly reshaping the future of the country.

In this section, I first look into the sociospatial disparities of the country in the presence of an important minority group geographically concentrated, the Berber-speaking population. In the absence of strong regional divide in the political scene, I turn to the decomposition of the electorate along the income gradient. I identify an original cross-class alliance incarnated by a formal two-party ruling that unite both the half poorer and the richest earners. The massive abstention of the youth leads me to put in perspective the importance of the generational cleavage. I lastly turn into the other dimensions of abstention and political activism in light of the massive protests that shake the regime since 2019.

8.0.1   Algeria's transition to democracy: from post-colonial authoritarianism to an 'electoral autocracy'

Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962 after 8 years of a long war that was not being called one. As the only settlement colony annexed to the French territory since its invasion in 1830, its independence was accompanied by a massive exodus of French and other Algeria-born Europeans the *Pieds-Noirs*, to mainland France. The new regime, deprived of around 10 percent of its population , replaced former bureaucrats and notables with trusted war veterans, enshrining from the start the deep connections between the State and the military. The National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN), that had united revolutionary dissidents during the independence war, imposed itself as the new state party and remained the only one legally operating in the country until 1989. Its former military arm, the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN), also reincarnated in the official army and kept a dominant position in the political field (Stora, 2004).

An authoritarian system promoting state socialism and Arabic nationalism then prevailed for almost three decades until nation-scale riots forced the regime to adopt governance reforms in 1988. Calling for ending corruption in deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, popular unrest was met by the adoption of a new constitution paving the way for a democratization process. Political parties could be created and take part into the first multiparty elections, raising hope in the whole Arab World. However, it was a fundamentalist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut*, FIS) that won an overwhelming majority in the 1991 elections. Threatened by such political outcomes in a context of increasing violence, the military called for cancelling the second round with the partial approval of the opposition puzzled between military interference and anti-democratic Islamism (Peyroulou, 2020).

With the Assembly dissolved and the FIS banned, the regime *de facto* fell under military ruling. An initial unelected collegial board involving historical figures of the Independence war was set up by generals. However, factional tensions led to the murder of its civil leader Boudiaf and transition to clear military authoritarianism. At the same time, state repression of the Islamists triggered a decade of violence and a bloody civil war that tore apart the country, with a human toll estimated between 100,000 and 200,000 deaths. Presidential elections organized in 1995, while being for the first time plural, equally confirmed at the presidency a general already heading the High Council of State.

It was only after the Black Decade ended that a second democratization turn really happened ,with a decline in armed violence and the annihilation of the Islamic threat. In 1999, a long-standing FLN member and former exile, Bouteflika, supported by both the military and the new ruling parties, was elected president. He would remain in place for nearly two decades, relying on a new pro-government coalition that would be renewed with no discontinuity until 2012. Uniting both the FLN, that never disappeared, and a new technocratic movement made up for supporting the president ahead of the 1997 elections, the Democratic National Rally (*Rassemblement national démocratique*, RND), the coalition also opened to the opposition that only moderate Islamic parties, distinct from the still banned FIS, decided to join (McDougall, 2017).

Figure 8.1: Legislative election results in Algeria (votes' share)

The political landscape in Algeria thus remained relatively stable and dominated by the alliance of the FLN and RND until 2019 despite increasing political fragmentation (Figure 8.1). The extremely high votes' share going to marginal parties did not translate into the allocation of parliamentary seats (Figure 8.2). The reinstatement of the institutional process with the regular holding of local and national elections was also accused of only perpetuating a status quo with limited democratization and freedom of association or of speech (Aghrout and Zoubir, 2015). The strong executive regime and the important power remaining in the hands of the security apparatus especially limited the genuine capacity of the Parliament. Part of the opposition then discontinuously refused to enter the political process. The Socialist Forces Front (*Front des Forces Socialistes*, FFS), the oldest opponent which had survived clandestinely since 1963 before being legalized, notably boycotted elections for nearly a decade until 2012. A contested constitutional modification also ruled out the terms limits in 2008 allowing the president to run for four mandates, despite deterioration of his health conditions in 2013.

Source: authors' computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the share of Parliamentary seats received by selected groups of Algerian political parties in legislative elections between 2002 and 2017.

Figure 8.2: Legislative election results in Algeria (share of seats)

The Arab Spring wave in 2011 fostered some additional reforms and the legalization of new political parties. Islamic parties dropped the government coalition and federated but did not manage to replicate in Algeria the success encountered across the region. Instead, their previous alliance with the regime rather signed their marginalization as credible opposition (Ghanem, 2019). The 5 percent electoral threshold also prevented the new players to get seats at the Assembly. Overall, the opposition remained weak and divided, while the Algerian electoral process was marked by a strong abstention exceeding 50 percent over the period (Table A1.1 in Appendix). Increasing importance has then been taken by street protests and located riots that gained an unprecedented and national dimension in February 2019 (Serres, 2019). Following the announcement of Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth mandate, millions of Algerians calling for reforms demonstrated every Friday and every Tuesday. Despite the president's renunciation and the organization of new elections, massively boycotted, the Hirak movement was still mobilizing a year after it started with unclear political consequences at the time of writing (Volpi, 2020).

8.0.2 Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria and ethnic cleavages

Algeria is a middle-income country which relies mostly on its reserves of hydrocarbon and gas all located in its Southern part. As the largest country in Africa in terms of its area, its population and economic activities beyond extraction are extremely unevenly distributed. The fourteen districts

along the coast, while representing only 4 percent of the country's surface, concentrate around 40 percent of its inhabitants and almost half of its companies, regardless of their size (Khaoua et al., 2014). This massive litoralisation has come with an important internal migration process, leading to the impoverishment of the major cities' surroundings. The geographical distribution of income groups then reveals important social disparities, especially between the North and the South part of the country (Figure A1.4)[42].

Figure 8.3: Spatial disparities in Algeria in terms of Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) in 2018
Source: Author's computation. DHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Institute for Management Research, Radboud Universty)

On the other hand, the high trend of oil prices until 2014, and the need of building a new social contract after the Black decade of the 1990s, translated into a sustained growth accompanied by significant social achievements. While no tax microdata are available for estimating accurately inequality levels, estimations from low-quality surveys suggest a relative decrease until the early 2010s [43]. Despite lack of recent poverty estimates, the World Bank also estimates Algeria to have achieved over 20 percent of poverty reduction in the past two decades. Nonetheless, large regional variations

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[42]One can also find in Appendix the geographical distribution of income groups according to the survey data collected (Figures A1.1 and A1.3) .

[43]According to the World Inequality Database, the distribution would have stabilized as follows: around 21 percent of the pre-tax national income share going to the bottom 50 and 37 percent to the top 10. If such absolute figures may seem especially low, they have to be taken with extremely high caution as such low-quality surveys are likely to severely underestimate levels but may offer some indications about the time-trend evolution.

persist at the expense of the Sahara and Steppe region with poverty reaching two to three times the national average. The share of the population seen as susceptible to falling into poverty also remains high (around 10 percent) (WB estimates).

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region.

Figure 8.4: Vote for the FLN by region

Do these spatial inequalities translate into voting behavior? Looking at the vote for the FLN across regions indeed suggest some significant geographical variations among its support base but only moderately and with no clear trends (Figures 8.4 and A1.5 in Appendix).While new regional protest movements have been increasingly taking importance in the 2010s, they did not seem to find an echo in the political arena. It is notably in name of all "inhabitants of the South" that a movement against unemployment started in 2004 and grew in the 2010s (Belakhdar, 2015). Calling for the employment of Algerians in the petroleum and gas projects of the region, the protest especially denunciated the marginalization of the youth and graduated in the energy sector in the absence of alternate options. On the eve of the 2014 presidential elections, the movement took a national resonance when some political figures from the opposition joined and claims turned against corruption scandals involving a former Energy Minister.[44] Nonetheless, no political party aiming at representing the distinct interest of the South has yet emerged.

The picture is quite different when turning to the Berber-populated region of Kabylia (Figure 8.6).

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[44]Doha Institute, 2013, "The Protest Movement of the Unemployed in Southern Algeria", online at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The_Protest_Movement_of_the_Unemployed_in_Southern_Algeria.aspx.

Berber, or self-named Amazigh, represent about a quarter of the Algerian population while other citizens are predominantly Arabic. Distinct by their language and culture, Amazigh are for two thirds located in Kabylia and for one third between the Aurès Mountain (North-Eastern) and the Northern frange of the Sahara (see the map 8.5 in Appendix). While having been a constitutive part of the independent factions against the French, the Berbers have initially not been recognized in the new regime as a distinct group. The post-colonial Arabization of the country and the Arab nationalism imposed a unified national identity not letting an official place for minorities.

Figure 8.5: Geographical distribution of Berber-speaking population in Algeria
Source: Author's computation

The so-called "Berber question" reached the political scene in 1980 when popular uprisings took place in Kabylia. Although contained to that region, this first large-scale unrest of independent Algeria did not only have an ethnic dimension but also endorsed socioeconomic and democratic requests at large. Accordingly, no regional or ethnic Berber political party was launched with the introduction of multiparty elections.[45]. Instead, two of the main secular opposition parties, the Socialist Forces Front (*Front des Forces Socialistes*, FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (*Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie*, RCD), were established and received greater support in Kabylia until today, despite their national scope and the lack of requests towards decentralization or autonomy. On the other hand, beyond the "Kabyle Spring" of 1980, the province distinguished itself again on the eve

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[45]Formation of parties on ethnic or religious grounds was also prohibited by the new Constitution of 1989 but regardless this point, scholars highlight the effort displayed by parties launched in Kabylia to not be perceived as regionalist and to endorse national and inclusive platforms (Willis, 2014)

of the 2002 elections. An important social unrest initiated there and expanded until the streets of Alger while the Kabyle were also the ones who massively boycotted the elections. Yet, most cultural demands were met during the 1990s with the recognition of the Berber identity and language by the government. Once more, the movement rather called for governance reforms, denunciating the worsening of socio-economic conditions in general, military interference, and police brutality (Willis, 2014).

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD) by region. In 2002, speaking Amazight at home is taking as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.

Figure 8.6: Vote for secular opposition (FFS & RCD) by region/language

Looking at the income composition in Kabylia or among people speaking Tamazight does not suggest that this group is more destitute compared to the rest of Algeria. On the contrary, Berber-speaking individuals appear to be over-represented among the top 10 percent of income earners (Figures A1.7 and 8.7). However, several points deserve further consideration. First, by endorsing mainly opposition parties, Kabylia is likely to have been let aside from the political clientelism organized around the government and could explain an acute denunciation of the ongoing nepotism. Second, the region displays important internal inequality and is far from being a homogeneous entity (Figure A1.8 in Appendix). Mountainous and densely populated, the area used to be highly rural and remaining rural spots encounter important unemployment rates (Akerkar, 2015).

The composition of income groups by regions (Kabylia), 2019

Figure 8.7: Income composition of Kabylia compare to the other regions of Algeria

Moreover, the relatively lower importance of the bottom 50 may reflect more the effect of the remittances in alleviating poverty due to peculiar migration schemes than the economic development of the region *per se* (Margolis et al., 2013b). At the same time, the partial overlapping of the Berber question with the Kabyle one should not overshadow the dynamics at play within the two other Amazigh tribes. From that respect, this ethnic cleavage rather endorses a strong regional component[46]. In the South in particular, the Mozabite have been engaged in long tensions with neighboring Arabs on the ground of strong socioeconomic claims. Although it nourished autonomous demands, those did not find any echo on the national political scene, neither federated with the Kabyle movement (Oussedik, 2015).

8.0.3 A renewed cross-class alliance in a two-party ruling

While regional and cultural disparities are definitely important in the Algerian landscape, they do not provide a good grid of analysis for understanding how the FLN managed to get back its predominance after the difficult civil strife. Given the composition of successive governments since 2002, only considering FLN support would be misleading. In fact, the RND, created for the 1997 elections first dominated the reopening political scene. It established itself as the right arm of the state-founding party and joined every coalition including when the FLN had the absolute majority of seats. Both

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[46]The 'Touareg question' constitutes another example of ethno-regional cleavage regarding the extreme-South of Algeria not investigated here.

parties then seem to have equally served the authorities in power despite apparently radical ideological differences: the FLN had a strong socialist component rooted in the early years of its ruling, while the RND initially aimed at incarnating a new liberal economic view, uniting technocrats behind the promotion of the structural adjustment reforms defended by the IMF and akin to capital account liberalization (Hamadouche and Zoubir, 2009).

Figure 8.8: Vote for ruling parties (FLN / RND) among top-income voters

The income gradient of these two parties then particularly reflects this divide and exhibits a striking symmetric pattern: until 2014 the FLN seems to have been relatively more successful among the poor, while the RND has appealed to higher-income voters[47]. The complementarity of their social base may have contributed to explain the remarkable stability of the regime so far. Such pattern, far from being exceptional, rather recalls the characteristics of so-called neopatrimonial states in which blurry frontiers between politics and the economic sector foster clientelistic loyalties among a socially diverse electorate (Eisenstadt, 1973; Médard, 1991). On one side, the regime adopted a strong welfare component since the 1970s and kept with high level of spending and redistributive policies with respect to MENA standards. The spike in oil prices in the 2000s notably translated into massive funding for development programs, jumping from 7 billion for the five-year investment plan in 2000 to more than 200 billion for the following ones (Eibl, 2020b). The distribution of the hydrocarbon rent also

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[47]This analysis has first been carried without reweighing the results find in survey data so as to match official election outcomes. The income divide was more salient and significant without reweighing. See Figures A1.17 and A1.18 in Appendix. The regression results in Table A2.1 nonetheless suggest that this income effect is non statistically significant at 5%, in the absence of controls

went through consumption, housing or interest rate subsidy and important state employment. Public sector still accounts for around 40 percent of employment despite the privatization path taken in the 1990s. All of these are potentially as many drivers of social justice discourses that can contribute to explaining support for the FLN among the bottom 50 percent earners.

On the other side, the RND also constitutes the party of the new entrepreneurs and globalization. Liberalization and privatization of the 1990s led to a rapid expansion of the private sector in a country opening to international trade and giving up on initial industrialization projects, especially for consumption goods. Three quarters of currently running companies, concentrated in the tertiary sector, had notably been created in the 2000s, after the stabilization of the security context. This equally marked a new stage for the crony capitalism system. Import markets that used to be state monopoly were allocated to a number of private sector oligopolies whose networks deeply enshrined into the circles of power and the military. United in the "Forum of Entrepreneurs" set up in 2000, this new elite did not hesitate to take public position and publicize its links with the family of the President Bouteflika, fueling suspicions of corruption (Belguidoum, 2019). Combining both sides of the regime's face makes then almost disappear the income cleavage observed when taking each of its component on its own (Figure 8.9), except in 2012.

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income group.

Figure 8.9: The limited income gradient for the rulling parties

It is also striking to observe that the income divide loss of its importance after 2014. The social equilibrium may have been put into question with the contemporary oil counter-shock which

dramatically decreased government revenues and subsequent subsidies as government budget depends for two-thirds on hydrocarbon export revenues. While consumption subsidy, pay rises for civil servants or youth unemployment scheme may have been efficient policy tools for limiting the Arab Spring spread in Algeria, these ones were not affordable anymore after 2014 without massive reduction in foreign currency reserves (Volpi, 2013; Achy, 2013). The president also appeared severely diminished after his stroke in 2013. Rising tensions around worsening social and economic conditions, especially with respect to employment and housing, then translated into a less preferential support from the bottom 50 compared to the other voters to the FLN. The increase perception of the RND and the FLN as being 'genuinely' the same may also explain why the income divide tended to fade away over time while the observed reverse in 2014 might only reflect differential preferences with respect to presidential elections occurring on that year.

8.0.4   The relevance of a generational cleavage

The Algerian population is very young, with more than 40 percent aged below 25, a group that constitutes one of the most fragile parts of the country Their unemployment rate is three times higher than the national average, peaking at 29 percent for the ones below 25. This point is even more salient for young women that translates into a particularly low participation into the labor force (Figure A1.20) [48]. The young graduates also suffer from a dramatic skill mismatch in the labor market resulting from the lack of diversification of the rentier economy. The unemployment rate of university graduates at large notably reaches 18.5 percent.

The rapid expansion of the population in the 2000s also meant a reduction in the rent per head, further shrunk after the drop in international oil prices in 2014. Beyond the salient sustainability challenges at play, the situation also points to the major role let to the informal sector in an economy with one of the lowest formal participation in the labor force in the world (only 40 percent). In the absence of socio-economic opportunities and the decline of targeted policies that became too costly, more than 57 percent of individuals aged below 25 expressed having thought about emigrating from Algeria in 2019.[49]

In this context, the relationship between the youth and the regime has been especially scrutinized. Main drivers of the riots of 1988 which opened the first multiparty interlude, a sizeable number of

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[48]See Figures A1.19 and A1.21 in Appendix for the distribution of employment status and the gender gap over the period.

[49]See Figure A1.23 in Appendix for the distribution among age groups. Data are available only for 2019.

young Algerians also joined Islamist armed groups during the civil war, increasing the salience of a generational cleavage (Willis, 1999). As in any post-colonial ruling, the symbolic capital taken from the participation into the Independence war that benefited the FLN tends to fade away over time and especially among the new generations. The youth has thus displayed a significant rejection of the regime party, while older voters have been much more likely to support the FLN, 2017 excepted. Interestingly, this did not come with a higher endorsement for Islamic opposition parties either, except in 2002 (Figure A2.5 in Appendix). Controlling for education also significantly reduced the observed gap[50].

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by age group.

Figure 8.10: Vote for the FLN by age group

The fact that support for the FLN seems to have varied little by age in 2017 should however not lead us to conclude that young voters have become more favourable to the ruling party. Especially, the field work survey took place in early 2019, ahead of the unexpected announcement that the president would run for a fifth mandate that triggered the Hirak protests. The voting choices expressed are then unlikely of having been the same at few months of intervals. Moreover, newly enfranchised cohorts seem to have increasingly moved towards abstention, with less than a fifth of voters younger than 39 declaring having voted in the 2017 legislative elections, in a context where aggregate turnout reached only 35 percent.[51] Rather than denoting an exceptional rallying, this figure invites to deepen

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[50]Figure A1.22 and regressions results in Table A2.2 can be found in Appendix

[51]See Figure A1.28 in Appendix. These figures should be interpreted with care given well-known issues of turnout misreporting of turnout, but they do reveal the magnitude of abstention among the youth.

on how the opposition, secular or Islamic, did not manage to incarnate an appealing alternative since the end of the civil war.

8.0.5 A discredited electoral system?

The extremely low turnout expressed in our data, even lower than official statistics throughout the period (Figure A1.27 in Appendix), casts doubt on the ability of the multiparty system to actually capture discontent. This goes with a strong presidential regime as the executive *de facto* not only names the prime minister and its government but also appoints a significant number of high-ranked officials (one-third of senators and of the constitutional council). Moreover, the control on the allocation of state resources gives a strong importance to the government and the bureaucracy independently from the Parliament (Willis, 2014). Patronage redistribution schemes through tribe and religious links also contribute to the opacity of a system escaping to the elected body (Hachemaoui, 2013).

The confidence level expressed into elected institutions then appears to be lower than the one allocated to the executive rewarded for preserving security.[52] Presidential elections also present a higher turnout (Table A1.1 in Appendix). Nonetheless, the appointment of presidential candidates does not reply to a party system mechanism as the governing parties (FLN, RND) and some opposition ones, such as the Islamist Hamas, back the candidate endorsed by the Military. The incumbent therefore faced almost no real challengers and with the notable exception of 2019 was re-elected with more than 80 percent of votes, which led major opposition parties to call for boycotting the electoral process, especially in 2014.

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[52]Arab Barometer Report, 2019, *The 2019 Algerian Protests*.

Figure 8.11: Political activism by income group

Abstention, together with street protests and increasing number of micro-riots, have then been seen as a renewed form of political participation in Algeria since the early 2000s while adopting a cross-class dimension (Hamadouche, 2009). In fact, while the poor and the youth are not the only ones not voting, political activism, as captured by the share of respondents having signed a petition or attended an organized demonstration, has been increasingly invested by the more disadvantaged social strata over time. While the gap between the first and the fifth quintile of the income distribution reached 13 percentage point in 2002 at the favor of the richest, the difference reduced and even inversed with the poorest half of Algerians participating more in 2019 and so, ahead of the Hirak movement (Figure 8.11).

The movement of the unemployed in the South as much as the Hirak also similarly claimed their independence from any political parties (Aït-Hamadouche and Dris, 2019). Civil movements have then been invested as potential ways to bring the democratic opposition together with the creation of several committees and increasing participation in various forms of civil society, beyond the existing party system (Northey, 2018). My data nonetheless suggest that civil participation measured by the involvement in various organizations as charity or local groups kept being invested more by the richer throughout the period, with no reduction of the gap observed along the income distribution (Figure 8.12).

Figure 8.12: Membership in civil society organization by income groups

By a striking parallel, both Iraqi and Algerian movements took place in rentier states which managed to avoid their own Arab Springs in 2011, are facing drastic diminutions of their oil revenues since 2014, and do not exhibit a consolidated opposition camp. Adopting an anti-establishment rhetoric, these protest movements exhibit interclass dynamics with no demands being expressed on behalf of a particular social, religious or ethnic group and rather directed towards broad governance reforms The main denunciations concern notably corruption and the poor quality of public services. Similarly, both also continued after the electoral solution provided by their respective regime. Hirak regular demonstrations kept being organized after the presidential election of December 2019 while Iraqi protests led the Prime Minister to call early elections in July 2020, for the first time in the Iraqi democratic era. Transcending existing cleavages, these two movements appear as momenta susceptible to reverse previous equilibria letting the future of both former regimes uncertain.

9 Conclusion

This paper extended a comparative methodology initially developed by (Piketty, 2018) for Western countries to the case of the Middle East. Combining four sources of opinion surveys, I built homogeneous time-series on political cleavages, considering the distribution of the party choice among the respective samples to be representative of the composition of the electorate in a given year. Creating simple measures of inequality along different dimensions, I investigated whether one could relate the divides observed in voting patters to some aspect of social and income inequality, putting into perspective survey findings with evidence from various fields of Social Science.

My focus on party choice only, discarding other expressions of political preferences or values reported in these surveys, led me to restrict my sample of interest to three countries: Algeria (between 2002 and 2018), Iraq (between 2004 and 2018) and Turkey (between 1990 and 2018). Each country displayed specific institutional configuration and politics history that required to be analyzed on its own. Algeria has a strong executive regime that is often perceived to be accompanied with a limited democratization, given the genuine weak power of the Parliament. Iraq set up its first multiparty elections in 2004 under US-occupation, establishing a sectarian system aiming at accounting for the ethno-religious diversity of the country. Turkey, by contrast, held democratic and pluralist elections since 1950. This paper therefore does not aim to infer conclusions for the region at large.

Given the specific treatment that is often reserved for the Middle East in comparative politics, my paper constitutes an attempt to see whether applying a comparative methodology to the study of this area can still be informative. As the most unequal region in the world, one could have suspected rising inequalities to have shaped the evolution of the structure of political conflict. The recent wave of mass protests that shook several countries of the area since 2019 similarly suggests a crisis of political representation and a reconsideration of previous social contracts around the redistribution of national resources.

However, the importance of ethno-religious and identity conflicts leads to usually pay limited attention to the dynamics of social inequality in the Middle East. The poor quality of data available equally questions the validity of quantitative work for studying electoral behaviour in the zone. The lack of party competition and the little congruence between parties programmatic position and individuals' preferences similarly cast doubts on the possibility to capture political cleavages by looking at party choice. Yet, the relationships between distributive policies and electoral competition, notably through

the channel of cronyism or clientelism, is well-acknowledged in the area. Moreover, the electoral process remains important, including for capturing the discontent by the mean of massive abstention. Interacting political cleavages and social inequality seems then equally relevant in the Middle East.

In this paper, I tried to see whether any conclusion could be reached, while bearing in mind the inherent limits and limited scope of my analysis. I documented whenever social inequality seemed to be important for explaining electoral divide and I tried to investigate the reasons that could explain why it was sometimes not the case. My main findings could be summed up in one sentence: unsurprisingly inequality matters in political cleavages, even in the Middle East, but the dimension of inequality that prevails remains highly context-dependent.

In Turkey, I identified that the salient religious divide preceded the arrival in power of the current incumbent and did not offer a definite grid of analysis for understanding how a party with an openly Islamic identity managed to predominate for almost two decades in the long-lasting secular republic of the area. I found that higher-educated and high-income voters did not preferentially endorse the AKP compare to the rest of the population but that the intellectual and economic elites rather appeared to be roughly split in two: one side supporting the AKP and the other, the secular state-founding party. The importance of the ethnic conflict around the Kurdish minority, that translated into strong and stable regional voting patterns over the period, also encompasses tremendous spatial disparities. All in all, the socioeconomic determinants in the Turkish setting seems especially accurate, despite the apparent move to identity politics.

In Iraq, I found an extremely strong persistence of the sectarian voting that is going beyond existing intra-sect inequalities. Nonetheless, this cleavage might have been recently questioned by the recomposition of the so-called opposition. The anti-sectarian camp notably incorporated in the last elections a Shia Islamic component that transformed its social base by becoming more inclusive. Moving from an alliance of secular parties with an over-representation of Sunnis Arabs, the anti-sectarian lists were equally supported by the poorer Shia in 2018. However, the diversity of the social composition of the opposition may relate to its lack of unity and extreme fragmentation. The absence of alternate political cleavages beyond the sectarian one may explain why popular discontent seems to have rather channeled through abstention that became the clearest cross-sectarian mode of political expression in the recent elections.

In Algeria, contrary to the two other settings, I did not find that socio-spatial diversities strongly overlapped with the geographical concentration of an important ethnic minority, the Amazigh. Those

nonetheless preferentially supported more a well-identified part of the opposition over the period. This suggests the relevance of an Identity vote that interestingly did not take the form of separatist or autonomy requests in the political arena. I identified that the predominance of the FLN, the sate-party that ruled the country since the independence, may have been reinvented in the recent period by incorporating an original cross-class alliance, exemplified by an actual two-party ruling: uniting both the half-poorer and the high-income voters. The massive abstention however, throughout the period, called for investigating in more depth the socioeconomic determinants of the discontent part of the population that remained aside of the party competition system but massively took the streets since February 2019. To that respect, the frame of this study may not be the most accurate one for this purpose.

To conclude, this study only constitutes preliminary observations linking the development of social inequality in the Middle East to political cleavages, identified through the lens of survey data. The wave of protests, that are still happening at the time of the writing despite the global pandemic, opened an uncertain path to many regimes across the region. Updating this analysis with the next wave of opinion surveys, that are hopefully still going to be conducted, would be especially interesting for confirming or refuting the interpretative hypothesis that are formulated in this work.

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Appendix

A1   Harmonization rules

Overall case	ISCED-A-level 2011	All categories	WVS Variable	WVS Code	Arab Barometer 3/4/5 Variable	Arab Barometer 3/4/5 Code	Afro Barometer 3/4/5/6/7 Variable	Afro Barometer 3/4/5/6/7 Code	CSES 3 Variable	CSES 3 Code	D2003 / E2003 Variable	CSES 4/5 Code
			x025 (Highest educational level attained)		q1003 (Highest educational level attained)		q97 (Highest educational level attained)		C2003 (Education)		q1003	(Education)
(1) Low	(0) No formal education and incomplete primary	Never attended an education programme	x025	(0) Not applicable; No formal education	q1003	(1) Illiterate / literate	q1003	(0) No formal schooling (1) Informal schooling only	q1003	(1) None	q1003	(0) None (no education)
		Some early childhood education	x025	(1) Inadequately completed elementary education			q1003	(2) Some primary schooling	q1003	(2) Incomplete Primary	q1003	(1) ISCED Level 0 - early childhood education
		Some primary education (without level completion)			q1003	(2) Elementary						
	(1) Primary	Primary education	x025	(2) Completed (compulsory) elementary education	q1003	(3) Preparatory / basic	q1003	(3) Primary school completed	q1003	(3) Primary Completed	q1003	(2) ISCED Level 1 - Primary
	(2) Lower Secondary	Lower secondary general education	x025	(5) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary,			q1003	(4) Some secondary school/High school	q1003	(4) Incomplete Secondary	q1003	(3) ISCED Level 2 - Lower Secondary
		Lower secondary vocational education	x025	(3) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational								
(2) Mid	(3) Upper Secondary	Upper secondary general education	x025	(6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary,	q1003	(4) Secondary	q1003	(5) Secondary school completed/high school	q1003	(5) Secondary Completed	q1003	(4) ISCED Level 3 - Upper Secondary
		Upper secondary vocational education	x025	(4) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary,								
	(4) Post secondary, non-tertiary	Post secondary, non-tertiary general and vocational			q1003	(5) Mid-level diploma / professional or technical	q1003	(6) Post-secondary qualifications, not university	q1003	(6) Post-secondary trade / vocational school	q1003	(5) ISCED Level 4 - Post-Secondary non-tertiary
	(5) Short-cycle tertiary	Short-cycle tertiary general and vocational	x025	(7) Some university without degree/Higher education - lower-level			q1003	(7) Some university	q1003	(7) University undergraduate degree incomplete	q1003	(6) ISCED Level 5 - Short-cycle tertiary
(3) High	(6) Bachelor's or equivalent level	University degree completed Bachelor	x025	(8) University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary	q1003	(6) BA	q1003	(8) University completed	q1003	(8) University undergraduate degree complete	q1003	(7) ISCED Level 6 - Bachelor or equivalent
	(7) Master's or equivalent level	University degree completed Master			q1003	(7) MA and above	q1003	(9) Post-graduate			q1003	(8) ISCED Level 7 - Master or equivalent
	(8) Doctor or equivalent level	Post-graduate education									q1003	(9) ISCED Level 8 - Doctoral or equivalent
(1) Low	Recoded as (0)	Other: Don't Know / Missing										

Figure A1.1: Harmonization rules for the Education variable (ISCED - sources)

Education level (3 categories) by country				Overall case	ISCED-A-level 2011	All categories
TR	IQ	DZ	EG			
(1) Low	(1) Low	No harmonization	(1) Low except Afro (3) put in Mid in 2016	(1) Low	(0) No formal education and incomplete primary	Never attended an education programme
						Some early childhood education
						Some primary education (without level completion)
					(1) Primary	Primary education
	(2) except WVS (3) put into Low for all period				(2) Lower Secondary	Lower secondary general education
						Lower secondary vocational education
(2) Mid			(2) Mid	(2) Mid	(3) Upper Secondary	Upper secondary general education
						Upper secondary vocational education
					(4) Post secondary, non-tertiary	Post secondary, non-tertiary general and vocational
(2) Mid except in			(3) High	(3) High	(5) Short-cycle tertiary	Short-cycle tertiary general and vocational
(3) High	(3) High				(6) Bachelor's or equivalent level	University degree completed Bachelor
					(7) Master's or equivalent level	University degree completed Master
					(8) Doctor or equivalent level	Post-graduate education
(1) Imputed as Low	(1) Imputed as Low		(1) Imputed as Low	(1) Low	Recoded as (0)	Other : Don't Know / Missing

Figure A1.2: Harmonization rules for the Education variable (ISCED – country)

Religion importance (3 cat)	Precise wording of the question	WVS - Important in Life	a006	WVS - Religious Person	f034	Arab 4 & 5 - Religious person	q609	CSES 3 & 4 (TR)	C2024 / D2025	Afrobarometer 5	Q98B
		Important in Life: Religion		Religious Person		In general, would you describe yourself as ...		Religiosity		How important is religion in your life?	
		Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code
All categories		a006		f034		q609		C2024 / D2025		Q98B	
(1) High	Very important / religious A religious person	a006	(1) Very important	f034	(1) A religious person	q609	(1) Religious	C2024 / D2025	(4) Very religious	Q98B	(4) Very important
(2) Mid	Rather important Somewhat important Not very important / religious	a006	(2) Rather important (3) Not very important			q609	(2) Somewhat religious	C2024 / D2025	(3) Somewhat religious (2) Not very religious		(3) Somewhat important (2) Not very important
(3) Low	Not a religious person Not all important A convinced atheist / no religious beliefs	a006	(4) Not at all important	f034 f034	(2) Not a religious person (3) A convinced atheist	q609	(3) Not religious	C2024 / D2025	(1) Have no religious beliefs	Q98B	(1) Not at all important

Figure A1.3: Harmonization rules for the religiosity variable (1)

Religious practices (3 categories)	Religious practices (harmonization suggested by OMBound project)	Precise wording of the sentence — All categories (taken from OMBound project)	WVS - Religious Services f028 How often do you attend		CSES 3 & 5 (TR) C2023 / Religious services attendance		Arab Barometer 3 & 5 - Religious Service q6105 & Attend Friday prayer		Afrobarometer 6 Q98B Aside from weddings and		Arab Barometer 3 & 4 & 5 - Read Quran q6106 & Listen or Read the Quran	
			Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code
(1) Regularly	(1) Once or several times a week	More than once a day					q6105	(1) Always	Q98B	(6) More than once a day	q6106	(1) Always
		Every day					q6105	(2) Most of the time	Q98B	(5) About once a day	q6106	(2) Most of the time
		Several times a week or more often (incl. every day, several times a day)			C2023 / E2014	(6) Once a week / More than once a week						
		Several times a week							Q98B	(4) A few times a week		
		More than once a week	f028	(1) More than once a								
		Once or several times a week	f028	(2) Once a week					Q98B	(3) About once a week		
		Once a week										
(2) One to three times a month		2 or 3 times a month			C2023 / E2014	(5) Two or more times a month						
		Once a month	f028	(3) Once a month	C2023 /	(4) Once a month			Q98B	(2) About once a month		
		One to three times a month										
(2) Rarely	(3) Several times a year, only on special holidays	About each 2 or 3 month										
		Several times a year			C2023 /	(3) Two to eleven times a year	q6105	(3) Sometimes	Q98B	(1) A few times a year	q6106	(3) Sometimes
		Few times a year										
		Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days	f028	(4) Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days								
		Other specific holly days										
	(4) Once a year or less frequently	Once a year	f028	(5) Once a year	C2023 /	(2) Once a year						
		Less frequently (than once a year)	f028	(6) Less often			q6105	(4) Rarely			q6106	(4) Rarely
		Less frequently (than only on special holly days)										
(3) Never practically never	(5) Never, practically never	Never, practically never	f028	(7) Never, practically								
		Practically never										
		Never			C2023 /	(1) Never	q6105	(5) Never (only for IQ)	Q98B	(0) Never religion	q6106	(5) Never (only for IQ)
		Respondent has no religion										

Figure A1.4: Harmonization rules for the religiosity variable (2)

Religious practices - PRAY (3 cat)	Presice wording of the sentence	WVS - Pray f028b	How often to you pray	CSES 4 (TR) D2024	Religious services attendance -	Arab Barometer 3 & 5 - Pray q6101 &	Do you pray daily? / Pray fajr	Arab Barometer 5 - Pray q609	How often do you pray?
All categories (taken from DNBound project)		Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code	Variable	Code
	More than once a day	f028b	(1) Several times a day			q6101	(1) Always	q609	(1) Five times a day
	Every day	f028b	(2) Once a day					q609	(2) Once a day
	Several times a week or more often (incl. every day, several times a day)			D2024	(6) Once a week / More than once a week	q6101	(2) Most of the time		
(1) Most of the times	Several times a week	f028b	(3) Several times each week						(3) Several times a week
	More than once a week								
	Once or several times a week								
	Once a week							q609	(4) Once a week
	2 or 3 times a month			D2024	(5) Two or more times a month				
	Only when attending religious services	f028b	(4) Only when attending						
	Once a month			D2024	(4) Once a month			q609	(5) At least once a month
	One to three times a month								
	About each 2 or 3 month								
(2) Rarely	Several times a year			D2024	(3) Two to eleven times a year	q6101	(3) Sometimes		
	Few times a year								
	Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days	f028b	(5) Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days						
	Other specific holy days								
	Once a year	f028b	(6) Once a year	D2024	(2) Once a year				
	Less frequently (than once a year)	f028b	(7) Less often			q6101	(4) Rarely		
(3) Not regularly / Never	Less frequently (than only on special holy days)								
	Never, practically never	f028b	(8) Never, practically						
	Practically never								
	Never			D2024	(1) Never	q6101	(5) Never (only for IQ)	q609	(6) Never

Figure A1.5: Harmonization rules for the religiosity variable (3)

A2   Overview of data available per MENA country - Author's computation

Table A2.1: Algeria - data available

Survey	Date	Missing/Sample size
World Values Survey	2002	49.38
Arab Barometer	2011	86.84
Arab Barometer	2013	63.11
Afrobarometers	2013	68.17
World Values Survey	2014	52.25
Afrobarometers	2015	65.33
Arab Barometer	2016	83.00
Arab Barometer	2019	61.66

Electoral calendar	
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**
2004	1997
2009	2002
2014	2007
2019	2012
	2017

Table A2.2: Egypt - data available

Survey	Date	Missing/Sample size
World Values Survey	2001	48.20
World Values Survey	2008	37.40
Arab Barometer	2011	82.20
World Values Survey	2012	73.41
Afrobarometers	2013	76.29
Arab Barometer	2013	84.11
Afrobarometers	2015	74.62
Arab Barometer	2016	93.33
Arab Barometer	2019	62.29

Electoral calendar	
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**
2005	2005
2012	2010
2014	2011-12
2018	2015
	2020

Table A2.3: Iran - data available

Survey	Date	Missing/Sample size
World Values Survey	2000	64.93
World Values Survey	2007	23.43

Electoral calendar	
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**
1997	2000
2001	2005
2005	2008
2009	

Table A2.4: Iraq - data available

Survey	Date	Missing/Sample size
World Values Survey	2004	65.03
World Values Survey	2006	18.14
Arab Barometer	2011	50.24
World Values Survey	2013	49.42
Arab Barometer	2013	62.55
Arab Barometer	2019	60.38

Electoral calendar		
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**	**Local Election**
1995	2000	2005
2002	2005 Jan	2009
	2005 Decc	2013
	2010	2014
	2014	2020
	2018	

Table A2.5: Jordan - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
World Values Survey	2001	88.63
Arab Barometer	2010	91.84
Arab Barometer	2012	93.65
World Values Survey	2014	93.42
Arab Barometer	2016	78.27
Arab Barometer	2019	96.79

Electoral calendar	
Legislative Election	**Local elections**
1997	1999
2003	2003
2007	2007
2010	2013
2013	2017
2016	
2020	

Table A2.6: Lebanon - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
Arab Barometer	2010	44.12
Arab Barometer	2012	53.42
Arab Barometer	2016	41.07

Electoral calendar		
Presidential Election	Legislative Election	Local Election
2014-2016	2009	2010
	2018	2016

Table A2.7: Libya - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
World Values Survey	2014	71.84
Arab Barometer	2014	72.81
Arab Barometer	2019	89.65

Electoral calendar	
Legislative Election	Local Election
2012	
2014	2019

Table A2.8: Morocco - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
World Values Survey	2001	77.94
World Values Survey	2007	54.00
World Values Survey	2011	84.58
Afrobarometers	2013	70.33
Arab Barometer	2013	79.39
Afrobarometers	2015	62.50
Arab Barometer	2016	68.17
Arab Barometer	2019	48.63

Electoral calendar	
Legislative Election	Local Election
2002	2009
2007	2015
2011	
2016	

Table A2.9: Palestine - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
Arab Barometer	2010	39.67
Arab Barometer	2012	34.75
Arab Barometer	2016	55.83
Arab Barometer	2019	37.22

Electoral calendar		
Presidential Election	Legislative Election	Local Election
2005	2006	2005
	postponed since 2009	2012
		2017

Table A2.10: Sudan - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
Arab Barometer	2011	83.22
Arab Barometer	2013	61.08
Arab Barometer	2019	52.16

Electoral calendar	
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**
2010	2010
2015	2015

Table A2.11: Tunisia - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
Arab Barometer	2011	67.06
Arab Barometer	2013	51.71
World Values Survey	2013	61.08
Afrobarometers	2013	64.08
Afrobarometers	2015	68.17
Arab Barometer	2016	65.08
Arab Barometer	2019	76.46

Electoral calendar		
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**	**Local Election**
2009	2009	2010
2011	2011	2018
2014	2014	
2019	2019	

Table A2.12: Turkey - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
World Values Survey	1990	28.54
World Values Survey	1996	13.37
World Values Survey	2001	44.16
World Values Survey	2007	36.78
CSES	2011	16.14
World Values Survey	2012	23.30
CSES	2015	21.27
CSES	2018	18.15

Electoral calendar		
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**	**Local Election**
2014	1987	1989
2018	1991	1994
	1995	1999
	1999	2004
	2002	2009
	2007	2014
	2011	2019
	2015 Jun	
	2015 Nov	
	2018	

Table A2.13: Yemen - data available

Survey	Date	Missing / Sample size
Arab Barometer	2011	65.42
Arab Barometer	2013	45.25
World Values Survey	2014	50.70
Arab Barometer	2019	41.50

Electoral calendar	
Presidential Election	**Legislative Election**
2006	2003
2012	

A3   Iraq, Turkey and Algeria at a glance

Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics of Algeria, Iraq and Turkey

	TURKEY		IRAQ		ALGERIA	
DEMOGRAPHICS						
Population, million	53.9 (W.B. 1990)	83.4 (W.B. 2019)	26.3 (W.B. 2004)	39.3 (W.B. 2019)	31.8 (W.B. 2002)	43.0 (W.B.2019)
Population growth		0.45% (W.F. 2020 est.)		2.16% (W.F. 2020 est.)		1.52% (W.F. 2020 est.)
Ethnicity	Turkish (70-75%) Kurdish (15-20%) Other (7-12%, including Arab, Circassian, Iranian)		Arab (70-80%) Kurdish (15-20%) Other (5-10%, including Turkmen, Assyrian, Black, Yazidi)		Arab (70-75%) Amazigh (20-25%) Other (<1%)	
Religion	Muslim (90-99%: Sunni 80% Shia - Alevi 9-14% Shia - Ja'fari & Alawi 5%) Christians (<1%) Jews (<1%)		Muslim (95-98%: Shia 64-69% Sunni - 29-34%) Christians - 1% Others - 4-5 %		Muslim (99%, predominantly Sunni) Other (<1%) (W.F.)	
Age structure	0-14: 23.41% 15-24: 15.67% 25-54: 43.31% 55-64: 9.25% 65 +: 8.35% (W.F. 2020 est.)		0-14: 37.02% 15-24: 19.83% 25-54: 35.59% 55-64: 4.23% 65 +: 3.33% (W.F. 2020 est.)		0-14: 29.58% 15-24: 13.93% 25-54: 42.91% 55-64: 7.41% 65 +: 6.17% (W.F. 2020 est.)	
ECONOMY						
GDP (PPP curr. US$ billion)	0.459 (W.B. 1990)	2, 316 (W.B. 2018)	0.240 (W.B. 2004)	0.419 (W.B. 2018)	0.296 (W.B. 2002)	0.496 (W.B. 2018)
GDP per capita (PPP curr; US$)	8, 518 (W.B. 1990)	27, 875 (W.B. 2019)	9, 134 (W.B. 2004)	11, 332 (W.B. 2019)	9,294 (W.B. 2002)	11, 820 (W.B. 2019)
Unemployment Rate	8.21% (W.D.I. 1991)	13.5% (W.D.I. 2019)	9.1% (W.D.I. 2004)	12.8% (W.D.I 2019)	25.9% (W.D.I 2002)	11.7% (I.L.O. 2019)
Unemployment Youth Age (15-24)	15.25% (W.D.I 1991)	23.7% - 20.2% (W.D.I. 2019- W.F. 2020)	17.4% (W.D.I. 2004)	25.1%- 25.6% (W.D.I. 2019- W.F. 2020)	45.8% (W.D.I. 2002)	29.5%-39.3% (W.D.I. 2019 - W.F. 2020)
INEQUALITY & POVERTY						
Gini index	41.4 (W.B. 2002)	41.9 (W.B. 2018)		29.5 (W.B. 2012 est.)		27.6 (W.B. 2011 est.)
Distribution of Pre-Tax National Income						
Bottom 50% share	7.9% (W.I.D. 1990)	14.6% (W.I.D. 2016)		15% (Alvaredo et al. 2007)		20.7% (W.I.D. 2017)
Middle 40% share	30.7% (W.I.D. 1990)	31.5% (W.I.D. 2016)		32% (Alvaredo et al. 2007)		42% (W.I.D. 2017)
Top 10% share	61.5% (W.I.D. 1990)	53.9% (W.I.D. 2016)		53% (Alvaredo et al. 2007)		37.3% (W.I.D. 2017)
National Poverty Rate (% of population)	18.6% (W.B. 2005)	13.9% (W.B. 2017)		18.9% (W.B. 2012)		5.5% (W.B. 2011)
GOVERNANCE						
Corruption Perception Index (0-100) Transparency International Lower score denotes higher corruption	41 (1995)	39 (2019, #91/180)	21 (2004)	20 (2019, #162/180)	26 (2003)	35 (2019, #106/180)
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) Estimates range approximately. between - 2.5 and + 2.5						
Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism	-1.3 (1996)	- 0.8 / - 1.3 (2002 / 2018)	-3.2 (2004)	-2.6 (2018)	- 1.6 (2002)	- 0.8 (2018)
Voice and Accountability	-0.1 (1996)	-0.8 (2018)	-1.6 (2004)	-1.0 (2018)	-1.0 (2002)	-1.0 (2018)
Rule of Law	-0.1 (1996)	-0.3 (2018)	-1.8 (2004)	-1.8 (2018)	-0.6 (2002)	-0.8 (2018)

Source: W.B. denotes World Bank Indicators, W.I.D: World Inequality Database,
W.F.: 2020 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook
Blank cells denotes no data available

Table A3.2: Worldwide Governance Indicators (metadata)

Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism	The index 'measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism'.
Rule of Law	The index 'captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence'.
Voice and Accountability	The index 'captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media'.

Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues". *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430*

A4   The Egyptian case

Egypt has not been investigated in this work given the poor quality of the data available with respect to party choice. In the Arab Barometer survey conducted in June 2011, respondents were asked for whom they would vote for if presidential elections were to be held the following day. A striking result is that no respondent cited the name of Mohammed Morsi who would be elected the following year, neither expressed support for the other Muslim Brotherhood leader, Khairat al-Shater, who initially ran for the party before M. Morsi candidacy. This is however not surprising as the Islamist movement was banned under Mubarak ruling and that its legalization with the revolution led to a creation of a party, Freedom and Justice Party, that gained an official status only in early June 2011. Moreover, while the FJP had announced that they were standing for parliamentary elections in April of the same year, they initially did not aim at contesting presidential ones.

In 2013, 84,11 percent of respondents declared that no party represented their aspiration in the Arab Barometer survey. While the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brothers came as the second answer, it gathers only 5.77 percent of the sample. There is then no statistical power left for carrying an analysis (the sample size is of 1, 196 respondents). The following results are then extracted from a survey carried by the Afrobarometer in the same year with slightly better quality in terms of missing data for the vote variable. Party choice expressed by respondents are displayed in A4.1.

Table A4.1: Party choice in Egypt in 2013 (Afrobarometer)

Party choice	Sample share (survey data)	Vote share (elections of 2012)
Democratic Alliance For Egypt	**11.51%**	**37.5%**
Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood)	10.92 %	
Dignity Party	0.34 %	
Ghad Al-Thawra Party	0.25 %	
National Salvation Front (secularist)	**15.46%**	20.9%
Egyptian Bloc	N/A	*8.9%*
The Revolution Continues Alliance (leftist, Nasserist)		*2.8%*
Popular Current Party	7.90 %	
Popular Socialist Alliance Party	0.42 %	
Center-left, liberal		*N/A*
Conference Party	3.28 %	
Constitution Party	1.51 %	
Ahmad Shafiq	1.43 %	
New Wafd Party	0.92 %	9.2%
Islamist Bloc (Salafist)	**3.53%**	27.8%
Al Nour (Light Party)	2.52 %	
Flag Party	0.76 %	
The Homeland Party	0.25 %	
Islamic moderate	**3.2%**	*N/A*
Strong Egypt Party	2.44 %	
Al Wasat (New Center Party)	0.76 %	3.7%
Missing	64.71 %	
Other	1.60 %	10.1%
Sample size	1, 090	
Total		100%

Source: Afrobarometer survey and 2012 elections results according to Al-Ahram newspaper.
Note: the table shows the support expressed for political parties grouped by main coalitions in Egypt, among the sample surveyed in 2013. Vote share received in the parliamentary elections of 2012 are provided for information.

Table A4.2: Complete structure of the vote in Egypt, 2013

	Democratic Alliance for Egypt	National Salvation Front	Islamic Moderate	Islamist Bloc	Other
		Share of Votes Received			
Gender					
Woman	30.21%	46.56%	1.37%	10.49%	0.76%
Man	37.32%	35.14%	3.93%	8.55%	2.05%
Age					
Below 25	35.79%	33.09%	4.15%	15.58%	3.16%
25-35	31.39%	42.09%	4.34%	8.66%	1.02%
35-55	35.33%	34.88%	0.91%	8.48%	1.88%
55+	32.15%	48.79%	1.70%	8.33%	0.38%
Income Group					
Bottom 50%	39.08%	36.76%	1.90%	11.05%	0.46%
Middle 40%	30.78%	41.70%	3.17%	9.25%	2.36%
Top 10%	24.44%	55.03%	2.11%	6.79%	0.67%
Employment Status					
Employed	39.19%	33.33%	1.96%	8.93%	2.29%
Unemployed	16.26%	37.18%	18.26%	20.07%	0.00%
Inactive	29.41%	50.51%	1.63%	9.53%	0.53%
Turnout Intention					
Did not vote	0.00%	31.46%	0.00%	45.68%	0.00%
Voted	33.65%	41.67%	2.51%	9.28%	1.34%
Interest in Politics					
Not at all interested	64.16%	35.84%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Not very interested	32.10%	53.42%	0.00%	9.59%	0.00%
Somewhat interested	33.47%	44.29%	1.62%	7.30%	1.37%
Very interested	31.23%	36.94%	4.01%	12.51%	1.65%
Degree of Political Activism					
None	27.71%	45.87%	3.21%	9.41%	1.96%
Having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration	45.01%	32.59%	0.98%	10.11%	0.00%
Rural/Urban					
Urban	21.76%	53.35%	0.85%	8.75%	1.87%
Rural	40.26%	34.49%	3.47%	10.17%	1.00%
Confidence in Political Parties					
Great / Some or limited	33.32%	41.57%	2.49%	9.64%	1.32%
Occupation					
Farmer	43.46%	29.63%	1.44%	9.77%	0.00%
Inactive	24.96%	52.71%	3.06%	9.82%	0.62%
Professional / Employer	40.16%	35.14%	1.22%	7.17%	2.84%
Trader / Worker	35.31%	35.73%	3.90%	11.18%	1.14%

Source: Authors' elaboration using Egyptian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2017 period (?). Vote shares by group are those reported in surveys and may not match exactly official election results.

A   Turkey Appendix

Table A0.1: Survey Data Sources for Turkey

Turkey - Survey Data Sources			
Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
1990	World Values Survey	WVS	1,030
1996	World Values Survey	WVS	1,907
2001	World Values Survey	WVS	3,401
2007	World Values Survey	WVS	1,346
2011	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	CSES	1,109
2012	World Values Survey	WVS	1,605
2015	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	CSES	1,086
2018	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	CSES	1,069

Source: Authors' elaboration.
Note: the table shows the surveys used in the section, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

A1   Turkish Politics before 1946

When the Republic of Turkey is proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, the country has already gone through a half-century electoral process. The Ottoman Empire initiated its Constitutional Periods (1877-1879 and 1879-1920) by setting up an electoral law in 1877 which was mainly retained by the Turkish Republic (Kayali, 1995). The 1908 elections are the first ones contested by well-defined political parties and they are also considered by most scholars to be pretty fair (Hanioğlu, 2010). It would thus be slightly misleading to start any retrospective of Turkish party system with the 1946 elections as it is usually the case. One would rather argue that a long-term perspective may be worth of further investigation, especially for capturing potentially long-lasting cleavages.

On the other hand, there are good reasons for starting with the 1946 elections. The newborn Republic established *de facto* a single-party authoritarian and presidential regime around the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People's Party – CHP] of Atatürk. The organization, identified as the founding party of the State, kept dominating the government and the local administrations until the end of World War II, without letting room for any opposition to institutionalize. One should nevertheless

mention here that some temporary multi-party interludes did take place in the aftermath of the Republic settlement, between November 1924 and June 1925 following internal splits in the CHP and between August and November 1930 by the will of Atatürk himself who wanted to establish "a most loyal opposition". Both also revealed opposition along ethnic and religious dimensions which would be revived at the end of the Cold War: Kurdish unrest and political Islam. However, both attempts were inconclusive, and the opposition was quickly silenced [53].

While the 1924 Constitution did account for a representative body under the form of a Parliament, the CHP reigned with almost no counterpowers as the few seats kept for Independent MPs were reserved to candidates who had proven their loyalty to the regime. Yet, it is still important to bear in mind that the formalization of the features required by a multiparty system did happen ahead of the political liberalization of the country pressured by the US as a counterpart of the Marshall Plan. It is the 1924 Constitution which lifts the tax requirement for being eligible to vote and sets the minimum age to 18. General Elections were regularly hold every four years, without interruption and with high turnout throughout the period, while the Republic also enacted the enfranchisement of women as early as in 1930 [54]. It is thus not within a land virgin of any political debate shaped through the lens of political competition that the multiparty elections of 1946 took place.

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[53]For an analysis of these interim periods within a political cleavages frame see Bermek (2019a)
[54]1930 for municipal elections while full voting rights were granted in 1934.

A2 Additional figures supporting the country-section

A2.1 A multiparty system challenged by new players

Table A2.1: Voters participation in Turkish general elections

Year	Voter Turnout
1950	89.3 %
1954	88,6 %
1957	76.6 %
1961	81.4 %
1965	71.3%
1969	64.3 %
1973	66.8 %
1977	72.4 %
1983	92.3 %
1987	93.3 %
1991	83.9 %
1995	85.2 %
1999	87.1 %
2002	79.1 %
2007	84.2 %
2011	83.2 %
2015 (June)	83.92%
2015 (November)	85.18 %
2018	86.22 %

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Yüksek Seçim Kurulu* (Supreme Election Council of the Republic of Turkey)

Vote for DSP/SHP/CHP by position on a left-right scale

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the center-left (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by self-assessed position on a left-right scale.

Figure A2.1

A2.2   A new role for the religious cleavage in the secular Republic?

Vote for centre-left (SHP / DSP) and the CHP by religiosity (practices)

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and by the CHP, by religiosity (measured by service attendances or frequence of pray). No data available in 2011.

Figure A2.2

The composition of the electorate by religiosity (self-description)

Figure A2.3

Income distribution among non-religious people

Figure A2.4

Age structure of non-religious people

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the age structure of the Turkish adult population that described itself as non-religious.
No data available in 2018. The data source changes in 2011.

Figure A2.5

Education attainment distribution among non-religious people

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education groups of the Turkish adult population that described itself as non-religious. No data is available in 2018. The data source changes in 2011.

Figure A2.6

A2.3   The rise of an "inverted" class cleavages?

Source: World Bank Indicators

Figure A2.7: Evolution of poverty rate in Turkey

Source: World Inequality Database

Figure A2.8: Evolution of inequality in Turkey in terms of distribution of pre-tax national income share

Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP by income quintile

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties and the AKP after 2007 by income quintile.

Figure A2.9

Vote for Kurdish parties by income group

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish by income group in the Turkish adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.10

Vote for centre-left parties and the CHP by income group

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by income group in the Turkish adult population, and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.11

Vote for right and Islamic among the upper class

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and voters that identified as upper class with respect to other voters supporting right and Islamic parties. In 2015 the upper class comprises those who declared several forms of capital accumulation (residence, property, bonds, savings).

Figure A2.12

Vote for right and Islamic parties by interest in politics

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right (DYP/ANAP), Islamic parties and the AKP by interest declared in politics. No data available in 2011 and 2015.

Figure A2.13

Vote for centre-left and the CHP by interest in politics

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-left (DSP/SHP) the CHP by interest declared in politics. No data available in 2011 and 2015.

Figure A2.14

A2.4   Education divide

The composition of the electorate by education

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Turkish adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.15

Vote for right and Islamic parties among educated women

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by right and Islamic parties among women, according to the highest educational attainment..

Figure A2.16

Vote for right and Islamic parties among highly-educated religious voters

Legend:
- Religious voters with primary or secondary level of education
- Religious voters with tertiary level of education

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by right and Islamic parties among voters self-describing themselves as a religious person, according to their highest educational attainment. No data available in 2018.

Figure A2.17

Vote for centre-left and CHP among the top 10% by education level

Legend:
- Top 10% earners with primary or secondary level of education
- Top 10% earners with tertiary level of education

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by centre-left parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP among top 10% earners, according to their highest educational attainment.

Figure A2.18

Vote for centre-right (ANAP/DYP) and AKP by education group

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-right parties (ANAP/DYP) before 2007 and by the AKP after that date, by education group.

Figure A2.19

Vote for centre-left (DSP/SHP) and CHP by education group

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the centre-lef- parties (DSP/SHP) and the CHP by education group.

Figure A2.20

A2.5   Gender vote gap

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by right and Islamic parties by gender.

Figure A2.21

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the right and the Islamic parties before and after controlling for education, income, age, employment and marital status, region and religiosity.

Figure A2.22

A2.6   Generational cleavage

The composition of the electorate by age

Below 25 ■ 25-35 ■ 35-45 ■ 45-60 ■ Above 60

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of age groups in the Turkish adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.23

Decomposition of abstention by age

■ Below 25 ■ 25-35 ■ 35-45 ■ 45-60 ■ 60+

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the age structure of the Turkish adult population that reported having voted in the last elections. No data available before 2011.

Figure A2.24

Age structure of voters of Islamic parties and the AKP

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the age structure of the Turkish adult population that voted for Islamic parties (RP/FP) or the AKP after 2007.

Figure A2.25

Age structure of voters of centre-left parties and the CHP

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the age structure of the Turkish adult population that voted for centre-left parties (SHP/ DSP) and the CHP.

Figure A2.26

A2.7 The regional cleavages and the "Kurdish question"

Spatial disparities: Income

GDP per capita in US dollars, 1997
744 - 1734
1734 - 2734
2734 - 3695
3695 - 4980
4980 - 7882

0   250   500 km

Source: Turkish Statistical Institut (TUIK), data collected and harmonized by Avital Livny

Figure A2.27: Geographical distribution of income per capita in 1997

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Islamic parties, and after 2007 by the AKP by regions.

Figure A2.28

Regional composition of income quintiles, 1990

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 1990.

Figure A2.29

Regional composition of income quintiles, 2018

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2018.

Figure A2.30

Spatial disparities: Education

Source: Turkish Statistical Institut (TUIK), data collected and harmonized by Avital Livny.

Figure A2.31: Geographical concentration of university graduates in Turkey in 2018

Source: Turkish Statistical Institut (TUIK), data collected and harmonized by Avital Livny.

Figure A2.32: Geographical concentration of lower-educated population in Turkey in 2018

Figure A2.33

Figure A2.34

Spatial disparities: Religiosity

Source: Self-reported religiosity from KONDA's monthly Barometer series (2010-2015). The religiosity variable is coded into four items: non-believer, believer, religious, devout. Data collected by Avital Livny.

Figure A2.35: Geographical distribution of the 'devout' population in Turkey

Source: Self-reported religiosity from KONDA's monthly Barometer series (2010-2015). The religiosity variable is coded into four items: non-believer, believer, religious, devout. Data collected by Avital Livny.

Figure A2.36: Geographical distribution of the 'non-believer' population in Turkey

Ethnic cleavage: the 'Kurdish question'

Linguistic composition of Turkish regions, 2018

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of language spoken at home by region in 2018.

Figure A2.37

Party choice of the Kurdish speaking population

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of the party choice among Kurdish speaking population. No data available in 1991 and 1999.

Figure A2.38

Vote for Kurdish parties by language spoken at home

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish parties by language spoken at home. No data available in 1991 and 1999.

Figure A2.39

A3   Electoral maps

Largest party by province between the CHP and the AP
(in terms of votes share) - 1977 elections

CHP
AP

Source: Author's computation based on official elections results.

Figure A3.1: Electoral map of the 1977 general elections

Figure A3.2: Electoral map of the 1995 general elections

Figure A3.3: Electoral map of the 2002 general elections

Source: Author's computation based on official elections results.

Figure A3.4: Electoral map of the 2018 general elections

Table A3.1: Regression results for the religious cleavage in Turkey

| 1991-2018	Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP in Turkey			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Devout voters	0,146***	0,130***	0,155***	0,083***
	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,010)
Education level (baseline: Primary)				
Secondary		-0,089***	-0,072***	-0,040***
		(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,011)
Tertiary		-0,177***	-0,158***	-0,070***
		(0,015)	(0,015)	(0,016)
Gender: Woman			0,074***	0,025**
			(0,009)	(0,011)
Income (standardized)				-0,010**
				(0,005)
Employment status				
Unemployed				0,024
				(0,018)
Inactive				0,029**
				(0,012)
Marital status: Married / Living in couple				0,050***
				(0,011)
Position on the left-right spectrum (standardized)				0,160***
				(0,004)
Age				-0,002***
				(0,000)
Time fixed effect	0,013***	0,015***	0,014***	0,013***
	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Adjusted R-squared	0,1038	0,117	0,1223	0,2312
R-squared	0,1039	0,1172	0,1225	0,2317
No. observations	20 131	19 606	19 606	16 985

Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) conducted between 1990 and 2018. Degree of secularism denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Source:

Table A3.2: Regression results for the income divide in Turkey

1991-2018	Vote for Islamic parties and the A...			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(...
Bottom 50% of earners	0,073***	0,033***	0,034***	0,02(
	(0,009)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,0...
Education (scale aligned with CSES)		-0,099***	-0,096***	-0,04
		(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,0(
Age		-0,001***	-0,001***	-0,0(
		(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,0(
Gender: Woman			0,020**	0,04...
			(0,009)	(0,0...
Degree of secularism (reverse of religiosity, standardized)				-0,0...
				(0,0(
Employment status				
Unemployed				0,01...
				(0,0...
Inactive				0,02...
				(0,0...
Position on the left-right spectrum (standardized)				0,15...
				(0,0(
Time fixed effect	0,013***	0,015***	0,015***	0,01...
	(0,000)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,0(
Number of observations	19 374	19 256	19 256	14 8...

Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems) conducted between 1990 and 2018. Degree of secularism
denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A3.3: Regression results for the education cleavage in Turkey

1990-2018	Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP in Turkey			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher-educated voters (top 10%)	-0,131***	-0,102***	-0,097***	-0,023
	(0,015)	(0,016)	(0,016)	(0,016)
Income (standardized)		-0,032***	-0,032***	-0,017***
		(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)
Gender: Woman			0,039***	0,047***
			(0,007)	(0,008)
Degree of secularism (standardized)				-0,055***
				(0,004)
Employment status				
Unemployed				0,011
				(0,015)
Inactive				0,031***
				(0,009)
Position on the left-right spectrum (standardized)				0,157***
				(0,003)
Age				-0,001***
				(0,000)
Time fixed effect	0,013***	0,013***	0,012***	0,012***
	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Number of observations	36 915	34 901	34 901	26 833
Adjusted R-squared	0,0798	0,082	0,0171	0,2284
R-squared	0,0799	0,082	0,0172	0,2286
No. observations	20 131	19 606	19 606	16 985

Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) conducted between 1990 and 2018. Degree of secularism denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A3.4: Regression for the generational cleavage in Turkey

1990-2018	Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Voters aged 18-24 years old	0,006	0,033*	0,036**	0,067***
	(0,017)	(0,017)	(0,018)	(0,023)
Education		-0,102***	-0,087***	-0,038**
		(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,015)
Gender: Woman		0,023*	0,012	0,047**
		(0,013)	(0,015)	(0,022)
Income (standardized)			-0,021***	-0,009
			(0,007)	(0,009)
Employment status				
Unemployed			-0,004	0,037
			(0,028)	(0,035)
Inactive			0,024	0,042**
			(0,017)	(0,021)
Degree of secularism (reverse of religiosity, standardized)				-0,087***
				(0,009)
Degree of political activism (standardized)				-0,031***
				(0,010)
Degree of interest in politics (standardized)				-0,005
				(0,009)
Time fixed effect	0,013***	0,015***	0,014***	0,019***
	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,002)
Number of observations	7 321	7 314	6 800	4 158

Notes: Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey, Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer) conducted between 2004 and 2019. Degree of secularism denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A3.5: Regression results for the ethno-regional cleavage in Turkey

2007-2018	Vote for Islamic parties and the AKP		
Region: South Eastern Anatolia	0,029	0,107***	0,034
	(0,026)	(0,030)	(0,032)
	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
Language at home: Kurdish		-0,193***	-0,223***
		(0,032)	(0,034)
Education (scale aligned with CSES)			-0,124***
			(0,015)
Gender: Woman			0,072***
			(0,019)
Income (standardized)			-0,047***
			(0,011)
Age			-0,001**
			(0,001)
Time fixed effect	-0,003	-0,003	-0,002
Number of observations	3 514	3 388	3 064

Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems) conducted between 1990 and 2018. Degree of secularism
denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

B   Iraqi Appendix

Table A0.1: Survey Data Sources for Iraq

Iraq - Survey Data Sources			
Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
2004	World Values Survey	WVS	2,325
2006	World Values Survey	WVS	2,701
2011	Arab Barometer	WVS	1,234
2013	World Values Survey	WVS	1,200
2019	Arab Barometer	Arab Barometer	2,461

Source: Authors' elaboration.
Note: the table shows the surveys used in the section, the source from which these surveys
can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

A1   Iraqi political parties: landscape and classification

Figure A1.1: Main actors in Iraqi Politics by ethno-religious identity

Ethnic identity	ARAB									KURD			
Religious identity	**SHIA**				**MIXED**				**SUNNI**				
Election date	Dawa	Badr Organisation	ISCI	Saadrist	Iraqi Communist Party	Secular socialist movement	Wifaq (Allawi)	Hiwar (Al-Mutlaq)	IIP	KDP	PUK	KIU	Goran
2005 January	United Iraqi Alliance				People's Union		Iraqi List		Boycott	Democratic Patriotic		N/A	N/A
2005 December	United Iraqi Alliance				Iraqi National List			Hiwar (Iraqi National Dialogue Front)	Tawafuq (Iraqi Accord Front)	Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan		KIU	N/A
2010	State of Law Coalition (Al-Maliki)	National Iraqi Alliance			People's Union	Al-Iraqiya (Iraqi National Movement)			Tawafuq	Kurdistani List		KIU	Goran
2014	State of Law Coalition (Al-Maliki)	Al-Muwatin		Al-Ahrar	Civil Democratic Alliance		Al-Wataniya	Al-Arabiya	Muttahidoon (Uniters for Reform)	KDP	PUK	KIU	Goran
2018	State of Law Coalition (Al-Maliki) / Victory Alliance (Abadi)	Fatah Alliance	Al-Hikma	Saairun (Alliance Towards Reform)		Civilized Alliance	Al-Wataniya		Muttahidoon / Sunni List by Governorate	KDP	PUK	KIU	Goran

Source: Author's computation

Figure A1.2: Main actors in Iraqi Politics by ethno-religious identity (official votes' share by elections)

Ethnic identity	ARAB									KURD			
Religious identity	SHIA				MIXED				SUNNI				
Election date	Dawa	Badr Organisation	ISCI	Saadrist	Iraqi Communist Party	Secular socialist movement	Wifaq (Allawi)	Hiwar (Al-Mutlaq)	IIP	KDP	PUK	KIU	Goran
2005 January	48,19%				0,83%		13,82%		Boycott	25,79%		N/A	N/A
2005 December	41,20%				8%			4,10%	15,10%	21,70%		1,30%	N/A
2010	24,22%		18,15%	unknown (no seat)				24,72%	2,59%	14,59%		2,12%	4,13%
2014	24,14%		7,55%	7,05%	0,86%	0,80%	4,38%	2,43%	5,23%	7,98%	6,54%	1,27%	3,47%
2018	6,98%	10,92%	13,16%	5,27%	14,38%	0,80%		6,01%	3,55% / 4,89%	8,41%	5,93%	0,95%	2,08%

Source: Author's computation

# A2   Additional figures supporting the country-section

A2.1   A democratic transition shaped by ethno-religious sectarianism

Table A2.1: Voters participation in Iraqi parliamentary elections

| Year	Voter Turnout
2005 (January)	53.31 %
2005 (December)	79.63 %
2010	62.40 %
2014	60.53 %
2018	44.85 %

 Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Inter-Parliamentary Union (PARLINE) database

A2.2   Social and spatial inequalities in Iraq


Source: Author's computation. SHDI database from the Global Data Lab (Institute for Management Research, Radboud Universty)

**Figure A2.1:** Social disparities in Iraq in terms of Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) in 2004

Figure A2.2: Social disparities in Iraq in terms of Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) in 2018

Figure A2.3

A2.3   The persistence of sectarian voting

Vote for Kurdish lists by region

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Kurdish lists by region. North-Eastern Iraq corresponds to the Kurdistan region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni and Southern Iraq Shia. Baghdad is mixed.

Figure A2.4

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by region

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by region. North-Eastern Iraq corresponds to the Kurdistan region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni and Southern Iraq Shia. Baghdad is mixed.

Figure A2.5

Vote for anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-sectarian lists by degree of religious practices. Bottom 50% denotes very religious (regular basis) and top 10% denotes none or hardly no religious practices.

Figure A2.6

The composition of income groups by employment status, 2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by employment status of the Iraqi adult population in 2018.

Figure A2.7

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by employment sector

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Shia Islamic lists by employment sector.

Figure A2.8

A2.4   What place for the income gradient in a sectarian vote?

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income group.

Figure A2.9

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by income quintile


Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by income quintile.

Figure A2.10

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by income group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by income group.

Figure A2.11

Vote for Sunni Islamic lists among economic elites

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated earners and the share of other voters voting for Sunni Islamic lists, before and after controlling for ethno-sectarian identity.

Figure A2.12

A2.5   An absence of cleavages beyond sectarian identity?

Education

The composition of the electorate by education

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Iraqi adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.13

Figure A2.14

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Shia Islamic lists by education group.

Figure A2.15

Figure A2.16

Age

Figure A2.17

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular and anti-sectarian lists by age group.

**Figure A2.18**

Vote for Shia Islamic lists by age group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Shia Islamic lists by age group.

Figure A2.19

Gender

Vote for secular lists by gender

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure A2.20

Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among those experiencing significant economic difficulties

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters who declared experiencing significant economic difficulties and the share of older voters voting for the secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-sectarian dynamics.

Figure A2.21

Figure A2.22

Figure A2.23

A2.6   A system in crisis?

The decomposition of abstention by socioeconomic characteristics

Decomposition of abstention by income group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group.

Figure A2.24

Decomposition of abstention by age group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voted in the last elections by age group and its evolution over time. Results have been reweighted with official turnout rates.

Figure A2.25

Decomposition of abstention by gender

Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by gender.

Figure A2.26

Decomposition of abstention by education group

Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having not voterd in the last elections by education group. Results have been reweighted with official turnout rate.

Figure A2.27

Political activism

Decomposition of abstention by political activism

Legend: ■ None   ■ Having signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration at least once

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the decomposition of abstentionist voters by political activism degree measured as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration. No data available in 2004.

Figure A2.28

**Decomposition of political activism by income group**

Legend: ■ Bottom 50%   ■ Middle 40%   ■ Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration by income group.

Figure A2.29

Decomposition of political activism by region

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the regional decomposition of political activism (defined as having already signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration) in the Iraqi adult population. North-Eastern Iraq corresponds to the Kurdistan region. Middle-Northern is predominantly Sunni and Southern Iraq Shia. Baghdad is mixed.

Figure A2.30

Share of population politically active by region and income groups in 2005

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having signed a petition and/ or attended a demonstration by income group, by region, in 2005.

Figure A2.31

Share of population politically active by region and income groups in 2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having signed a petition and/ or attended a demonstration by income group, by region, in 2018.

Figure A2.32

Vote for secular lists by political activism

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of politically active and the share of other voters (defined as having already signed and/or attended a demonstration) voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure A2.33

Trust deficit towards the government over time

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of trust expressed in the goverment in the Iraqi adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A2.34

Decomposition of lack of trust in the government by income group

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of voters who declared having absolutely no confidence in the government by income group.

Figure A2.35

Vote for secular lists among voters not trusting the government

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters having no confidence in the government and the share of other voters voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for other ethno-religious identity.

Figure A2.36

Table A2.2: Regression results for the income divide in Iraq

2004-2018	Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists in Iraq			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Bottom 50% of earners	0,029	0,087***	0,070***	0,058**
	(0,022)	(0,022)	(0,024)	(0,025)
Region		0,091***	0,045***	0,051***
		(0,010)	(0,012)	(0,013)
Degree of religiosity (standardized)			0,197***	0,190***
			(0,028)	(0,029)
Education level (baseline: Primary)				
Secondary				-0,056**
				(0,027)
Tertiary				-0,036
				(0,036)
Gender: Woman				0,002
				(0,022)
Number of observations	2 120	2 120	1 819	1 817

Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Arab Barometer) conducted between 2004 and 2019. Degree of secularism denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A2.3: Regressions results for the Education cleavage in Iraq

2004-2018	Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists in Iraq			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher-educated voters (top 10%)	0,025*	0,022	0,019	0,028*
	(0,015)	(0,015)	(0,022)	(0,016)
Region		-0,047***	-0,074***	-0,042***
		(0,003)	(0,004)	(0,003)
Degree of religiosity (standardized)			0,119***	
			(0,009)	
Income (standardized)				0,023***
				(0,003)
Age				0,001***
				(0,000)
Number of observations	27 649	27 649	12 906	26 755

Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and
Arab Barometer) conducted between 2004 and 2019. Degree of secularism denotes the
intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

C   Algeria Appendix

Table A0.1: Survey Data Sources for Algeria

Algeria - Survey Data Sources			
Year	Survey	Source	Sample size
2002	World Values Survey	WVS	1,282
2013	Arab Barometer	Arab Barometer	1,220
2014	World Values Survey	WVS	1,200
2019	Arab Barometer	Arab Barometer	2,332

Source: Authors' elaboration.
Note: the table shows the surveys used in the section, the source from which these surveys
can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

Table A2.4: Age and gender divides in Iraq

2004-2018	Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists in Iraq		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voters aged 18-24 years old	-0,006	-0,003	-0,024
	(0,019)	(0,018)	(0,019)
Gender: Woman	0,016	0,013	-0,025
	(0,016)	(0,016)	(0,020)
Region		0,134***	0,144***
		(0,006)	(0,006)
Income (standardized)			0,029***
			(0,010)
Education			-0,018
			(0,011)
Employment status			
Unemployed			0,069**
			(0,029)
Inactive			0,085***
			(0,021)
Time fixed effects	-0,007***	-0,000	-0,000
	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Number of observations	5 551	5 551	5 326

Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey and Arab Barometer) conducted between 2004 and 2019. Degree of secularism denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

A1   Additional figures supporting the country-section

A1.1   Algeria's transition to democracy: from post-colonial authoritarianism to an 'electoral autocracy'

Table A1.1: Voters participation in Algerian elections

Year	Turnout (Parliamentary)	Turnout (Presidential)
1991	59.0 %	
1995		75.0 %
1997	65.6 %	
1999		60.2 %
2002	46.2 %	
2004		57.7 %
2007	35.5 %	
2009		74.6
2012	43.1 %	
2014		51.7%
2017	37.1 %	
2019		39.9 %

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), *Conseil Constitutionnel* (Algerian Constitutional Council)

Table A1.2: Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2002 (without reweighing)

			Share of Votes Received (%)		
	FLN	**RND**	**Islamic Opposition (Ham as /MRN)**	**Secular Opposition (FSS/RCD)**	**Other**
Initial Distribution of Party Choice	26.29%	4.68%	12.55%	7.10%	2.81%
Overall Vote Share	49.20%	8.76%	23.50%	13.28%	5.26%
Gender					
Woman	53%	11%	19%	13%	4%
Man	46%	7%	27%	14%	6%
Age					
Below 25	39%	11%	28%	16%	6%
25-35	48%	11%	25%	9%	6%
35-55	51%	8%	22%	16%	4%
55+	67%	4%	16%	8%	5%
Education Group					
Bottom 50%	59%	6%	19%	13%	4%
Middle 40%	41%	12%	28%	13%	6%
Top 10%	34%	8%	29%	18%	11%
Income Group					
Bottom 50%	54%	8%	22%	11%	5%
Middle 40%	45%	11%	27%	14%	4%
Top 10%	39%	13%	26%	19%	3%
Employment Status					
Employed	48%	10%	24%	14%	5%
Unemployed	54%	6%	23%	10%	7%
Inactive	51%	7%	24%	13%	5%
Martial Status					
Not Married	46%	9%	28%	13%	4%
Married	52%	9%	20%	14%	5%
Turnout Intention					
Did not vote	0.00%	31.46%	0.00%	45.68%	0.00%
Voted	33.65%	41.67%	2.51%	9.28%	1.34%
Language					
Arabic or Algerian Dialect	53%	9%	26%	6%	5%
French or Other	38%	31%	6%	19%	6%
Tamazight	28%	2%	10%	55%	5%
Interest in Politics					
Not at all interested	60%	6%	23%	3%	8%
Not very interested	46%	10%	25%	15%	5%
Somewhat interested	46%	7%	26%	17%	3%
Very interested	54%	8%	13%	17%	8%
Degree of Political Activism					
None	52%	9%	24%	11%	5%
Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration	44%	9%	23%	19%	6%
Rural/Urban Index					
Urban	48%	9%	24%	15%	4%
Rural	50%	9%	23%	11%	7%

Source: Authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2002. Vote shares by group are those reported in surveys and do not match exactly official election results. 46,57% of the initial sample is dropped when focusing on party choice results.

Table A1.3: Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2013 (without reweighing)

Share of Votes Received (%)						
	FLN	**RND**	**Islamic Opposition (Ham as /MRN)**	**Secular Opposition (FSS/RCD)**	**Worker's Party (PT)**	**Other**
Initial Distribution of Party Choice	16.89%	6.80%	3.36%	3.69%	3.52%	2.63%
Overall Vote Share	45.78%	18.44%	8.00%	10.00%	9.56%	8.22%
Gender						
Woman	47%	20%	5%	6%	14%	8%
Man	47%	15%	10%	13%	7%	8%
Age						
Below 25	34%	22%	5%	16%	15%	9%
25-35	39%	18%	7%	9%	16%	10%
35-55	33%	25%	13%	10%	11%	9%
55+	76%	6%	2%	8%	2%	5%
Education Group						
Bottom 50%	59%	12%	6%	10%	4%	8%
Middle 40%	34%	19%	11%	10%	16%	10%
Top 10%	28%	35%	6%	8%	20%	3%
Income Group						
Bottom 50%	53%	11%	3%	13%	9%	11%
Middle 40%	45%	12%	4%	15%	14%	9%
Top 10%	25%	28%	10%	8%	14%	15%
Employment Status						
Employed	32%	25%	11%	11%	13%	9%
Unemployed	37%	14%	2%	12%	18%	17%
Inactive	62%	11%	6%	9%	6%	6%
Martial Status						
Not Married	42%	17%	6%	10%	17%	8%
Married	50%	17%	9%	10%	5%	8%
Language						
Arabic or Algerian Dialect	49%	17%	8%	8%	10%	8%
Tamazight	18%	15%	2%	38%	14%	13%
Interest in Politics						
Not at all interested	52%	13%	3%	10%	12%	10%
Not very interested	46%	17%	7%	12%	10%	8%
Somewhat interested	46%	20%	13%	6%	8%	7%
Very interested	20%	53%	14%	12%	0%	0%
Degree of Political Activism						
None	53%	14%	6%	10%	10%	8%
Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration	37%	22%	10%	11%	11%	9%
Rural/Urban Index						
Urban	44%	18%	8%	10%	10%	10%
Rural	53%	16%	7%	9%	10%	5%
Turnout						
Did not vote	37%	20%	5%	16%	16%	6%
Voted	49%	17%	8%	9%	9%	9%
Region						
Alger	39%	14%	7%	15%	5%	20%
East Highlands	49%	19%	14%	5%	11%	1%
Middle Highlands	61%	9%	0%	4%	12%	14%
North Eastern Region	46%	30%	8%	4%	9%	2%
North Middle Region	32%	14%	3%	22%	14%	15%
North Western Region	61%	15%	6%	5%	10%	4%
South Region	54%	13%	5%	14%	8%	7%
Western Highlands	39%	28%	26%	0%	4%	3%

Source: Authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2013. Vote shares by group are those reported in surveys and do not match exactly official election results. 63.12% of the initial sample is dropped when focusing on party choice results.

Table A1.4: Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2014 (without reweighing)

Share of Votes Received (%)						
	FLN	**RND**	**Islamic Opposition (Ham as /MRN)**	**Secular Opposition (FSS/RCD)**	**Worker's Party (PT)**	**Other**
Initial Distribution of Party Choice	13.83%	9.00%	7.25%	8.75%	5.33%	7.34%
Overall Vote Share	26.86%	17.48%	17.31%	16.34%	10.36%	10.68%
Gender						
Woman	27%	16%	13%	16%	15%	11%
Man	27%	19%	21%	17%	5%	11%
Age						
Below 25	16%	20%	15%	23%	9%	16%
25-35	17%	20%	25%	14%	9%	13%
35-55	20%	18%	18%	17%	14%	12%
55+	53%	13%	12%	12%	7%	2%
Education Group						
Bottom 50%	30%	15%	17%	18%	10%	8%
Middle 40%	22%	22%	17%	13%	10%	15%
Top 10%	24%	15%	19%	17%	13%	11%
Income Group						
Bottom 50%	25%	19%	18%	12%	12%	13%
Middle 40%	30%	16%	18%	19%	9%	8%
Top 10%	23%	17%	12%	27%	11%	9%
Employment Status						
Employed	21%	20%	22%	15%	8%	12%
Unemployed	16%	16%	18%	27%	14%	10%
Inactive	34%	15%	13%	16%	12%	10%
Martial Status						
Not Married	23%	17%	19%	15%	11%	14%
Married	30%	18%	16%	17%	10%	8%
Language						
Arabic or Algerian Dialect	30%	17%	19%	11%	10%	12%
French or Other	25%	19%	13%	6%	25%	13%
Tamazight	17%	20%	11%	39%	9%	5%
Interest in Politics						
Not at all interested	31%	11%	13%	21%	12%	12%
Not very interested	21%	18%	19%	21%	11%	9%
Somewhat interested	28%	21%	19%	11%	11%	11%
Very interested	29%	26%	20%	10%	6%	8%
Degree of Political Activism						
None	24%	18%	18%	18%	10%	10%
Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration	37%	14%	15%	11%	11%	12%
Rural/Urban Index						
Urban	31%	17%	18%	12%	10%	12%
Rural	22%	18%	17%	21%	10%	10%
Turnout						
Did not vote	13%	15%	18%	28%	6%	18%
Voted	31%	18%	17%	14%	12%	8%
Region						
Alger	35%	22%	16%	10%	8%	8%
East Highlands	31%	14%	24%	8%	11%	10%
Middle Highlands	29%	14%	50%	0%	0%	7%
North Eastern Region	33%	13%	7%	3%	17%	23%
North Middle Region	17%	20%	16%	31%	8%	7%
North Western Region	26%	18%	7%	14%	18%	16%
South Region	33%	12%	19%	12%	6%	17%

Source: Authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual
characteristics in 2014. Vote shares by group are those reported in surveys and do not match
exactly official election results. 48,50% of the initial sample is dropped when focusing on party choice
(22,08% of items are missing while 26,42% of respondents replied "Abstention" to the question).

Table A1.5: Complete structure of the vote in Algeria, 2019 (without reweighing)

	FLN	RND	Islamic Opposition (Ham as /MRN)	Secular Opposition (FSS/RCD)	Worker's Party (PT)	Other
Share of Votes Received (%)						
Initial Distribution of Party Choice	24.79%	5.06%	1.93%	3.47%	0.99%	5.71%
Overall Vote Share	64.65%	13.20%	5.03%	9.06%	2.57%	
Gender						
Woman	61%	10%	6%	9%	2%	11%
Man	58%	13%	5%	9%	3%	12%
Age						
Below 25	65%	9%	1%	7%	2%	15%
25-35	52%	11%	5%	7%	3%	19%
35-55	60%	13%	5%	11%	3%	8%
55+	64%	11%	6%	7%	1%	10%
Education Group						
Bottom 50%	58%	11%	7%	9%	2%	12%
Middle 40%	62%	12%	3%	8%	3%	11%
Top 10%	53%	16%	5%	13%	5%	9%
Income Group						
Bottom 50%	61%	10%	4%	12%	1%	11%
Middle 40%	65%	10%	3%	8%	2%	11%
Top 10%	62%	12%	4%	9%	3%	10%
Employment Status						
Employed	59%	14%	4%	10%	3%	10%
Unemployed	50%	11%	3%	9%	3%	21%
Inactive	61%	11%	7%	8%	2%	10%
Martial Status						
Not Married	55%	12%	4%	7%	2%	17%
Married	61%	12%	6%	10%	3%	9%
Language						
Arabic or Algerian Dialect	30%	17%	19%	11%	10%	12%
French or Other	25%	19%	13%	6%	25%	13%
Tamazight	17%	20%	11%	39%	9%	5%
Interest in Politics						
Not at all interested	62%	4%	5%	8%	1%	18%
Not very interested	57%	16%	5%	10%	4%	8%
Somewhat interested	66%	13%	6%	6%	2%	6%
Very interested	42%	12%	5%	8%	9%	25%
Degree of Political Activism						
None	61%	11%	5%	6%	2%	13%
Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration	55%	13%	5%	14%	4%	8%
Rural/Urban Index						
Urban	60%	12%	5%	9%	3%	11%
Rural	56%	12%	5%	8%	2%	16%
Turnout						
Did not vote	63%	12%	2%	4%	5%	14%
Voted	57%	11%	13%	9%	3%	7%
Region						
Alger	58%	13%	8%	7%	4%	10%
East Highlands	58%	9%	10%	11%	2%	9%
Middle Highlands	48%	17%	6%	14%	3%	12%
North Eastern Region	72%	10%	4%	4%	2%	7%
North Middle Region	55%	12%	1%	18%	2%	12%
North Western Region	60%	12%	5%	1%	4%	18%
South Region	33%	9%	13%	30%	0%	15%
Western Highlands	63%	12%	10%	0%	6%	7%

Source: Authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of votes received by the main political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2019. Vote shares by group are those reported in surveys and do not match exactly official election results. 58,50% of the initial sample is dropped when focusing on party choice.

Table A1.6: Structure of no response and self-reported abstention in Algeria, 2019

	Feels close to no party	Did not vote in the last elections
Overall Vote Share	58.05%	79.23%
Gender		
Woman	57%	77%
Man	53%	76%
Age		
Below 25	74%	92%
25-35	65%	84%
35-55	51%	76%
55+	42%	58%
Education Group		
Bottom 50%	53%	76%
Middle 40%	55%	77%
Top 10%	62%	79%
Income Group		
D1	62%	76%
D2	52%	75%
D3	51%	75%
Ethno-regional Identity		
Living in Kabylia	54%	75%
Not living in Kabylia	57%	69%

Source: Authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: The table shows the average share of respondents having reported no party choice
to the question "Which of the existing parties is closest to representing your political,
social and economic aspirations?" and of those who reported having not voted
in the last election by selected individual characteristics in 2019.

A1.2   Socio-spatial disparities in Algeria and ethnic cleavages

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by region in 2019.

Figure A1.1

Figure A1.2: Regions of Algeria (author's computation)

Note: Algeria is administratively divided into 58 provinces (wilayah). The grouping of provinces realized are my own and created for accounting with the heterogeneity in the definition of geographical location across data sources.

The composition of income groups by regions (Littoral vs Hinterlands), 2019

Littoral   Hinterlands

**Source**: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in the littoral wilayats (Jijel, Skika, Annaba, El Taref, Chlef, Tipasa, Boumerdès, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Tlemcen, Témouchent, Oran, Mostaganem and Alger) and the hinterlands ones in 2019.

Figure A1.3

Figure A1.4: Spatial disparities in terms of evolution of SHDI between 2002 and 2018
Source: Global Data Lab (Institute for Management Research, Radboud Universty)
Note: 'The Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) is a translation of the UNDP's official HDI (hdr.undp.org) to the subnational level. As such, it is an average of the subnational values of three dimensions: education, health and standard of living. In its official version defined at the national level, these dimensions are measured with the following indicators: Education measured with the variables 'Mean years of schooling of adults aged 25+' and 'Expected years of schooling of children aged 6'; health measured with 'Life expectancy at birth' and standard of living measured with 'Gross National Income per capita (PPP, 2011 US$)' https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/about/

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.5

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN parties by region. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taking as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.

Figure A1.6

The composition of income groups by language spoken at home, 2002

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income groups by the language spoken at home of the Algerian adult population in 2002.

Figure A1.7

The composition of income groups in Kabylia by wilayah, 2019

Source: authors' computations using Algeria political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of income in Kabylia decomposed by its wilayah in 2019. Bord Bou Arreridj is not sampled in 2019.

Figure A1.8

A1.3   A renewed cross-class alliance in a two-party ruling

Vote for FLN by income quintiles

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income quintiles.

Figure A1.9

Vote for FLN by income group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by income group.

Figure A1.10

Vote for RND by income quintiles

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income quintiles.

Figure A1.11

Vote for RND by income group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the RND by income group.

Figure A1.12

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by FLN by income quintile.

Figure A1.13

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by RND by income quintile.

Figure A1.14

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN and the RND by income quintiles.

Figure A1.15

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voters and the share of other voters voting for the FLN and the RND.

Figure A1.16

**Without reweighing the distribution of party choice among the electorate**

Figure A1.17

Figure A1.18

A1.4   The relevance of a generational cleavage

The composition of the electorate by employment status

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of employment status in the Algerian adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A1.19

The composition of employment by gender

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of individuals employed by gender in the Algerian adult population and its evolution over time.

Figure A1.20

The composition of employment by age

Figure A1.21

Generational gap: vote for the FLN among the youth

Figure A1.22

The composition of emigration thought by age groups, 2019

Figure A1.23

Vote for FLN by religious practices

Figure A1.24

Vote for FLN by religiosity (self - description)

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the FLN by religiosity (measured by self-description as religious or non religious).

Figure A1.25

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by religiosity (religious practices)


Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamics opposition parties by degree of religiosity, measured by religious practices.

Figure A1.26

A1.5   A discredited electoral system?

The composition of the electorate by turnout

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of turnout in the Algerian adult population and its evolution over time. No information is available in 2002.

Figure A1.27

Decomposition of abstention by age groups

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by age groups. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.28

Participation in civil society organizations by age groups

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the age groups distribution of the respondents affiliated with a civil society organization (including labor unions and religious groups, excluding political parties membership) in the Algerian adult population.

Figure A1.29

A1.6   Structure of the abstention

Decomposition of abstention by income quintiles

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by income quintiles. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.30

Decomposition of abstention by income group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by income group. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.31

Decomposition of abstention by education group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share those who declared having not voted in the last elections by education group. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.32

Decomposition of abstention by political activism

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by political activism. No data available in 2002.

Figure A1.33

Decomposition of abstention by participation in civil society

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of those who declared having not voted in the last elections by membership in civil society organizations (excluding political parties memberships). No data availble in 2002 and 2014.

Figure A1.34

A2   Structure of the vote for other Algerian parties

by income

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by income quintiles

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by income quintiles.

Figure A2.1

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income quintiles

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by income quintiles.

Figure A2.2

## by education

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by education group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamic opposition parties by education group.

Figure A2.3

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group


Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by education group.

Figure A2.4

by age

Vote for Islamic opposition parties by age group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Islamics opposition parties by age group.

Figure A2.5

Vote for secular opposition parties (FFS/RCD/PT) by age group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the secular opposition parties FFS/RCD/PT by age group.

Figure A2.6

Table A2.1: Regression results for the income divide in Algeria

2002 - 2017	Vote for the FLN and the RND in Algeria		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 10% of earners	-0,021	-0,035	-0,046
	(0,044)	(0,045)	(0,048)
Education (standardized)		0,018	0,009
		(0,013)	(0,016)
Employment status			
Unemployed		-0,015	-0,065
		(0,037)	(0,040)
Inactive		0,030	0,040
		(0,028)	(0,031)
Age		0,006***	0,005***
		(0,001)	(0,001)
Gender: Woman			-0,021
			(0,031)
Degree of secularism (reverse of religiosity, standardized)			-0,004
			(0,014)
Region			-0,005
			(0,006)
Time fixed effect	-0,004**	-0,007***	0,046***
	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,008)
Number of observations	5 330	5 309	3 367

Notes: Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey, and Arab Barometer)
conducted between 2002 and 2019. Degree of secularism
denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A2.2: Regression results for the generational cleavage in Algeria

2002-2017	Vote for the FLN in Algeria		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
Voters aged 18- 24 years old	-0,102***	-0,108***	-0,072***
	(0,021)	(0,022)	(0,028)
Education (standardized)		-0,036***	-0,028**
		(0,010)	(0,012)
Income (standardized)		-0,028**	-0,014*
		(0,014)	(0,007)
Employment status			
Unemployed		-0,010	-0,035
		(0,027)	(0,031)
Inactive		0,100***	0,131***
		(0,023)	(0,026)
Gender: Woman			-0,045*
			(0,025)
Degree of secularism (reverse of religiosity, standardized)			-0,018
			(0,011)
Region			-0,007
			(0,005)
Time fixed effect	-0,008***	-0,012***	0,023***
	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,007)
Number of observations	5 846	5 311	3 369

Notes: Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey, and Arab Barometer) conducted between 2002 and 2019. Degree of secularism
denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Table A2.3: Regression results for abstention in Algeria

2012-2017	Abstention in Algeria		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
Voters aged 18- 24 years old	0,268***	0,221***	0,186***
	(0,023)	(0,028)	(0,030)
Education (standardized)		0,027**	0,031***
		(0,011)	(0,011)
Income (standardized)		0,022	0,023*
		(0,014)	(0,014)
Employment status			
Unemployed		0,176***	0,189***
		(0,033)	(0,034)
Inactive		0,056**	0,047*
		(0,023)	(0,026)
Political activism : Signed a petition and/or attended a demonstration			-0,049*
			(0,025)
Gender: Woman			-0,011
			(0,025)
Degree of secularism (reverse of religiosity, standardized)			0,012
			(0,011)
Region			0,036***
			(0,005)
Time fixed effects	0,060***	0,064***	0,069***
	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)
Number of observations	3 478	2 677	2 539

Notes: Notes:Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported
in brackets. Data are from several waves of opinion surveys (World Value Survey, and Arab Barometer)
conducted between 2002 and 2019. Degree of secularism
denotes the intensity of religious practices measured by service attendances or frequency of pray.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively